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The purpose of this study is to investigate whether government intervention in 
Indonesian State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) governance, financial, and regulatory 
framework impact on performance. The SOEs studied are more than 50 per cent 
government-owned, which gives the Government ultimate control over all 
investigated variables. Agency theory is used as the basis to construct the 
hypotheses. 
The entire 125 commercial listed and non-listed SOEs (Persero Terbuka and 
Persero) from nine major industry groups in Indonesia are examined using data from 
2007-2009 SOE financial reports and government documents as the main sources. 
Government involvement in SOE has been classified into three areas (governance, 
financial, and regulatory framework) for the development of hypothesis.The thesis 
investigates ten independent variables where the government may through either its 
majority shareholding or control of the regulatory setting, influence SOE 
performance. Semi-structured interviews are conducted with thirteen respondents to 
corroborate findings of the main analysis.  
The analysis concludes that external appointment of the Chairperson, establishment 
of board sub-committees and the dividend payout policy are positively related to 
SOE financial performance. In contrast, the acceptance of government subsidies or 
payments for public service obligation (PSO) decreases SOE financial performance. 
Externally appointed CEOs, Government related appointments to the Board of 
Directors and Commissioners, Government imposed asset transfers and legal cases 
initiated for non-compliance with regulation do not significantly affect SOE 
performance. The findings above were supported in small to medium size SOEs 
(equal to or less than 10 trillion rupiah of total assets) however were not broadly 
applicable to large SOEs (more than 10 trillion rupiah of total assets). 
A number of the hypotheses were not supported. The reasons are articulted in the 
conclusion of the thesis. We speculate that this may be due to governance regulations 
in Indonesia not being properly enforced or implemented and hence not resulting in 
the improvement of profitability that normally be expected. 
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The interview results supported the quantitative findings noting strong government 
involvement in the operation of SOEs various governance, financial and regulatory 
activities.  
This study contributes to the existing theory in several ways. It introduces an 
Indonesian specific definition of commercially oriented SOEs that differentiates 
them from other government owned enterprises. It also clearly defines the multiple 
ways in which the government actions impact on SOE performance. Several 
variables exploring government involvement are introduced in this study. These 
variables include government transfer payments in the form of subsidy or public 
service obligation, dividend payout policy, asset transfer from the central 
government to SOEs and legal cases resulting from non-compliance with 
regulations.  
From a practical viewpoint, the interview results confirm that SOEs governance 
practice is highly influenced by government, primarily through the actions of the 
responsible minister. It further suggests that those actions are largely driven by a 
political agenda. Several mechanisms or regulations to resolve this political 
intervention could be applied, including open bidding and transparent recruitment 
processes.  
Both the quantitative and semi-structured interview results point to government 
transfers to SOEs influencing performance negatively. The interview data suggests 
that effective communication with SOE management is needed to understand and 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background  
Indonesia‟s geographical position in South East Asia, its tropical climate and 
abundant natural resources has made it an attractive proposition for foreign 
investment, as its three and half centuries of colonisation testifies (Kementerian 
BUMN 2012). With the additional advantage of a younger rather than aging 
population and a strong fiscal base, it is predicted to become one of the rapidest 
emerging economies in the world along with Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) 
(Indonesia‟s middle class 2011; Farrell 2012; Balakrishnan 2013). Despite the impact 
of the global financial crisis, Indonesia is well- placed to maintain its solid economic 
growth rate for years to come. 
The literature draws attention to two key periods of economic downturn in 
Indonesian history from 1830-1860 and 1929-1967 that underlies the current 
economic position of the country (van Zanden and Marks 2012). Crop exportation 
dominated the economic activity in the first period, 1830-1860, overseen by the 
Colonial administration (Kementerian BUMN 2012). However, despite rapid export 
growth and economic openness in the market, the period was characterised by a 
collapse in productivity. The second downturn period, 1929-1967, were years that 
included the Great Depression, the Second World War and the transition of Indonesia 
to independence.  
Nationalisation of Dutch companies and the establishment of state-owned companies 
to balance the dominance of Dutch owned companies took place in this period and 
became important milestones. Ironically, however, the economic problems peaked 
during this phase due to budget deficits, money supply and uncontrollable inflation. 
Apart from these two periods, there are also periods of very rapid economic growth 
where productivity increased significantly, one of which was the period between 
1968-1998. Known as the pro-growth era, the government opened the door to 
international competition during this time. Petroleum was in a booming market with 
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the state-owned energy sector as the most dominant player. Ironically, this did not 
prevent a bankruptcy in 1976 due to large-scale inefficiency and mismanagement 
(van Zanden and Marks 2012). Van Zanden and Marks also document growth in the 
agricultural sector, transportation sector, the industrial sector (in particular industries 
in natural resources such as oil, forests, and technology) during this period. It should 
also be noted, State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were active in almost all industries. 
The role of SOEs in the national economy can be identified in its contribution to the 
economy. The capital expenditure and operatioal expenditure of SOEs have been a 
significant portion to the GDP of the country over the years. Every year SOEs 
become one of the direct financial sources of Central Government‟s revenue 
generated from dividend, tax, and privatisation. Likewise, indirect contribution of 
SOEs to the overal economy of the state can be found in the form of partnership and 
community development program. Figure 1.1 illustrates the trend of SOE‟s 
contributions to the national economy in 2004- 2009.    
 
Figure 1. 1: SOE’s contributions to the Indonesian Economy in 2004-2009 
 
Source: Kementerian BUMN (2012, p. 134 and 136).  
 
 
From the description above, it can be concluded that in every stage of economic 
growth or decline, SOEs have played important roles in the country.  
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1.2. Indonesian State Owned Enterprise (SOEs)   
SOEs have played a strategic role in laying the foundation of the national economy 
since Indonesian independence (Kementerian BUMN 2009; Rafick and Amir 2010). 
SOEs were originally a continuation of the Dutch private companies operating in 
Indonesia, most of which were public utility companies (Moeljono 2004). Their 
dominance continued until the 1950s and ended when the nationalisation program 
took place in 1967. In 1967, following the Dutch ending their occupation of 
Indonesia, all Dutch companies operating in Indonesia were nationalised and taken 
over by the Indonesian government. These companies, which became state-owned 
enterprises, have changed the Indonesian economy significantly. About 600 
companies are nationalised, comprising the plantation, mining, commerce, banking, 
insurance, telecommunications and construction sectors (Kementerian BUMN 2012). 
In addition to taking over the Dutch companies, the government also established 
public service companies, such as airlines, sea transportation, and banks, in order to 
offset the dominance of the former Dutch companies. This move was also aimed at 
pioneering new economic sectors that had not existed previously. In 1960, the 
government issued a presidential decree governing SOEs designed to expand its 
position in the national economy, Seven years later, the government issued another 
decree to reform SOEs institutionally. Profit-oriented companies were segregated 
from non-profit ones and known as Perusahaan Jawatan (Perjan), Perusahaan 
Umum (Perum) and Perusahaan Perseroan (Persero). The position of the SOEs 
shifted   to become the main driver of the national economy and social capital. SOEs 
contributed to government through taxes and dividends, as well as contributing 
directly to the economy in terms of capital expenditure (BUMN Track 2012; 
Muchayat 2010, 83; Sugiharto 2008, 178).   
As in many other countries, Indonesian SOEs are considered vital to the national 
economy, contributing directly to GDP, employment, and market expansion. The 
collective total assets of the SOEs accounted for IDR 2,234 trillion in 2009 
(Kementerian Keuangan 2010). Market capitalisation of 16 publicly listed SOEs (two 
of them minority owned by the Government) comprised nearly 31.57 per cent of total 




However, the long history of SOE performance suggests that the overall financial 
performance of SOEs has been very low (Nugroho and Wrihatnolo 2008; Rafick and 
Amir 2010). Unhealthy aggregate performance can be seen from the slow growth of 
overall Return on Assets from 1.6 per cent (1992) to 1.9 per cent (2009) suggesting a 
very low level of efficiency of asset utilisation to generate profits. Moeljono (2004, 
6) describes this low SOE productivity as „asset value destruction‟ (Moeljono 2004, 
4). Likewise, the ROE trend has fluctuated in 18 years with the extreme drop at 
negative 16.4 per cent in 1998 and 6.5 per cent in 2009, post the global financial 
crisis. 
There are some positive stories about SOE performance however, centring on the 
performance of 26 SOEs. According to the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise 
(Ministry of SOE), the total net income of the 141 SOEs was equal to approximately 
US$ 10.83 billion, of which about US$ 10.05 billion (or 92.80 per cent) was 
generated by 26 SOEs (Kementerian BUMN 2011). The figure suggests another 
issue for SOEs, which is the large performance gap between 26 SOEs and the 
remaining 115 SOEs. Moreover, Muchayat (2010, 121)  concludes that among those 
high performing SOEs, the level of competition in the industry still needs to be tested 
as their financial result is below that of the private sector.  
The literature discusses many factors contributing to the low performance of 
Indonesian SOEs. Prior investigations have pinpointed Government control over the 
SOEs as one of the major causes of low performance (Hill 1982; Hamzah 2007; 
Laksanawan 2008). Bureaucratic interference, such as pricing policy and regulations 
on purchasing and contracting, planning and investment, could inhibit SOEs from 
operating independently and competitively. A study by the World Bank identifies 
poor business operation and management as the root of the issues. High employment, 
low productivity, and low quality of goods and service are aspects that have also 
contributed to poor execution (Nugroho and Wrihatnolo 2008). Habir, Sebastian, and 
William (2002) also add the mentality of corruption, collusion, and nepotism as a 
reason for poor management practices. Meanwhile, Rafick and Amir (2010) claim 




Supporting the findings by the World Bank, Muchayat (2010) concludes that poor 
performance of SOEs is caused by three main reasons. First is the low level of 
productivity as a result of high fixed costs. According to Muchayat, SOEs have the 
tendency to explore all business sectors, rather than stay focussed on their core 
business. Secondly, the absence of effective research and development in SOEs has 
resulted in a lack of innovation in product and market opportunities. Thirdly, the 
inability to produce goods and service that meets high quality, low cost and time 
delivery in the market (p.68). Discussions and arguments on the factors causing low 
performance in SOEs have led to a better understanding of the multi-dimensional 
factors contributing to the success of this national economic icon. However, 
Muchayat claims that corporate problems can be resolved by creating synergy 
between management and stakeholders; this requires a foundation of good corporate 
governance.   
 
1.3. SOEs, Government and Corporate Governance  
The practice of corporate governance in Indonesia has been a great challenge. Wu 
(2005, 160) gathered ratings on corporate governance at country level measured by 
three international consulting companies, namely PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), 
McKinsey  & Company and Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA). First, 
according to PWC ratings, the level of Indonesian corporate governance equals to the 
20
th
 position among 35 countries with the rating (68) higher than the average rating 
(61.29). The higher rating represents lower corporate governance standard, thus it 
shows that Indonesia is still below the international standard. Second, the Mc Kinsey 
ratings signify the average premiums that an investor is willing to pay for a company 
that is well-governed in a specific country. The result also infers that Indonesia is far 
below the average (ranked as the 25
th
 of the total 30 countries). Last, as for CLSA, 
the rating represents the weighted average on corporate governance key areas. 
According to the result comparison, Indonesia is positioned as the second lowest 
among 13 countries (37.3 far below the average of 51.76). Even though the ratings 
are constructed with certain perceptions by the surveyors, these are acceptable 
parameters to showcase corporate governance practice. Appendix A exhibits the 
Corporate Governance Ratings Comparison adopted from Wu.  
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More specifically, Muchayat (2010, 142) quotes from the Booz-Allen survey in 1998 
that Indonesia has the lowest corporate governance index in the East Asia region. 
The low score also reflected poor corporate governance in SOEs in areas such as 
procurement, recruitment of directors, and integrity and transparency issues.  
While an extensive literature review reveals a strong correlation between good 
corporate governance and successful business practice, it is interesting to examine 
the Indonesian experience and link it to the problems of low performing SOEs for the 
following reasons. First, from a business perspective, SOEs might be seen to be 
legally and financially overprotected by the Government. Highly inefficient SOEs 
have been maintained under special restructuring programs sustained by the 
Government. Second, although corporate governance regulations applying to SOEs  
have been introduced since 2002, studies continue to show that ineffective practice 
still exists (Syakhroza 2005). Didu (2011a) identifies that non-corporate intervention 
degrades the quality of SOE leadership due to outside intervention in the Board 
selection process. Third, one of the milestones of the SOE reform is the issuance of a 
Ministerial Decree on Good Corporate Governance
1
 that marks the start of good 
corporate governance practices by SOEs in Indonesia. However, there is no study 
undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulation. The examination of SOE 
corporate governance practice is hence important.  
The reform of SOEs commenced in 1998 and was executed in stages. The gist of the 
reform was to improve performance by relinquishing the Government‟s deep 
interference by means of introducing corporate governance practices (Laksanawan 
2008; Rafick and Amir 2010). One substantial milestone of the reform was the 
issuance of Ministerial Decree No. KEP/-117/M-MBU/2002 on the implementation 
of good corporate governance for SOEs issued in 2002 (Kementerian BUMN 2002). 
Under new legal arrangements, SOEs operations would be based mainly on three 
laws: the State-Owned Enterprise Law
2
, the Limited Corporation Law
3
, and the State 
Finance Law
4
. Based on these, the institutional relationship between SOEs and the 
Government can be described in at least three ways. First is the relationship of SOEs 
                                                 
1 Implementation of Good Corporate Governance for State-Owned Enterprise Minister of SOE Decree (Number 
.KEP-117/M-MBU/2002). 
2 The State-Owned Enterprise Law (Number  19/2003). 
3 The Limited Corporation Law (Number 40 Year 2007). 
4 The State Finance Law (Number 17 Year 2003). 
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and the Ministry of SOE as proxy shareholder. The minister represents the 
Government‟s voting rights in the General Meeting of the Shareholder (GMS) with 
power to control and supervise management‟s strategy and operations. Therefore, 
corporate related issues such as privatisation and SOE restructuring to liquidation are 
under the coordination of the Ministry of SOE. 
Second is the relationship between SOEs and the Ministry of Finance as ultimate 
shareholder and fiscal regulator or state treasurer. In this context, the Ministry of 
Finance as State Treasurer has the ultimate authority to determine measures such 
capital injection, privatisation, restructuring, and divestment as mentioned in the 
State Treasury Law
5
. Moreover, SOE and the Ministry of Finance also coordinate 
funding activities such as subsidy, public service obligation (PSO) funds, and 
dividend payouts (Sunarsip 2012a).  
Third is the relationship between the SOE and the respective line ministry as the 
regulator in the related industry or economic sector. This consists of various sectoral 
ministries such as the Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Transportation; Ministry of 
Agriculture; and Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. 
According to Moeljono (2004), such coordination leads to many consequences, one 
of which weakens the SOEs due to high levels of intervention from the Government.   
Moreover, in contrast with private companies, SOEs are bound to various regulations 
where private companies are not. Currently, the SOEs are bound to at least 22 laws 
(compared to eight laws for private firms). These laws, directly and indirectly, 
establish corridors that hinder the flexibility of SOEs to implement corporate 
strategy. Appendix B lists the 19 specific regulations for SOEs.  
With this type of legal and institutional arrangement, the relationship between SOEs 
and Government becomes very bureaucratic (Sunarsip 2012b). For instance, the 
State-Owned Enterprise Law states that in relation to funding activity for capital 
injection, a long due process has to be undertaken, which involves several stages 
from different government departments.  
                                                 
5 The State Treasury Law (Number 1 Year 2003). 
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Similar processes are found in the dividend payout policy area. Despite the reform, 
practice shows that government intervention still exists inhibiting competitiveness in 
the market (Hamzah 2007; Didu 2011b). For example, pressure from stakeholders 
such as politicians, bureaucrats, non-government organisations, local government, 
community leaders, press, or other power groups can be very difficult for SOEs to 
manage, particularly in the CEO and Chairperson selection process (Didu 2011a).  
A review of the literature on SOEs  shows an absence of study on the specific role of 
the Government in SOE governance practice. This thesis will therefore investigate 
the Government‟s various involvements in Indonesian SOEs.  
 
1.4. Research questions  
Governance of SOEs differs from that of the private sector. Boardman and Vining 
(1989) and Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) find the performance of publicly owned 
companies to be less profitable than that of private ones. Two plausible reasons are 
the social goals required of SOEs (Dornstein 1976; Lin, Cai and Li 1998; Chang 
2007; Nugroho and Wrihatnolo 2008; Siqueira, Sandler and Cauley 2009; Lu, Tao, 
and Yang 2010; Zhang and Rasiah 2013; Xiongyuan and Shan 2013) and 
government interference in the SOE business process and management (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997; Yuan, YongFeng, and Yi 2006; Ghosh and Whalley 2008; Lu, Tao, 
and Yang 2010; Hu and Leung 2012; Xiongyuan and Shan 2013). Nevertheless, the 
intervention of the Government in the governance system does not always result in 
negative consequence. Studies in Singapore (Feng, Sun, and Tong 2004; Chang 
2007) and China (Sun, Tong, and Tong 2002; Lu, Tao, and Yang 2010) have 
demonstrated that government interference has led to better company performance.   
The presence of corporate governance in improving corporate performance has been 
studied worldwide, yet there is no single uniformity (Solomon 2007) as countries 
throughout the world are distinguished by their respective governance system 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Robertson, Gilley, and Street 2003). The practice of 
governance in Indonesian SOEs is unique with government involvement at many 
levels. First, the Government is the major shareholder, by means of controlling the 
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General Meeting of the Shareholder (GMS). Second, the Government engages with 
SOEs in the context of its representation on the supervisory board (known as the 
Board of Commissioner/BOC). Third, the Government is the regulator of fiscal 
policy as well as sector related policy.  
This research will therefore investigate Government involvement in the SOE 
governance system. A specific question arising from this research is:  
Does the governance, financial and regulatory measures controlled by 
government impact on performance in Indonesian SOEs? 
While Indonesian SOEs are corporate entities which are fully or more than 50 per 
cent government-owned (State-Owned Enterprise Law), it gives the Government 
ultimate control involvement or majority control/involvement over all measures.  
 
1.5. Objectives of the study 
Utilizing agency theory, this thesis provides insight into various types of government 
intervention, directly and indirectly, in the operations of SOEs in Indonesia. 
Specifically, the objectives of the research study are as follows:  
1. To analyse the level of government ownership and its relationship with SOE 
performance. 
2. To examine the association between the General Meeting of Shareholders 
(GMS) attributes and SOE performance. 
3. To investigate the association between the Boards of Commissioner (BOC) 
attributes and SOE performance. 
4. To assess the association between the Central Government as financier and 
regulator and SOE performance. 
 
1.6. Significance of the Study  
The potential contributions of this study are three fold. First, this study focuses on 
the impact of Government intervention on governance practice of SOEs. Most 
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previous studies investigating SOEs in Indonesia focus on privatisation (Siagian 
2004; Laksanawan 2008; Sugiharto 2008), legal issues on corporate governance 
(Kamal 2008), BOC and corporate governance (Sari, Halligan, and Sutiyono 2010). 
Second, there is diversity among SOEs with regard to the company size, industry 
competitiveness, and economic sector. This calls for a more thorough analysis across 
SOEs. Previous studies on SOEs in Indonesia predominantly focussed on individual 
industries such as mining (Gillis 1982), 6 SOEs from textile (Hill 1982), 14 SOEs 
from construction (Pamulu 2010), and 8 SOEs from construction, energy, banking, 
and telecommunication and plantation industries (Sari, Halligan, and Sutiyono 2010). 
The fact that the SOEs range from very small to very large will limit the finding of 
those studies. This study examines 125 SOEs or the entire profit-oriented SOEs 
(SOE Persero and SOE Persero Terbuka) from all existing industrial sectors. Third, 
this study provides insight into government intervention in SOE governance practice 
through three different roles, namely the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS), 
Board of Commissioners (BOC), and Board of Directors (BOD). The results  will 
assist diverse stakeholders in obtaining a better understanding of the extent of good 
corporate governance practiced by SOEs and will contribute to the policy making 
process for continuing SOE governance reform in Indonesia. 
Therefore, this research expects to make a significant contribution to scholars and to 
business practice as explained below. 
1.6.1. Contribution to Theory  
This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by examining whether 
the entrenchment hypothesis can explain the impact of Government involvement on 
SOE performance. Taking into account existing governance attributes from common 
international practice and bringing in new attributes of Government involvement 
variables to be tested, this study expects to provide comprehensive data on SOEs 
governance practice in Indonesia following the SOEs reform process.  
In contrast, this study will take into account the full population of all industry type 
SOE Persero & Persero Terbuka. 
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Previous studies on SOEs in Indonesia have focused on SOE performance in specific 
industries (Hill 1982; Gillis 1982) and the impact of privatization on performance 
(Siagian 2004; Laksanawan 2008). They have also analysed legal aspects of SOEs 
with small samples using a qualitative case study approach (Setiawan 2007; Kamal 
2008; Sari, Halligan, and Sutiyono 2010).  
A gap in the literature exists in respect of non-privatised SOEs and the full extent of 
government involvement in these entities. Therefore, this study will be the first to 
examine non-privatized SOEs after the SOE reforms in Indonesia, with the full 
population of all industry type SOE Persero & Persero Terbuka. It will be the first 
study to include a number of governance attributes unique to Indonesia, including 
comprehensive measures of government involvement. The study further contributes 
to the corporate governance literature by examining whether the entrenchment 
hypothesis can explain the impact of Government involvement on SOE performance. 
1.6.2. Contribution to Practice  
This research provides insights into SOE governance practice. It will assist 
stakeholders, particularly the Government as the policy maker and the Parliament in 
obtaining a better understanding of the importance of good corporate governance for 
SOEs. It will allow stakeholders to understand the association between various 
governance related measures and performance of SOEs. Eventually, the outcome of 
this study will contribute to the policy making process for continuing SOE reform in 
Indonesia.  
 
1.7. Structure of the thesis 
Research into the Government‟s involvement in the business process as part of SOE 
governance is important, yet empirical evidence investigating this is extremely 
limited. This thesis attempts to fill this gap by investigating the involvement of the 
government in the operations of SOEs with regard to the governance, financial and 
regulatory framework.   
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This thesis is structured into seven chapters. Chapter 1 begins with introducing the 
background of the research. The chapter then describes research questions, research 
objectives, significance of the study, and the thesis structure is presented.  
Chapter 2 describes State-Owned Enterprises in the Indonesian context in depth. 
First, the definition and characteristics of Indonesian SOEs are presented. Following 
that, the SOEs financial performance and SOEs in industry competition are reviewed. 
The chapter also shows the chronology of SOE establishment in Indonesia and their 
governance structure. In addition, government involvement in the SOEs operation is 
also explained. 
Chapter 3 details the theoretical backgrounds, starting with the core belief of agency 
theory and corporate governance. Then the discussion extends to government 
involvement, both in the international and Indonesian context. Following that, it 
advances hypotheses derived from the literature.   
Chapter 4 illustrates in detail, sample selection followed by variable definition and 
measures.  
Chapter 5 reports the research findings from univariate analysis. It starts with 
informing the approach for univariate analysis. Then it discusses the dependent 
variable (Return on Assets). The next section describes each independent variable 
that is grouped into governance related involvement,  finance related involvement 
and regulatory related involvement. Finally, additional descriptive analysis on 
control variables is presented.  
The analysis is followed by Chapter 6 where findings from multivariate analysis are 
illustrated. To begin with, statistics for multivariate analysis and assumptions are 
reviewed. Then correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis are clarified. 
The next section analyses the semi-structured interview result. Detailed discussion on 
the three areas of government intervention is conducted followed by additional 
analysis on control variables. Lastly, sensitivity analysis to test the robustness is 
detailed.  
Finally, the last part of this thesis, Chapter 7, concentrates on the implications and 
limitation of the research. Recommendations for future study conclude this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2: STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN INDONESIA 
 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter describes SOEs in Indonesia. It begins with defining SOEs using the 
generally accepted legal context in Indonesia. It then discusses the establishment, 
history and progress of SOEs over time. The structure of this chapter is as follows: 
(1) defining state-owned enterprise; (2) SOE in industry competition; (3) history of 
establishment (4) the governance of SOE; (5) SOE and government; and (8) 
summary.   
 
2.2. Defining State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)  
The world has recognized the important role of SOEs in the economy of a country. 
Not only is an SOE one of the players in the competitive market, it can also function 
as an economy stabilizer. One of the most significant lessons from China‟s economic 
transition is that the reform of SOEs can have substantial effect on political and 
economic change in social welfare, financial institutions, and employment (Lin, Cai, 
and Li 1998, 422; OECD 2009, 3). This is explained by the domination of Chinese 
SOEs in every economic sector. With regard to privatising SOEs, empirical studies 
show that privatisation improves corporate efficiency and performance, leading to 
greater revenue collection by the government (OECD 2003). The OECD documents 
the success of privatisation programs across the majority of OECD member countries 
such as Australia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovak Republic (p. 27).  
The Indonesian Constitution stipulates that all economic sectors, which are important 
for prosperity, are to be controlled by the state. As this is the mandate, it is the duty 
of the government to control either through regulation or state ownership of certain 
businesses in order to build the wealth of the country. One of the policy measures 
taken to improve the economic control is to establish SOEs. 
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An SOE is characterised by at least two factors: it is owned by the state and the role 
it carries. According to the OECD (2009, 5), the term „state-owned enterprises‟ is 
defined as “enterprises where the state has significant control, through full, majority, 
or significant minority ownership” (OECD 2005). Similar to the accepted 
international definition, SOEs in Indonesia are one of the economic entities in the 
national economic system, in addition to private businesses and cooperatives. The 
Indonesian definition of SOEs is described in the State-Owned Enterprise Law as “a 
business entity which is fully or majority owned by the state through government‟s 
permanent investments”. By the State-Owned Enterprise Law, Indonesian SOEs fall 
into three categories: public corporation (Perusahaan Umum or Perum or SOE 
Perum), limited liability enterprises (Perseroan Terbatas or Persero or SOE 
Persero) and publicly listed limited liability enterprise (Perseroan Terbatas Terbuka 
or Persero Tbk or SOE Persero Tbk). The first category, SOE Perum is defined as 
fully owned by the Government whose operations are considered vital for the public. 
The SOE Perum is urged to make a profit even though the basis is not fully 
commercial. The latter two categories, SOE Persero and Persero Tbk  are classified 
as fully (majority) owned by the Government whose capital is divided into shares 
and all (or at least 51 per cent) owned by the Republic of Indonesia. Majority owned 
SOEs means a publicly listed SOE (known as Persero Terbuka or Persero Tbk). 
Both non-publicly listed SOEs and publicly listed SOEs operate on a fully 
commercial basis with their main objective to pursue profit.   
 
2.3. SOE History and the Picture of SOE Financial Performance  
The dynamics of SOEs in Indonesia are marked by the number of SOEs that change 
from time to time in accordance with economic change and demands nationally and 
internationally. Based on the time period, SOEs can be categorized into three types 
i.e. (1) SOEs in the Colonial era up to post–Independence Day (up to 1960); (2) 
SOEs in the New Order era (1960-1998); and (3) SOEs in the reform era. A detailed 




The first era was the post-nationalisation of Dutch-owned companies up to 1960.  
After the Dutch occupation ended, the Dutch‟s companies were handed over to the 
Indonesian Government (Kementerian BUMN 2012, 27). In 1958, companies were 
nationalised, which meant the Dutch-owned companies located in the territory of 
Indonesia became the full property of the Republic of Indonesia by law. About 600 
companies were nationalised, consisting of approximately 300 companies from the 
plantation sector, 100 companies from the mining sector, and the rest from trade, 
banking, insurance, communications, and construction (p.34). Laksanawan asserts 
that nationalisation was a blow for foreign capital investment in Indonesia and 
fundamental change in the structure of the economy (2008). Following the 
nationalisation policy, the government then began to establish some public 
corporations to overcome the dominance of the Dutch companies. Two years later, 
the issuance of a regulation
6
 marked the initial establishment of public corporations 
or SOEs as one of the significant milestones of the Indonesian economy.   
During the second era, the ”New Order era”
7
, there was a decline in the number of 
SOEs. As a result of the global financial crisis, the Indonesian economy was 
dependent upon the international financial or funding community such as the IMF, 
World Bank and foreign companies, which was interpreted as a doorway for a liberal 
economy. Then the government attempted to simplify the management of SOEs by 
issuing another law to restructure SOEs. Also, the new legal form of public 
corporations was introduced in 1969. The corporations were grouped into three, i.e. 
Perjan, Perum, and Persero, based on the different purpose of operations. The 
impact of these regulations was the restructuring of state enterprises to the total of 
233 companies (Kementerian BUMN 2012, 36).  
The third era, the “Reform era”
8
, marks a new approach of SOE development 
particularly in response to the global financial crisis and political change in 
Indonesia. The government marked another milestone by issuing the new law on 
State-Owned Enterprises, reforming the legal form of SOEs by only Perum, Persero 
and Persero Terbuka. With improvements in the overall national economy, the 
                                                 
6 Government Regulation as a Substitution of Law on Public Corporation (Number 19 Year 1960). 
7 The term “New Order era” is used to describe an era when Indonesian was led by the regime of President 
Suharto between 1966 to 1998.  
8 The term “Reform era”, also known as Post-Suharto era, is used to explain the era after President Suharto 
stepped down in 1998.   
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number of SOEs grew to 142 SOEs in 2011. Table 2.1 exhibits the growth on SOEs 
during the reform era. 
A growing number of SOEs as described above indicates an increased amount of 
equity, of which the largest amount comes from the Central Government fund. It is 
recorded as government capital investment or posted in the Central Government‟s 
financial statement as a permanent investment. The value of this capital investment 
as well as the growth has been substantial over time. Overall, there has been a steady 
increase of the total amount of investment by 58.28 per cent in only three years 
(2004 to 2007). However, it experienced a collapse of 13.26 per cent reaching US$ 
58.50 billion in 2008. The decline only occurred in one year as the trend gradually 
went up again until 2011 amounting US$ 83.24 billion. This value equals to 31.72 
per cent of the Central Government total assets as shown in the 2011 Balance Sheet 
indicating that massive amounts of Central Government economic resources are 
allocated permanently in the SOEs. Figure 2.1 below presents the upward trend of 
the permanent investment whereas Table 2.2 describes how significant the 
investment is to the finances of the Central Government.   
Table 2. 1: Growth of SOEs for 2005-2011 
Type of SOE 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
SOE Perum 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 
SOE Persero 114 114 111 113 113 111 109 
SOE Persero Tbk.  12 12 14 14 14 16 18 
Total SOEs 139 139 139 141 141 142 142 
 
Figure 2. 1: Trend of permanent investment on SOEs by central government for 
2004-2011 in US$ billion 
 
Source: Indonesian Central Government Financial Statements for 2004-2011 
(Kementerian Keuangan 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) 
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Table 2.2 exhibits the SOEs financial highlights from 1992 to 2009 showing that the 
value of total assets was in a steady upward trend over 8 years reaching almost up to 
eight times the size of total assets during the time. A dramatic fall of total equity 
occurred in 1998 due to the global financial crisis. However, the figure improved 
again afterwards. Total liabilities, on the other hand, experienced very steady growth 
over 18 years. This indicates the increasing performance of SOEs over time yet there 
is still a certain level of dependency due to a high level of leverage. It should be 
noted that the gradual increase of total assets over 8 years is consistent with the fast 
increase of total liabilities and slower increase of total equity suggesting that the 
SOEs overall performance was inefficient. 




(in billion US$) 
Total Assets 
(in billion US$) 
Total Permanent 
Investment Relative to 
Total Assets (in %) 
2004 42.61 91.02 46.81% 
2005 59.61 119.63 49.82% 
2006 66.36 135.85 48.85% 
2007 67.45 169.17 39.87% 
2008 58.50 185.64 31.51% 
2009 71.44 225.19 31.72% 
2010 74.17 272.75 27.19% 
2011 83.25 341.48 24.38% 
Source: Compiled from Indonesian Central Government Financial Statements for 
2004-2011 (Kementerian Keuangan, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011). 
 
Furthermore, Table 2.3 also presents the very low level of ROA and ROA growth 
from 1.6 per cent in 1992 to 1.9 per cent in 2009. The average ROA remains low 
every year (below 5%) suggesting that the level of efficiency of SOEs using its assets 
to generate profits was very low. Moreover, the ROE trend shows a higher rate yet 
increasing variability over 18 years. The most striking decline occurred in 1998 (at 
negative 16.4 per cent), which then skyrocketed in 1999 to 25.2%. One reason is the 
number of SOEs in plantation sectors experiencing windfall profits from rising 
commodities in US dollar (Nugroho and Wrihatnolo 2008, 26). This unstable figure 




Table 2.3: SOEs financial highlights, 1992-2009  
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of SOEs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 139 139 139 141 141
Total Asset
a  n.a. 129.79 132.31 142.99 143.73 147.03 42.95 77.35 102.63 78.99 100.55 135.78 132.44 135.11 158.95 188.89 202.24 214.64
Total Equity
a  n.a. 33.5 38.29 44.2 42.91 35.52 -8.49 7.23 13.96 12.64 29 45.55 43.38 44.56 50.24 56.58 54.61 55.14
Total Liabilities
a  n.a. 96.3 94.07 98.78 100.82 111.5 51.43 70.13 88.68 66.35 71.55 90.23 89.06 90.55 108.72 132.31 147.62 159.5
Profit After Tax
a  n.a. 1.86 2.08 3.25 3.01 2.52 1.39 1.82 1.58 1.79 2.76 2.97 3.7 4.61 5.56 7.39 6.9 8.94
Dividend
a  n.a. 0.62 0.51 0.45 1.2 1.48 0.46 0.88 1.05 0.96 1.35 1.14 1.1 2.16 2.51 3.18 2.69 n.a.
Sales
a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 745 839 1.137.6 962.1
Capex
a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 48 91 128.3 107.2
Opex
a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 672.1 748 1.028.4 833
ROA (%) 1.60 1.40 1.60 2.30 2.10 1.70 3.20 2.40 1.50 2.30 2.70 2.20 2.80 3.40 3.50 3.90 3.40 4.20
ROE (%) 5.90 5.50 5.40 7.40 7.00 7.10 -16.40 25.20 11.30 14.20 9.50 6.50 8.50 10.40 11.10 13.10 12.60 16.20
Dividend Payout (%) 31.60 33.30 24.40 13.70 40.00 58.90 33.10 48.30 66.20 53.30 49.00 38.40 29.60 46.90 45.10 43.00 39.00 n.a.
Leverage(%) 27.10 25.80 28.90 30.90 29.90 24.20 -19.80 9.30 13.60 16.00 28.80 33.50 32.80 33.00 31.60 30.00 27.00 25.70  
Note: 
a
 in US$ Billion.  




With regard to SOE overall performance, the Ministry of SOE records that of the 
US$ 271.87 billion of the total asset value, US$ 251.50 billion or 92.51 per cent is 
owned by the 26 largest SOEs. Similarly, the total net income of all SOEs is worth 
US$ 10.05 billion, of which 92.80 per cent is generated from the 26 SOEs 
(Kementerian BUMN 2010a). The description suggests that approximately 17.73 per 
cent are categorized as highly performing SOEs while the remaining 115 SOEs are 
low or contributed less to the overall SOE performance. Table 2.4 below describes 
the gap of the two groups.   
 
Table 2.4: Contributions of 26 largest SOEs in 2011  
 
 
In US$ billion Assets Equity Revenue Net Income 
26 largest SOEs 251.50 58.63 112.09 10.05 
Remaining 115 SOEs 20.37 9.11 11.88 0.78 
Total SOEs 271.87 67.75 123.97 10.83 
Source: Kementerian BUMN (2011) and DJKN (2011). 
 
Furthermore, as a reciprocal form of capital invested by Government to SOEs, SOEs 
contribute back to the state both directly to the Government and indirectly to the 
national economy. SOEs generate dividends, tax and cash flow as a result of 
privatisation, all of which are directly paid to the State Treasury accounts. Likewise, 
SOEs participate in driving the economy through the capital market, partnership in 
environmental conservation, funding for small to medium enterprises, public service 
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obligations, capital expenditure, and operating expenditure activities (Abubakar 
2011, 4; Kementerian BUMN 2011, 16). Table 2.5 provides information on SOE 
contributions to the national economy. It should be noted that the impact of SOE 
capital expenditure on growth in the real economic sector is considerable, with the 
total amount of SOE capital expenditure in 2009 at US$ 11.40 Billion.  
 
Table 2.5: SOE contribution to the national economy (in 2008-2010) in US$ billion  
 Contribution 
Fiscal Year 
2008 2009 2010 
Direct 
Contribution to 
the Government  
Dividend  2.61 3.03 3.39 
Tax  8.64 9.72 11.33 




Capital market capitalization  34.59 67.57 92.17 
Environmental conservation 
partnership 
0.15 0.21 0.33 
Funding for small to medium 
enterprises 
0.00 1.82 0.00 
Public service obligation 22.02 8.89 18.87 
Capital expenditure (CAPEX) 11.47 11.40 22.16 
Operating expenditure (OPEX) 92.11 88.35 104.91 
Note: Adapted from SOE contribution to the 2010 Economy (BUMN Track 2011, 
17; Kementerian Keuangan 2008, 2009, 2010).   
 
2.4. SOEs in Industry Competition  
As a driver of the national economy, SOEs participate in almost every industry. In 
infrastructure, such as roads, transportation, seaports, airports and 
telecommunication, and public utilities and services, such as electricity, gas, fuel, 
water, SOEs have been the dominant player and investor (Laksanawan 2008).   
The categorisation is regulated by a ministerial decree grouping the SOEs into 31 
sectors (DJKN 2011) comprising plantation; forestry; fishery; supporting agriculture; 
fertilizer; irrigation services; mining; energy; cement; defence; steel, manufacturing 
and engineering; dock and shipping; miscellaneous industry; paper; printing and 
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publishing; pharmaceutical; telecommunications and media; electricity; ports; 
airport; transportation (land, air and sea); construction; construction consultants; 
region; warehousing; banking; insurance; financing; trade; certification; hospitality 
and tourism; and miscellaneous. The mapping of 31 categories into nine groups is 
presented in Appendix C. 
In this study, the SOE categorisation is regrouped into nine industry categories based 
on the categorisation used in the publicly listed companies in the capital market or 
the Indonesian Stock Exchange (ISX). This category consists of nine groups i.e. 
agriculture; mining; basic industry and chemicals; miscellaneous industry; consumer 
goods industry; property, real estate, and building construction; infrastructure, 
utilities, and transportation; finance; and trade service and investment. The mapping 
of 31 categories into nine groups is as presented in Appendix C. The largest SOEs 
are distributed across the finance; infrastructure; utilities; and transportation; and 
mining sectors. Whereas the smallest SOEs are found in trade services. and the 
investment industry. The graph below depicts the mean of total assets by industry 
category.  
 
Figure 2. 2: Mean comparison of total assets of 125 SOEs
a
 by industry group in 2009 




 Based on 125 SOEs Persero and Persero Terbuka (Source: DJKN 2009)  
The figure above describes the government as capital owners investing in all sectors 
of the economy but particular industries are more prioritised than others. For 
example, five companies in the mining and energy sector worth US$ 6,699 million 
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form the second largest group in terms of  total assets while utilities and 
transportation infrastructure consisting of 21 companies worth US$ 2,612 billion, 
only one third the mining group in total assets, is almost 3 times smaller. 
The participation of SOEs in the economy of the country also triggers, and enlivens, 
the market. Even though there are some SOEs with a monopolistic privilege, most 
SOEs participate in the competitive market. Table 2.6 below shows the industry 
group by competition level. According to the table, the majority of SOEs are in a 
highly competitive playing field.  
 
Table 2.6: Industry group by industry competition level in 2009  
 
Industry Competition  
Monopoly Low Moderate  High  Very High 
(0) (1-5) (6-20) (21-40) (>41) 
Agriculture 0 0 6 0 18 
Mining 0 0 0 1 4 
Basic industry and 
chemicals 
0 0 3 4 3 
Miscellaneous industry 2 2 1 0 2 
Consumer goods industry 0 0 0 0 6 
Property, real estate and 
building construction 
0 1 0 0 14 
Infrastructure,  utilities,  and 
transportation 
3 7 3 0 8 
Finance 1 6 0 2 10 
Trade, services, and 
investment 
6 1 0 2 9 
Total 12 17 13 9 74 
 
According to the statistics released by the Bank of Indonesia (Kementerian BUMN 
2010b), there are a total of 122 banks in Indonesia, five of which are SOEs. Total 
assets of the SOE banks are approximately 37 per cent, relative to total assets of the 
entire 122 banks. The Bank of Indonesia also notes that the SOE banks‟ assets have 
been among the slowest growing in Indonesia yet have a very rapid growth of office 
branches across the country. In the non-bank finance industry, i.e. financial 
institution, insurance and social security, there are 7, 7 and 3 SOEs, respectively.  
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The property, real estate and building construction industry is a very highly 
competitive and fast growing economic sector. According to Kementerian BUMN 
(2010b), approximately 120,000 construction companies collapsed in 2008 with the 
increasing growth each year. Eight were SOEs, two of which were the largest and 
dominated the sector. Moreover, there are 3000 companies within the construction 
consultancy sub-sector with only five SOEs. With a very high level of competition 
and less efficient operation, three out of the five SOEs in this area are under a merger 
scenario. 
Within trade, services and investment, there are four SOEs in logistics trading and 
distribution, some categorised as monopolies. Likewise, there are 16 SOEs amongst 
83 industrial estates in Indonesia with export processing and bonded zones. The 
volatility of Indonesian social politics creates a big challenge for developing this sub-
industry due to the decreased level of foreign direct investment.  
Infrastructure, utilities, and transportation and air transportation have experienced 
fast growth in both competition and passenger traffic. It should be noted that due to 
the deregulation policy on air transportation in 1999, many commercial airlines 
entered the market. The increase in service providers led to a drastic reduction in 
airfares. This resulted in not only air transportation becoming highly competitive, but 
has encroached on other markets, i.e. land and water transportation. Thus, the rapid 
growth in air transportation sector has had an inverse relationship with the land 
transportation and water transportation sector. In addition, some of them provide a 
public service. Such SOEs are characterised as monopolistic businesses with highly 
regulated government rules. 
Moreover, transportation infrastructures such as airports and ports also have strategic 
functions such as opening up access to domestic and international travellers. 
Following on from the fast growth of airplane industries, there are 163 airports to 
date in Indonesia, 27 of which are operated by two SOEs. Both SOEs are the largest 
companies within the country taking care of almost 90 per cent of the total passenger 
traffic. Meantime, more than 2133 ports are operated across the country; with 4 
SOEs operationalising about 111 of them (Kementerian BUMN 2010b, 141).  
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By contrast, the transportation support and shipyard sector (as part of the 
infrastructure, utilities and transportation industry), is much neglected. Currently, 
there are only 9 major companies (amongst the total of 240 transportation support 
and shipyard businesses that exist) and 2 of the 10 SOEs have the capacity to build 
and repair ships. It is difficult for new ship construction companies to enter the 
market due to high domestic interest rates and collateral problems.  
In tourism, there are three SOEs operating in this sector. Despite the fact that tourism 
is one of the significant revenue generators offering wide opportunity for profit 
making, the presence of state companies does not really affect the industry.   
In plantation, Indonesia has a leading position in the world market for several 
plantation commodities. The domestic market can produce over 22 million tons of 
commodities mainly palm oil (the largest in the world), rubber, coconut, tea, coffee 
and cocoa. There are 16 SOEs in the plantation sector whose production consists of 
palm oil, rubber, sugar and tea. This occupies only about 10 per cent of the total 
plantation area in Indonesia in 2008.  
Similar to the importance of the plantation sector in the national market, the 
agriculture and agriculture support sector, such as the provision of seeds, pesticides 
and fertilizers, also have significant roles. Agriculture and agricultural support 
sectors play a significant part in the national economy that absorbs more than 40 per 
cent of the workforce. SOEs contribution is not large in terms of size, yet relatively 
influential (Kementerian BUMN 2010, 215).   
Government investment in irrigation through SOEs has made a vital contribution to 
escalating rice prices. With fertilizer, SOEs have a virtual monopoly on its 
production. In forestry, the role of SOEs has declined for years despite the fact that 
forestry in Indonesia owns considerable forest area (133.1 million ha). 
The paper industry, conversely, is a significant generator of foreign exchange for the 
Indonesian economy in the last twenty years. Among major players, there are two 




As for mining, this business is in its growth stage. Unlike countries with a relatively 
mature mining sector, in Indonesia natural resources and reserves are still plentiful. 
Not just oil and gas, the country is rich in coal, nickel, tin, lead, gold and silver. 
Despite the massive opportunities, mining in Indonesia, especially by SOEs, is 
constrained by several important factors such as declining exploration activities and 
foreign investment, regulatory uncertainty, illegal mining, undiversified operations 
and a scale problem. State companies are big players in this industry, where three out 
of four SOEs are the largest publicly listed companies in the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. In the energy sector, both oil and gas, and electricity are all dominated by 
SOEs and highly regulated by the government. 
In the cement industry, both domestic and foreign companies have a large investment 
in the state. The growth of domestic demand has been increasing swiftly since 2004. 
Cement distribution is free from zone restriction. 
As for energy, a range of segments in the energy industry comprises oil and gas 
extraction and transmission, electricity generation and production, and various 
related services. Indonesia‟s oil production has been continually decreasing. With 
domestic consumption increasing, Indonesia‟s export capacity has even further 
diminished. At current levels of consumption, Indonesia‟s potential reserves are 
predicted to be drained in 15 years. Consequently, Indonesia has started to utilize 
natural gas, coal, and geothermal and hydropower as alternative energies. It should 
be highlighted that the energy industry is highly regulated. Related SOEs remain as 
fully government-owned as it is Government policy to protect the energy reserves. 
Telecommunication is a highly competitive industry in Indonesia. Since deregulation 
and restructuring was introduced in 2001, the practice of monopoly ceased and the 
market opened for competition.  
With regard to steel manufacturing, Indonesia is the largest steel producer in the 
ASEAN (35 per cent of the region‟s output) with the total national capacity 
accounting for 6 million tons of steel. This need is fulfilled by 95 steel manufacturers 




Conversely, in the pharmaceutical industry, there are 198 manufacturers in Indonesia 
with a market size of more than US$ 2.5 billion. The market is dominated by the 
largest 60 manufacturers (three of them are SOEs), which account for 80% of sales.  
In the fishing industry, small-scale fishermen and commercial fisheries dominate the 
sector reaching only about 5% of the world‟s capacity. The market is particularly 
thriving as aquaculture has increased the production from 1.5 tons in 2004 to 3.5 tons 
in 2008. Conversely, the four SOEs in this industry suffered from large losses and 
financial difficulties, resulting in a merger of these four companies in 2005. 
Based on the above description, it can be noted that as a player in the economy, 
SOEs rotate the wheels of the industrial sector. This affects opportunities for 
business expansion and employment (Simatupang 2005). Likewise, it stimulates the 
economy through capital and operational expenditure. In particular, the total capital 
expenditure of all SOEs was worth approximately US$ 246.000 billion in 2009, 
which is approaching 40 per cent of the GDP of the country (Kementerian BUMN 
2010b). 
Furthermore, SOEs play a very strategic role in the national economy. This is 
particularly relevant when the SOE is perceived as a pioneer in the business sector 
that private companies have no interest in. SOEs also have a strategic role as 
implementers of public services, balance the forces of large private capital and 
facilitate the development of small businesses. In addition, SOEs are substantial 
sources of revenue to the state from tax, dividend and privatisation (BUMN Track 
2012; Kementerian BUMN 2012).   
SOEs as one of the focal strengths of the national economy can also be seen in the 
capital market. To date, there are 14 publicly listed SOEs and more state enterprises 
in the privatisation process. The frequency distribution of publicly listed SOE based 
industries in 2009 can be seen in the figure 2.3 below. Market capitalisations of 16 
publicly listed SOEs (two of them minority owned by the Government) comprise 
nearly 31.57 % of the total market capitalisation of the Indonesian Stock Exchange 





Figure 2. 3: Public listed SOEs and non-public listed SOEs by industry group in 2009 
 
 
2.5. History of Establishment  
The chronology described below gives an overview of the development of the SOE 
in Indonesia across time. The chronology is divided into three eras as earlier 
mentioned: (1) The SOE in the Dutch Colonial to post –Independence Day; (2) The 
SOE in the New Order era; and (3) The SOE in the reform era.  
2.5.1. The Dutch Colonial – Post-Independence Day Era   
The history of SOEs is inseparable from the history of Indonesia's independence. 
From the time of Dutch settlement, the Dutch Government invited the Dutch trading 
companies to unite and to form an alliance, which was named after Vereenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie or VOC. The VOC, established in 1602, was given 
exceptional monopoly rights and privileges such as forming the armed force and 
conducting direct commercial negotiations with other countries. It cannot be denied 
that the VOC in Indonesia had an ambiguous impact. On one hand, the VOC 
transformed a barren land into fertile land and created a new source of economic 
activity that attracted foreign investors to Indonesia. Yet, on the other hand, the VOC 
notoriously absorbed the natural resources of Indonesia, which resulted in 
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extraordinary losses for the country. The VOC was later declared bankrupt in 1799, 
leaving massive debt after handing over all assets and company operations to the 
Dutch government (Kementerian BUMN 2012).  
When the independence of Indonesia was declared, the first agenda of the founding 
fathers was to formulate the constitution and to implement the vision and mission of 
Indonesia. According to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, 
…sectors of production which are important for the country and affect the life 
of the people shall be under the powers of the State” (article 33 no.2) …. The 
land, the waters and the natural resources within shall be under the powers of 
the State and shall be used to the greatest benefit of the people (The 1945 
Constitution article 33 paragraph 3).  
This embeds SOEs as a part of the Indonesian political system. This constitutional 
basis provides legitimacy for SOEs as a policy tool to promote society‟s welfare 
(Laksanawan 2008). The intention of "under the power of the state” set forth in the 
Constitution was to strengthen the economy after independence. This due to (1) the 
situation of the new state that required social overhead capital for capital 
development. (2) the great loss and damage on public utilities and (3) the practices of 
indigenous employers which were far behind those of  employers from Europe, 
Arabia and China.   
Based on the mandate of the Constitution, later on the government took two initial 
steps to strengthen the economy. First was to nationalise companies in key 
infrastructure industries. The issuance of Nationalisation of the Dutch-owned 
companies Law
9
 was the milestone of the nationalisation of ex-Dutch companies in 
Indonesia. It signified that all the Dutch-owned companies located in the territory of 
the Republic of Indonesia were nationalised and declared the full property of the 
Republic of Indonesia. The nationalised companies comprised airlines, railroads, 
postal and telephone telegraph, shipping, mining and energy, printing, rubber 
processing, and so forth. Furthermore, of 600 nationalised companies, 300 came 
from plantation companies, more than 100 came from mining companies, and the 
remaining came from banking, insurance, communications, and construction (p. 14).   
                                                 
9 Nationalisation of the Dutch owned companies Law (Number 86 Year 1958).  
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The second step was to strengthen the post-independence Indonesian economy by 
establishing several national public corporations. When the Declaration of 
Independence in 1945 took place, the local business sector was less developed and 
mostly dominated by foreign companies and small businesses. Moreover, there was 
only a small financial sector available for additional capital and limited opportunity 
for private funding. Subsequently, the central government became the main capital 
resource for speeding up Indonesia‟s economic development. Thus, the dominance of 
the former Dutch companies in Indonesia evaporated through newly-funded 
government held companies. This step underpinned the important role of SOEs in the 
development of the national economy through generating goods and services to the 
public, steering exports, creating employment as well as developing experts in the 
fields concerned.  
By the end of the Sukarno presidency in 1967, public corporations dominated the 
Indonesian economy particularly in banking, commerce, plantation, mining, energy, 
manufacturing, capital, steel, shipping, electronics, and cement. The role of subsidy 
and government protection to the public corporations should be also highlighted as 
key factors in the rate of industrial growth.   
2.5.2. The New Order Era  
The transition of leadership from the first president (Sukarno) to the president of the 
New Order (Suharto) resulted in a turnaround in economic policy, which was marked 
by three milestones. The first milestone was the issuance of the Foreign Investment 
Law
10
, which signified the opening of the door to foreign capital. Gradually and 
inevitably, Indonesia's economic strength began to depend upon foreign financial 
institutions, like the IMF, World Bank and other foreign institutions. 
The second milestone of the new order era was the issuance of the Presidential 
Instruction for the Direction and Simplification of Public Corporations
11
. More 
importantly, the commencement new law
12
, which governed the public corporation 
into three groups, namely covenants (perusahaan jawatan), public corporations 
(perusahaan umum) and the limited liability company (perusahaan perseroan). The 
                                                 
10 Foreign Investment Law (Number 1 Year 1967). 
11 The direction and simplification of public corporations Presidential Instruction (Number 17 Year 1967).   




implementation of the second milestone resulted in downsizing the number of firms 
to 233 companies (Kementerian BUMN 2012, 36; Laksanawan 2008). 
The government declared under the New Order two clear objectives in the 
establishment of SOEs. First was to maintain economic and political stability; the 
second was to support national defence. 
Unlike the former leadership, the New Order era supported the emergence of the 
private sector. To achieve this goal, the government targeted subsidies solely to 
strategic SOE industries. Moreover, the government limited its intervention by 
restraining bureaucratic procedure and regulations on SOEs. This allowed the board 
of directors to run the company with a full mandate and responsibilities.  
However, through the 1970s SOEs and government bodies were still dominant in the 
economy. Only in the early 1980s, did that reverse with the role of the private sector 
elevating following a decline in the role of SOEs. As a comparison, the proportion of 
SOEs relative to the national economy was 70 per cent in 1970 and 23 per cent as of 
2011. During this period of time, financial institutions, capital markets and debt were 
developed to fund newly emerging companies.  
Later in 1998, Indonesian history recorded a striking period of economic downturn. 
This occurred when an economic crisis severely hit Southeast Asia countries 
including Indonesia. The monetary crisis in Indonesia was triggered by a domino 
effect of the absence of foreign exchange systems and hedging policies  as well as 
the lack of debt management that went into domestic private sectors. All of these led 
to the uncontrollable declining value of the Indonesian currency against the dollar in 
mid-1997. The economy of the country started to improve slowly when the 
presidential successor, B.J. Habibie sharply boosted the Indonesian currency rate in 
1998.  
In addition, defence and military spending was relatively low in the Central 
Government budget, amounting to about 6 per cent of the total budget in 2009. 
Military spending was inadequate to safeguard national security as it consists of 
approximately 0.5% of GDP. This portion is very small in comparison to other Asian 
countries (3% to 5% of the GDP) (Kementerian BUMN 2010b, 299).  
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2.5.3. The Reform Era 
A new paradigm of SOE management is marked by the publication of the State-
Owned Enterprise Law
13
. There are three major changes introduced in this law. First, 
the law reinforced the relationship between SOEs as the operator with the 
government as the shareholder and the government as the regulator. This clarified the 
conflicting role of the government conducted by the Ministry of SOEs as the proxy 
shareholder and the line ministries as regulator.  
Second, the new law incorporated the principles of good corporate governance in 
order to encourage efficient and productive SOEs. The governance structure 
introduced in the law is discussed later in this chapter.  
Third, there was a confirmation of the position of state-owned enterprise as a 
business enterprise that aimed to generate income and provide maximum 
contribution to the national economy. SOEs were then transformed into three new 
classifications: public corporation (perum), limited company (perusahaan persero) 
and public listed limited company (perusahaan perseroan terbuka). The definition of 
each was discussed earlier in this chapter.  
Based on the chronology outlined above, the commencement of SOEs in Indonesia 
can be defined into three groups based on the history of SOE establishment. First, 
SOEs came into existence as a result of legal transformation from Dutch companies 
known as nationalisation. Second, SOEs were formed to balance the dominance of 
nationalised SOEs as well as maintaining national economic and political interests. 
Third, SOEs were also established  to protect national security.  
 
2.6. Governance Structure of SOE   
Corporate governance should be understood as operating in a particular environment 
(Kim and Hoskisson 1997, 11-13; Lukviarman 2001). Relevant to the Indonesian 
context, Lukviarman suggests that the uniqueness of corporate governance practice 
in Indonesia requires certain emphasis. Corporate governance of SOEs is regulated 
                                                 
13 State-Owned Enterprise Law (Number 19 Year 2003).   
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by the State-Owned Enterprise Law and is defined in the Good Corporate 
Governance Ministerial Decree
14
 as:  
…a process and structure used by an organ of SOE to enhance the success of 
the business and corporate accountability in order to create shareholder value 
over the long term by taking into account the interests of other stakeholders, 
based on the law and ethical values (the State-Owned Enterprise Law article 
1 paragraph a).   
On one hand, the practice of corporate governance of SOEs is reflected in the 
principles of good corporate governance as stipulated in five aspects in the law 
(article 3). First is transparency, which refers to openness in  processes and in 
disclosing material and relevant information about enterprises.  Second is 
independence, which means ensuring that enterprises are managed professionally 
without influence being exerted by any party contrary to applicable laws and 
regulations. The next aspect is accountability, which emphasizes the clarity in the 
functions and responsibilities of corporate structures so that the company 
management is carried out effectively. The fourth aspect is responsibility, a way of 
managing compliance with applicable laws and regulations and adherence to good 
corporate principles. The last aspect is fairness, which describes equity in upholding 
the rights of shareholders under agreements and applicable laws and regulations.  
On the other hand, corporate governance as a structure reveals the governance 
structure of the SOE organ. For the SOE Persero, it consists of the General Meeting 
of the Shareholders (GMS), Board of Commissioners (BOC) and Board of Directors 
(BOD) (article 13). Each role is explained as follows. First, the General Meeting of 
Shareholders (GMS) is the supreme organ of the SOE who holds the highest 
authority. The Minister of SOEs acts as the GMS in respect to all shares owned by 
SOE Persero; and acts as shareholders in partially owned SOEs. Moreover, the 
Minister may delegate this responsibility to individuals or a legal entity. The GMS 
appoints and dismisses the BOC and the BOD. When the Minister acts as the GMS, 
then appointment and replacement of BOD is his sole prerogative right. 
Second, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) is appointed and dismissed by the 
GMS. An individual who is legally competent and has no record of bankruptcy or 
                                                 




found guilty of causing bankruptcy, or convicted of a criminal offence that causes a 
loss to the state, can be appointed as a BOC member. Their role and responsibility is 
to monitor the company‟s funds and other special purposes as well as advising the 
BOD, in accordance with the corporate charter. The BOC configuration should be 
arranged to meet the effectiveness and independency in making decision. Likewise, 
the BOC is required to establish an audit committee to work collectively in assisting 
it to carry out the BOC task. The audit committee is chaired by a chairperson who is 
responsible to the BOC.   
Third, the Board of Directors (BOD) is an organ of the company whose members are 
authorized and fully responsible for running the business on a daily basis and in 
accordance with the aims and objectives of the company. The BOD also represents 
the company both inside and outside the court. A person who is legally competent 
and has no record of bankruptcy, or found guilty of causing bankruptcy, or convicted 
of a criminal offence that causes a loss to the state can be appointed to the BOD. The 
GMS assigns the BOD and may dismiss them at any time by the GMS‟s decision 
stating the reasons. A dismissal decision can be made after listening to the defence of 
the GMS.  
In addition, the State-Owned Enterprise Law also regulates that members of the BOD 
and the BOC are prohibited from holding double positions as members of the BOD, 
local public enterprises, private companies and other positions that may cause a 
conflict of interest, structural and functional positions at institutions/agencies and 
local governments; and/or any other office in accordance with the legislation (article 
25). Tenure of the BOD and BOC is a 5 (five) year term. Both may be reappointed 
once for another term (article 28(3) and article 45 (5)).  
In international practice, there are two common models of governance structure. 
These models are adopted by many companies, both private and government-owned, 
and by many countries. The first model is the Anglo-Saxon model where a Board of 
Directors provides the supervisory function. It is, therefore, known as a one-tier 
model. The second model, the Continental Europe model, has separate boards for 
supervisory functions and management functions. Each board is occupied by 
different people. Figure 2.4 illustrates this difference between the two models.  
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Figure 2. 4: Diagram of three models of governance structures 
Source: Adopted from Cernat (2004), Syakhroza (2005),  and Sari, Halligan, and 
Sutiyono  (2010).  
 
Meanwhile, the governance structure of the Indonesian SOE model is unique. Like 
the two-tier model, the GMS takes on a supervisory function (namely as BOC) and 
the management function (namely as BOD). Interestingly, the position of the BOC 
and BOD is not hierarchal yet equal. As a consequence, the role of the BOC is 
limited to monitoring and advising the operational performance of the BOD. The 
BOC is given a right to propose candidates to the BOD but they cannot appoint or 
dismiss the BOD. The figure 2.4 also shows the Indonesian SOE model in 
comparison with the two other models.  
As depicted in the illustration, the governance structure for Indonesian SOEs is 
distinct from the two other models. The most significant difference is the position of 
the BOD and the BOC as equals, because they are directly elected by the 
shareholders. This is in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon model, where shareholders also 
elect the BOD and the BOC. In the Continental Europe model, shareholders elect the 
BOC. Then, the BOC appoints the BOD. As mentioned earlier, the appointment and 
dismissal of the BOC and BOD is conducted by the GMS. The BOC composition in 





2.7. SOE and Government  
As a business entity, SOEs in Indonesia were used to operating under two equally 
controlling drivers. i.e. first, the Ministry of Finance as the representative of the 
government and as the ultimate shareholder; and second, line ministries that 
regulated SOE technical matters (Laksanawan 2008). For instance, SOEs from the 
energy industry are under the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and SOEs in 
the plantation business are under the Ministry of Agriculture. However, since the 
State-Owned Enterprise Law was introduced, the relationship between the 
government and SOEs has shifted. The law gives a mandate to the Minister of SOEs 
to act as the proxy shareholder. Thus, the Ministry of Finance is positioned as the 
State Treasurer and fiscal regulator. Similarly, line ministries are regulators in each 
related sector.  
Therefore, since 2003, the relationship between government and SOEs can be 
described by three involvements. First is the involvement of Ministry of Finance as 
the fiscal regulator. Second is the association with the Ministry of State-Owned 
Enterprise as the proxy shareholder to SOEs of which the Minister of SOEs 
represents the government as shareholder in the General Meeting of the 
Shareholders. Third is the intervention of line ministries as the industry regulator. 
Descriptions about each ministry and their involvement areas are as detailed below.  
To start with, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) operates as the State Treasurer. 
According to the Ministerial Decree on Organisation and Work Procedures of 
Ministry of Finance
15
, as the State Treasurer, the MOF has a duty to formulate and 
implement policies and technical standardisations in the field of the SOEs. In 
carrying out this duty, the MOF determines policy, norms, standards and procedures, 
policy implementation, as well as evaluation of the provision of technical assistance 
in the areas of SOEs (Kementerian Keuangan, 2010a). Likewise, the MOF handles 
administration that requires government regulation for every financial activity that 
involves government share equity changes including capital injection, restructuring, 
divestment, or privatisation.  
                                                 




Furthermore, the MOF controls the SOEs funding allocation from the annual budget. 
This funding includes revenue activities such as tax and dividend payout policy, and 
expenditure activities, such as loan (known as subsidiary loan agreements), public 
service obligations, subsidy, and asset transfer.   
In addition, as part of governance practice, the State Treasurer is obliged to disclose 
the SOE‟s financial position in the Central Government Financial Statements 
following SOEs submitting financial statements to the Ministry of Finance. This is 
stipulated in the State Finance Law
16
. Second is the Ministry of SOE. The shift of 
government representation of SOE ownership has given the Ministry of SOE a 
mandate as a proxy shareholder due to the Ministry of Finance‟s delegation of its 
mandate. This is stated in the State-Owned Enterprise Law
17
 and Delegation of 
Authority Regulation
18
. Accordingly, the Minister of SOEs thenceforth represents the 
Government voting rights in the GMS. All rights of the GMS, such as the 
appointment and dismissal of the BOC and BOD and the approval of the annual 
budget and work plan, are part of the Ministry of SOE‟s job description. In carrying 
out this function, the Minister may authorize the substitution rights to an individual 
or legal entity to represent the GMS (article 14 of the State-Owned Enterprise Law).   
Furthermore, as part of the bureaucratic structure of government, the Ministry of 
SOEs formulates and determines policies related to the SOEs. Ministerial decree is 
often issued for SOEs as guidelines for operations. The Ministry of SOEs also 
coordinates and synchronizes the implementation of SOE policy in the field, such as 
synergizing business processes of SOEs within a similar industry.  
Third are line ministries, which in general are regulators in their sector. Even though 
there is no specific technical rule governing the relationship between SOEs and line 
ministries, there are conventions that line ministries are to be directly involved in 
decision-making related to SOEs that are within the ministry‟s coordination. 
                                                 
16 The State Finance Law (Number 17 Year 2003) article 30 (2) states that “the financial statements at least cover 
Budget Realization Report, Balance Sheet, Statement of Cash Flows, and Notes to the Financial Statements, 
which is attached with the financial statements of state-owned enterprises and other entities.”  
17 State-Owned Enterprise Law (Number 19 Year 2003) article 1 (5) states that “Minister refers to the Minister 
who is appointed and/or authorized to represent the government in the state-owned enterprise (Persero)  as 
shareholder and in the public company (Perum) as capital owners with regard to legislation.”  
18 Devolution of position, duties and authority of Minister of Finance to Minister of State-Owned Enterprise on 
state-owned enterprise (Persero), public company (Perum) and bureau company (Perjan) Government 
Regulation (Number 41 Year 2003).  
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Technical ministries involved in each state are distinguished according to the 
characteristics, type of business and the field of industry where SOEs operate. For 
example, the Ministry of Energy is the regulator in the exploration of petroleum and 
natural gas. Therefore, all SOEs in the energy business are under the Ministry of 
Energy coordination. The Ministry of Agriculture is to coordinate regulation in 
agriculture, including fertilizer, rice fields and plantations. The Ministry of Forestry 
is a regulator of forest management. Ministry of Transportation is the transportation 
industry regulator in land, sea and air transportation. The Ministry of 
Telecommunications oversees the telecom industry. The Ministry of Commerce and 
Ministry of Trade regulate various manufacturing industries. The Ministry of Health 
supervises the pharmaceutical field. In addition, the banking financial services are 
under the coordination of the Bank of Indonesia (Central Bank), while the non-bank 
financial services such as insurance and securities are under the Ministry of Finance. 
 
2.8. Summary of the Chapter  
Chapter Two describes Indonesian SOEs in detail. It introduces the distinctive 
definition of SOEs that are categorised into three groups, each of which represent 
different characteristics and business orientation. The history of SOE establishment 
in Indonesia is then discussed describing the erratic economic situation and impact 
on SOEs. The considerable amount of investment value by the Government to SOEs 
remains consistent over periods despite SOE performance fluctuation caused by 
financial crises in 1997 and 2008. This unstable figure reveals the inability of SOEs 
to generate profits with the money the Government has invested.  
As a driver of the national economy, SOEs participate in almost every industry. 
Initiated from the time the Dutch occupied, Indonesian SOEs grew in certain ways 
under the Government‟s control. After the issuance of the Law on SOEs, SOEs were 
officially introduced to so-called corporate governance, through five pillars, namely 
transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, and fairness. It was then 
followed by the reform or governance structure of the SOE organ.  
The three organs of SOE organisation comprise the General Meeting of Shareholders 
(GMS), the Board of Commissioners (BOC), and the Board of Directors (BOD). The 
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governance structure of these three organs has been adapted from the two-tier model 
of Continental Europe with customisation where the BOC operates on equal terms to 
the BOD (Figure 2.4). 
Lastly, with regard to the SOE relationship with government, SOEs are under three 
controlling agencies, i.e. the Ministry of SOEs, the Ministry of Finance and line 
ministries. The Ministry of SOEs coordinates and synchronizes the implementation 
of SOE policy and acts as the GMS. The Ministry of Finance is the representative of 
the Central Government and, hence, has duty to formulate and implement policies 
and technical standardisation in the field of SOEs. Finally, line ministries regulate 
the industrial sector. 
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This chapter provides the literature review of the thesis. It presents key aspects of 
existing literature relevant to agency theory as the basis for the discussion of 
relationships between principal and agent. Guided by this principle, a review of the 
entrenchment effect as a consequence of the ownership structure is conducted and is 
used as a foundation to develop the hypotheses.  
The organisation of this chapter is presented into the major sections with the 
following subheadings:  Theoretical Background, Agency Theory and Corporate 
Governance, Corporate Governance Model, Government Involvement in the SOE 
Business Practice, Hypothesis Development, and Concluding Remarks. The 
hypothesis development is discussed in relation to three groups of government 
intervention being Governance Intervention, Financial Intervention and Regulatory 
Intervention.  
 
3.2. Theoretical Background  
Over decades, study on state-owned enterprises took place across the world, 
investigating a wide range of issues, of which the most researched are privatisation, 
corporatisation, and corporate governance. The study of SOEs also involves diverse 
disciplines such as accounting and finance, management, law, and organisational 
behaviour and, consequently, a variety of theoretical frameworks.  
Agency theory is  the most frequently used by researchers in examining the 
competing interests of owners and managers. The theory acknowledges the 
relationship between the two main parties, the principal (owner) who delegates work, 
and the agent (manager) to whom the principal delegates the work; and the problems 
that emerge from such a relationship (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 
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1983). It is often used as a basis to examine cases related to agency problems such as 
voluntary disclosure, board size and composition, remuneration, turnover and CEO 
duality and their impact on performance.  
In much of the literature, the theory of property rights is also used as a theoretical 
base to build the case of comparing private and state-owned enterprises (Boardman 
and Vinning 1989; Al-Obaidan and Scully 1992; Bozec, Breton, and Cote 2002; 
Marra 2007). Property rights studies generally focus on the efficiency of private 
ownership over public emphasising the discipline brought by the market and threat of 
bankruptcy (Ramamuriti 2000). 
However, the emphasis for this study is not a comparative of SOE versus private 
performance, but rather performance within a group of SOEs, which have been 
challenged to maximise profit. The focus is on the effectiveness of a number of 
measures in disciplining the behaviour of the managers within these firms.  
As this study focused on the performance of SOEs, with a specific emphasis on the 
(agency) costs arising through their (largely government) ownership structure, 
agency theory is selected to underpin the study.  
Another theory that is commonly used in examining SOEs is stakeholder theory. 
Instead of merely concentration on shareholders, this theory takes into consideration 
stakeholders from a larger community (Mallin 2004; Tosi et al. 2003). Consequently, 
a governance structure of a company shall accommodate more direct representation 
from all stakeholder groups. There are also a number of studies into SOEs testing 
institutional theory. This theory concerns more in-depth and more resistant aspects of 
social structure by taking into account the processes by which establishing structures 
as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour (Scott 2004). Researchers use this 
theory to test, for example, environmental issues (Chen 2011; Zeng, Yin, and Tam 
2012), housing and other social infrastructure (Abdul-Azis et al. 2010) and other 
social political issues (Clark and Soulsby 1999; Giacobbe-Miller, Miller and 
Victorov 2003; Li, YongFeng, and Liu 2006; Weng 2008).    
The purpose of this study is to investigate the government's relationship with SOEs, 
especially linking the relationship between government intervention and its impact 
on the performance of Indonesian SOEs. It becomes the main concern of this 
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research to examine the role of government intervention in SOEs‟ business process. 
It investigates three areas of government intervention:  governance, financial and 
regulatory.  
Based on the research objectives, agency theory is the best fit for constructing and 
testing the hypotheses in this study. Agency theory accommodates the approach of 
this study, i.e. the investigation of the relationship between the government 
(principal) and SOEs (agent) and the presence of vertical agency problems. In 
contrast to previous studies that focussed on examining the opportunistic behaviour 
of the agent, this study focusses on the principal (government) as the dominant party 
and how it impacts on the performance of SOEs.  
3.2.1. Agency Theory  
Agency theory, proposed by Jensen and Meckling, is extensively acknowledged as 
an important justification of the relationship under contract between principal (or 
owner) and agent (or manager). It identifies a relationship where one party, the 
principal, under which the principal(s) delegates work to another party (the agent) to 
perform services including making decisions on their behalf (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Tosi, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia 1997; Mallin 2004; 
Wasserman 2006; Nicholson and Kiel 2007; Lambright 2009).  
The premise of the theory is “if both parties to the relationship are utility maximisers, 
then there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best 
interest of the principal” (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 308). Based on McGregor‟s 
Theory X who claims that individuals are lazy, passive, not intrinsically motivated to 
work and need to be controlled by management or they will not act in the best 
interest of the organisation (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997, 20; McGregor 
as quoted by Tosi, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia 2003, 2054). The principals then seek to 
motivate the agents to act in the principal‟s interest through monitoring and incentive 
arrangements (Fama and Jensen 1983). Under this situation, managers acquire better 
knowledge and expertise than the firm‟s owners and thereby are in a position to 
pursue their own agenda at the cost of the owners (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Hart 
1995). The agents can misuse their power over the management advantage and they 
do not take appropriate risks in the interest of the principals. Such abuse of power 
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can exist in the form of fraud, misreporting of financial statements, failure to 
undertake external audits, and unethical behaviour by the management.   
Agency problems can be found in any type of organisation, both private and public 
sectors. When a conflict of interest of the principal and the agent emerges, 
particularly in monitoring the behaviours of the agent (Eisenhardt 1989), it initiates 
the principal-agent type of problem. Costs incurred as a consequence of resolving 
this conflict is known as agency cost. Jensen and Meckling measure this as the sum 
of the monitoring cost, bonding cost and residual loss (the cost of implementation by 
the agent surpass the benefits) (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 308; Fama and Jensen 
1983). Agency cost decreases when the financial interest of corporate insiders and 
shareholders converge. Cost arising due to the conflicts between owners and 
managers is more specifically called “vertical agency cost” (Hope 2013).  
3.2.2. Controlling Shareholder and the Entrenchment Effect  
In a case where there is more than one principal, all shareholders are obliged to 
monitor  management. This causes difficulty if the ownership is dispersed or if there 
is a different interest amongst owners especially between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders. Theoretically, the larger the investment of the largest 
shareholder, the greater their incentive to make the company more profitable. 
However, as ownership gets beyond a certain point, large owners gain almost full 
control of the company. At some point, controlling shareholders are influential if 
they favour to use companies generate personal benefits that are not shared by 
minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The more dominant group might 
possess conflicting interests and trigger principal-principal agency problems (Ali, 
Chen, and Radhakrishnan 2007; Memili, Misra, and Chrisman 2012). Such 
circumstances are risky to overall company performance and long-term shareholder 
wealth. This type of situation is specifically known as „horizontal agency cost‟ (Hope 
2012).  
Moreover, the largest controlling shareholder with the extended power can 
expropriate firm resources to get what they want at the expense of other shareholders 
(Lin, Chiou, and Chen 2010). The pyramidal structure, cross-holding structure or 
dual-class shares are applied to expand control of the company (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 1999). In Taiwan, controlling shareholders expand their control 
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rights by choosing family members or trusted people for director and supervisor 
positions (Yeh and Woidtke 2005). Consequently, the discrepancy of ownership and 
control takes place giving  incentives for entrenchment. This effect is known as 
„„entrenchment effects‟‟ or “negative entrenchment effects of large ownership” 
(Claessens et al. 2002). The negative entrenchment effect is disadvantageous for 
minority shareholders. Control by dominant shareholders can take many forms, such 
as gaining positions on the board. Being in this role, they can directly monitor and 
even control operations by having regular meetings with management and becoming 
involved in strategic decision making in areas such as investment and dividend 
payout policy.  
Family run firms are the most common types of corporation in Asia and are an 
example where shareholders can become a controlling bloc (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes 1999, 511; Bunkanwanicha 2008, 1579). A traditional viewpoint believes 
that in family businesses, agency problems occur less due to unified ownership and 
management (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Chrisman, Chua, and Litz 2004). However, 
in publicly listed family firms, the agency problem performs differently. When the 
family owner dominates the management and board positions, they act for the 
controlling owner (the family) to pursue the interests of the family, not that of non-
controlling owners (Morck and Yeung 2003). Hence the focus of the agency problem 
shifts from principal-agent conflict to principal-principal conflict, that is minority 
shareholders versus majority shareholders (Berglöf and Claessens 2004; Memili, 
Misra, and Chrisman 2012). Morck and Yeung argue that the principal-principal 
agency problem caused by this multiple principal-agent relationship is a form of 
expropriation of non-controlling shareholder‟s wealth.   
Despite the above, dominant shareholders are commonplace in many economies. La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) discovered that among 27 wealthy 
economies the company is generally controlled either by the family or by the state. 
This finding contradicts Berle and Means‟ (1932) who earlier claimed dispersed 
ownership structures were more common across the world. Over time, a growing 
number of studies have confirmed the finding that the majority of publicly listed 
companies in most observed countries experienced a concentrated ownership (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer  1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2002). In 
Asia (eg Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and Thailand), Claessens, 
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Djankov, and Lang discovered that more than two-thirds of East Asian companies 
were owned by a single largest controlling shareholder.  In Indonesia, high 
ownership concentration is the norm (Husnan 2001; Bunkanwanicha 2008, 1579). 
Sanjaya (2009) also observed that principal-principal agency problems (between 
controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholders) were more common in his 
research involving publicly listed manufacturing companies in Indonesia. He also 
points out that family-owned private companies are dominant where the founding 
family members were appointed to be part of management (Board of Directors) and 
the supervisory board (Board of Commissioners).   
State-owned enterprise is defined by the OECD as an enterprise where the state has 
control over full, majority or substantial minority of share ownership (2004). 
However, SOEs in Indonesia are defined as the Government having  at least 51 per 
cent of shares. The State-Owned Enterprise Law states:  
…State-Owned Enterprises is a business entity that all or most of the capital 
owned by the state through direct investment from wealth separated state 
(article 1 paragraph 1)... limited company, hereinafter referred to Persero, is a 
state-owned enterprise  in the form of a limited liability company whose 
capital is divided into shares that all or at least 51% (fifty one percent) owned 
by the Republic of Indonesia, with main objective of pursuing profit (Article 
2 paragraph 2).  
This high level of government ownership (at least 51%), opens the opportunity for 
the negative entrenchment effect. Thus, for Indonesian SOEs, government 
intervention as the ful or majority owner is the main element of the principal-agent 
problem in this thesis.  
 
3.3. Agency Theory and Corporate Governance  
The term „corporate governance‟ has emerged since the early 19th century, but 
gained currency in the wake of the bankruptcy of some of the world's business giants 
in the 21st century. For instance, the 1997 financial crisis in Asia severely hit the 
economies of most East Asia countries causing a sudden withdrawal of foreign 
capital after property assets collapsed. During that time, economists around the world 
observed that the absence of proper „corporate governance‟ in these nations 
explained the weaknesses of the institutions in their economies. In the early 2000s, 
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the world economy was again confronted with the news of massive bankruptcies at a 
number of giant US firms such as Enron Corporation, MCI Inc. (Worldcom), and 
Arthur Andersen and noted this as one of the blackest periods in American business 
history. A number of scandals behind the collapse were uncovered, due to criminal 
malfeasance found in corporate accounting, leading to bankruptcy and the loss of 
public trust in financial markets. As a reaction, in 2002, the US government passed 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act with the aim of addressing inadequacies and restoring public 
confidence in „corporate governance‟. Many flaws in corporate governance also exist 
in other parts of the world, causing a severe impact on the business and economies of 
those countries (Bank 2004).  
For a long time, „corporate governance‟ also has been the subject of a long and 
multi-disciplinary academic discussion. Scholars have very different views about the 
concept of corporate governance. Bank (2004, 3) simply defines corporate 
governance as the company‟s structure and function with regard to its stakeholders in 
general, and its shareholders in particular. Monks and Minow (2003) characterise 
corporate governance as diverse participants of shareholders, directors and the 
management in navigating the direction and achievement of the corporation. 
Meantime, Berglöf and Von Thadden (1999, 21) refer to corporate governance as 
being  “the mechanism translating signals from product and input markets into 
corporate behaviour” and the mechanism includes all stakeholders (investor, 
employee, supplier, competitor, corporate networks and the government). Berglöf  
and Von Thadden‟s definition is constructed based on their observation on the 
paradigm shift of corporate governance in transition and developing countries. 
Moreover, in a broader perspective, the OECD defines corporate governance as  
...the private and public institutions, including laws, regulations and accepted 
business practices, which together govern the relationship, in a market 
economy, between corporate managers and entrepreneurs („corporate 
insiders‟) on one hand, and those who invest resources in corporations, on the 
other (Oman 2001, 13). 
The World Bank specifically defines corporate governance in two ways. From a 
social perspective, corporate governance is an orientation towards a company‟s 
sustainability, growth, and development in concurrent ways through corporate 
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control. From a corporate perspective, corporate governance is about the relationship 
between the owner, manager and other stakeholders (Monks and Minow 2003).  
While the discussion continues to evolve, there seems no agreement reached on the 
definition of corporate governance, except that no single universally acceptable 
definition of corporate governance exists (Turnbull 1997, 200; Monks and Minow 
2003, 537; Babic 2003, 4; Solomon 2007, 12) which the OECD refers to as a “no-
one-size-fits-all-approach” (1999). However, all definitions suggest that corporate 
governance is about a set of relationships among participants aiming to achieve the 
company‟s objective. This also suggests that corporate governance is 
multidimensional which gives each country the latitude to develop a specific 
approach to practice. 
The development of corporate governance is influenced by global dynamics. Many 
factors contribute to the adoption and implementation of corporate governance 
(Mallin 2004, 16). One very influential aspect is the legal system. Research by La 
Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (LLSV) in 27 countries concluded that the legal 
system in one nation affected how corporate governance was exercised (1999, 511). 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer identified the presence of controlling 
shareholders in the companies in countries with weak shareholder protection. These 
controlling shareholders, usually in family firm or state-owned companies, had the 
power to implement a management structure, which may include taking the most 
senior position. Meantime, bigger and more effective equity markets are found in 
common law countries (eg the United States) with sound legal protection for 
minority shareholders. In such practice, regulations governing the composition of the 
board, appointment of CEO and so forth become a crucial instrument of good 
corporate governance. 
Another aspect that has impacted on how the corporate governance system is built, 
among others, is culture (Turnbull 1997; Kuada and Gullestrup 1998; Licht, 
Goldschmidt, and Schwartz 2001; Tabalujan 2002). Following up LLSV‟s findings, 
Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2005, 2004) tested the relationship between 
national cultural and legal rights‟ of investors, including anti-director rights, creditor 
rights, and legal families. They found evidence that corporate governance laws have 
a systematic relationship to the existing culture of one nation.   
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Furthermore, the country‟s economic development is another aspect that influences 
the practice of corporate governance. In the investigation held in transition and 
developing countries, Berglöf and Von Thadden (1999, 24) assert that LLSV‟s 
findings are more suited to widely held firms where strong managers and weak 
owners exist. However, they claim that it does not fit to closely held firms in 
developing countries. An important role of an investor can only be played if they are 
in the position of strategic investor.    
Another investigation, conducted by Babic (2003, 1) highlights the difference 
between the corporate governance system of developed market economies and ones 
in transition. While in the developed countries the system is pictured as a multiplex 
of law, regulation, politics, public organisation, and codes of ethics, in countries with 
transition economies the issues are corporate ownership, government, fiscal, 
regulatory, legal, institutional and human capital related problems.  
Furthermore, Denis and McConnell (2003) explain that the development of the 
concept of corporate governance occurs over two generations. The first, initiated by 
Berle and Means (1932), focuses on the shareholder and the concept of separation of 
ownership and control in a company. This is introduced by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) in their well-known “agency theory”. This shareholder viewpoint is used to 
develop the governance model system. However, corporate governance is not only 
dominated by law and economics researchers, but also other disciplines such as 
sociology, strategic management, finance, accounting, and others. In fact, corporate 
governance is more approachable and easily understood after the introduction of 
agency theory.  
The second generation of corporate governance is characterized by the introduction 
of the concept stakeholder theory by Freeman (Syakhroza 2005). From this 
perspective, the company is seen as an entity associated with many interested parties 
who are both inside and outside the company. The second generation of corporate 
governance is marked by the findings of La-Porta et al or known as LLVS (1998) 
who found that the implementation of corporate governance across countries was 
different and greatly influenced by the legal instruments in force. Also they identified 
the presence of ownership concentration that resulted in the entrenchment between 
majority owner and minority owner (Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
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3.4. Corporate Governance Model  
The basis of agency theory as proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) addresses the 
separation of ownership and control. To enable a control mechanism to work, a 
governance system is required. The OECD (2011) further delineates corporate 
governance as a system representing a set of interrelations among shareholder, 
management board and supervisory board. Meanwhile, the World Bank defines 
corporate governance as 
“the structures and processes for thedirection and control of companies. 
Corporate governance concerns the relationships among the management, 
Board of Directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and 
other stakeholders.” (The World Bank 2009, 2). 
The first generation of corporate governance introduced two models of governance, 
i.e. the Anglo-Saxon model and the Continental European model (Syakhroza 2005; 
Millet-Reyes and Zhao 2010; Bohinc 2011; Nikolić and Eric 2011). Both models aim 
to describe how the concept of ownership and control separation is implemented. The 
difference is in the composition and leadership structure, which characterises the way 
the board functions (Nikolić and Eric 2011). Figure 3.1 below illustrates both 
models. 
First, the Anglo-Saxon model is initially built based on the common-law system. The 
structure of this model consists of one board only (Board of Directors). The Board is 
appointed by the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS). The figure implies that 
the member of the BOD is also the member of the supervisory board suggesting that 
a similar person is responsible for two functions: management and control. 
Meantime, ownership and control is clearly dispersed. Furthermore, the highest 
position in the structure is the GMS. It has the authority to appoint and dismiss the 
BOD. The BOD is a representation of the shareholders / owners, who collectively 
have direct responsibility to the GMS (Syakhroza 2005). The BOD should comprise 
a large number of outside members that are independent of the management and have 
no conflict of interest with the shareholders. The main tasks of the BOD, among 
others, include defining the corporate goals, strategies, and work plans; appointing 
and replacing the CEO and executive managers; and proposing potential BOD 
candidates (Nikolić and Eric 2011).  
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Figure 3. 1: Governance model comparison: Anglo-Saxon versus Continental 
European 
 
Note: It should be  noted that  the term „Board of Directors* „ on the Anglo-Saxon 
model is not similar to the Board of Directors** on the Continental European model. 
The Anglo-Saxon‟s BOD* has the function of supervisory management, while the 
Continental European‟s BOD** has a purely management function. Since the sample 
used in this study adopts a dual board system, the use of the term „Board of 
Directors‟ in this context refers to CEO and executive managers with management 
function, except when the context refers to the Anglo-Saxon model, when the term 
„Board of Commissioner‟ refers to Chairperson and BOC members with supervisory 
function.   Source: Syakhroza (2005) and Nikolić and Eric (2011). 
 
Second, the Continental European model is characterized by two boards: the 
supervisory board (or so-called Board of Commissioners) and management board (or 
so-called Board of Directors). The model is very clear about integrating ownership 
and control (Nikolić and Eric 2011) and vividly separating management and 
supervisory functions. The supervisory board is selected by the GMS. It has three 
important functions, i.e. (1) as counsellor to the management board, (2) as authoriser 
of important decisions made by the management board and (3) to monitor the 
management performance (Douma 1997, 613). The last role is the most important 
one as the supervisory board is given the mandate to appoint and replace the BOD 
members. As for the BOD, it is headed by a director, who is in charge of carrying out 
the day-to-day corporate operations (Syakhroza 2005).  
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The Anglo-Saxon model has only one board (i.e. BOD) with a Chairman responsible 
for two functions, in management (as the CEO) and in supervision, while these two 
functions are run by different persons in the Continental European model. The 
Anglo-Saxon model is also known as a “one-tier board”, and the Continental 
European model as a "two-tier board". While the one-tier board exhibits separation 
of ownership and control, the two-tier model integrates both. The table 3.1 below 
presents differences between both models as proposed by Nikolić and Eric.  
 
Table 3. 1: Difference between one-tier and two-tier board model 
One-tier Board Two-tier Board 
Dispersion of ownership and control Concentration of ownership  
Integration of management and control  Integration of  ownership and control  
Poor incentive for investors to be 
involved in the control process 
Control from the part of banks, 
partners and employees 
Climate for hostile takeovers are not 
unusual  
Aversion towards hostile takeovers 
which are rather rare 
Other stakeholders‟ interests are not 
taken into account 
Other stakeholders‟ interests are taken 
into account 
Investor engagement is regulated by 
law and is related to formulating long-
term strategies of the company 
Investor engagement is allowed only 
in case of obvious financial failures 
Takeovers may lead to the forming of 
monopolies  
Insider system may lead to secret 
agreements  
Source: Nikolić and Eric (2011, 73) 
 
The literature has discussed the advantages of each system. To start with, the basic 
benefit of the two-tier model is that there is a balance or clear separation between the 
power of management and control (Aste 1999; Jungmann 2006; Nikolić and Eric 
2011) as well as a division of responsibilities between the supervisory board and the 
BOD. The minimal number of members on the BOC of the two-tier model can speed 
up the decision-making process. Aste also argues that this model encourages non-
traditional candidates to take up a BOD position. This model also accommodates the 
interests of foreign capital. Finally, the two-tier model gives merging companies an 
opportunity to sit in a position on the supervisory board.  
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However, there are criticisms of the two-tier models. Firstly, the supervisory board in 
this model is prone to influence the decisions of the management board (Douma 
1997). With the power, it can promote interlocking directorships. It can be easily be 
misused for political rather than economic interests. For example, a director who has 
resigned could be appointed to the supervisory board. This model also has the 
potential to accommodate the hidden interests of the supervisory board that is not 
necessarily an advantage for the company (Aste 1999). Secondly, ratification of 
management decisions by the supervisory board may cause delays leading to 
potential waste of management time and business opportunity. 
As for the one-tier model, the key advantage is the structural strength. The fact that 
the board leads as well as controls the firm gives the firm benefits that its entrusted 
board members have similar responsibilities for supervising and setting strategy. 
Since all of the board members have direct access to the information, there is no 
information asymmetry. In addition, with one board, the meeting frequency is higher, 
the decision making process is therefore quicker (Jungmann 2006, 459).  
Nonetheless, the one-tier model also has drawbacks. The main weakness of this 
model is the high risk of having great concentration of power in the CEO‟s hand 
since the function of the supervisory board is limited to administration (Nikolić and 
Eric 2011, 71). Also, there is a potential of abuse by BOD members of the one-tier 
model as they may seek personal benefits through share issuance at discount value, 
sale of property to targeted parties that is not necessarily beneficial to the firm and 
invite consultants to award BOD member‟s an extra personal bonus. The BOD 
members can also interfere with financial reports and issue biased information.  
A country decides on a governance system model based on the legal system applied 
in the country. The one-tier of the Anglo-Saxon model is adopted by countries 
including the US, UK, Australia, Finland, Spain, Sweden, Greece, Cyprus, Turkey 
and Canada; whereas the two-tier of Continental European system is used in 
countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands and Japan (Syakhzora 2005). In 
addition, some countries leave the company to select one of the two systems as in 
France and Slovenia. Others decide not to follow the mainstream models and apply 
their own types of governance system with different kinds of the supervisory board 
(Bohinc 2011), like Serbia and Indonesia. 
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3.5. Indonesian Corporate Governance Model 
The Indonesian governance system is influenced substantially by the historic Dutch 
system in the era prior to Indonesian independence (Husnan 2001). As a follower of 
the two-tier board system, the governing body in an organisation consists of the 
General Meeting of the Shareholders (GMS), with the Board of Commissioners 
(BOC) as supervisory board and the Board of Directors (BOD) as management 
board. As such, the governance structure is greatly affected by the power of the 
controlling owners represented by the General Meeting of the Shareholders.  
Company Law defines the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) as  
… the organ of the Company that has authority not given to the Board of 
Directors or the Board of Commissioners, within limits as stipulated in this 
Law, and/or the articles of association (Article 1 number 4).  
This signifies the supreme power of the GMS to control both boards. Company Law 




. Even though the 
BOC is given rights to temporarily suspend BOD members, the final decision for 
permanent suspension is the GMS prerogative
21
.  
More specifically, the National Committee on Governance describes the duty, 
function and authority of the GMS in the Indonesian‟s code of good corporate 
governance. The code emphasises the role of the GMS to facilitate shareholders to 
make substantial judgements regarding shareholders‟ investment in the company 
(KNKG  2006, 11). The code makes very clear the rights and limitations of the GMS.   
Decisions taken in the General Meeting of Shareholders must be based on the long-
term interests of a company. The General Meeting of Shareholders and/or 
shareholders cannot intervene in the exercise of the duty, function and authority of 
the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Directors, without curtailing the 
authority of the General Meeting of Shareholders to carry out its rights in accordance 
with the articles of association and laws and regulations, including the replacement 
                                                 
19Members of Board of Directors shall be appointed by the GMS (article 94 (1)).  
20 Members of Boards of Commissioners shall be appointed by GMS (article 111 (1)). 
21 Members of Boards of Directors may be dismissed at any time by virtue of GMS resolutions stating the reason 
therefor (Article 105 (1)). A member of a Board of Directors may be temporarily suspended by a Board of 
Commissioners, giving the reasons therefor (Article 106 (1)). In the event that the GMS confirms the resolution 
for suspension, the member of the Board of Directors shall be dismissed (Article 106 (7)).  
53 
 
or termination of the members of the Board of Commissioners and or the Board of 
Directors (KNKG 2006, 11). 
Meantime, the two boards under the GMS, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) and 
the Board of Directors (BOD), have each respective authority and tasks but for 
similar vision, mission and values of the company (KNKG 2006). Company Law 
defines “Board of Commissioners” as the Company Organ with the task of general 
and/or specific supervision in accordance with the articles of association and giving 
advice to the Board of Directors (Article 1 number 6).   
The BOC consists of a Chairperson and members of BOC whose positions are equal. 
As the board responsibility is limited to overseeing and offering advice to the BOD, 
the BOC is prohibited from any activity that signifies participation in any operational 
decision of the BOD (KNKG 2006).  
As for the BOD, it consists of the Chief of Executive Office and the BOD members 
to manage the company on a daily basis. The code defines the role of the BOD to 
“function and be responsible collegially for the management of the company as each 
member” performs their duty based on their respective tasks and responsibilities 
(KNKG  2006, 17).   
By structure, the governance model of Indonesia and that of the European system 
seem identical since both are two-tier/dual model. However, both are conceptually 
different. The major difference is that the function of ownership and control is 
integrated under the GMS, while it is cascaded in the original two-tier Continental 
European system. This means the GMS is in full control over the BOC and the BOD 
(Syakhroza 2005, 13). The second difference is in the supervisory function, as the 
BOC has only limited authority in carrying out the function of monitoring the BOD. 
With no power to enforce and discipline the BOD, the BOD is able to overlook the 
BOC rendering it ineffective in performing its monitoring function (Kamal 2008). 
This is different from the Continental European model where the supervisory board 
is given a mandate by the GMS to implement strategic decisions on behalf of the 
GMS, including appointment and dismissal of the CEO and the BOC members. As 
such, the supervisory board may use their power to enforce and discipline the 
management board allowing them to perform their function of counselling, ratifying 
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and monitoring more effectively. In addition, Kamal describes the German model, 
which is one of the followers of the Continental Europe model, as a model that 
accommodates the representation of the employees as members of the BOC (2010, 
222), which, in contrast, is disallowed in the Indonesian model.   
Meanwhile, Indonesia's state-owned enterprises are tied up by a specific rule. The 
State-Owned Enterprises Law stipulates that the governance model for SOEs is more 
likely similar to those of private companies with several distinctions. First, SOEs are 
government owned companies therefore the Minister of SOEs is the government‟s 
representative in state ownership.  The Law stipulates that:  
The Minister acts as the General Meeting of Shareholder for the SOE which 
is fully owned by the government and acts as a shareholder in a limited 
liability company which is partially owned by the government (Article 14 
paragraph 1). 
Secondly, the GMS (the Minister) appoints a chairperson and members of the BOC 
as well as a CEO and BOD members. The GSM also has the power to dismiss the 
BOC and BOD (Sari, Halligan and Sutiyono 2010, 11). The BOC is only given 
authority to propose a candidate for CEO or BOD members who come from inside 
the current company (insider) as prospective candidates from outside can only be 
nominated and selected by the Minister. With regard to BOD dismissal and 
replacement, the law does not regulate the BOC‟s rights to replace or even 
temporarily suspend the CEO or BOD members. Thus, the BOCs oversight function 
can be said to be very weak because it does not have the power to drive performance 
and discipline the BOD (Kamal 2008). Figure 3.2 presents a comparison of the two-
tier model, Indonesian private companies and Indonesian SOE s model.  
On the other hand, the position of the GMS remains very strong and controlling. 
Because the ownership of SOEs are under the coordination of the Ministry of SOEs, 
the Minister becomes very controlling and influential as many strategic decisions 
rely on the Minister‟s decision, such as the appointment and turnover of a CEO; 
dividend and investment strategy and other strategic decisions that have direct impact 
on the performance and the sustainability of the SOEs.  Since, Government 
interference has commonly been seen as a negative influence that inhibits SOEs 
performance (Boardman and Vining 1989; Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996; 
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Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Dewenter and Malatesta 2001), it then becomes important 
to highlight Government intervention in SOEs.  
Figure 3. 2: Comparison of two-tier model, Indonesian privates company’s and 
Indonesian SOE’ s model 
 
Source: Adopted from Cernat (2004), Syakhroza(2005), and Sari, Halligan, and 
Sutiyono (2010).  
 
3.6. Government Involvement in the SOEs Business Practice   
3.6.1. Government Involvement in International Practice  
Government involvement in a company is identical with political connectedness. A 
study by Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) investigating 43 countries 
concluded that companies with political connectedness, private or SOEs, 
underperform their non-connected peers on an ex ante basis regardless of the given 
benefit. Later studies (eg Fan, Lau, and Young 2007; Kamal 2010; Chen et al. 2005) 
indicated similar results, that strong connections with political or government reduce 
performance.  
The power of control depends on whether the shareholder is the sole owner or a 
dominant shareholder. A study by La Porta, Lopez-de-Salines, and Shleifer (1999) 
across 27 nations found that the majority of firms have had a controlling shareholder 
for some period of time, largely controlled by the family or the state (government). 
In companies with 100% government ownership, the government possesses single 
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voting rights in the General Meeting of the Shareholders. If the government does not 
fully own the SOEs, then the government is the controlling shareholder. The 
dominating power is unique in that the government is not merely a shareholder, but 
also a fiscal and industry regulator (Muchayat 2010).  
Government intervention in SOEs is discussed widely in the literature by presenting 
distinctive case studies, as different countries have different forms of government 
involvement and its impact. To begin with, Polsiri and Jiraporn (2012) tested 
financial companies in Thailand during the 1997 financial crisis. They found that the 
ownership structure and government (in this case is the Crown Property 
Bureau/CPB) played a significant role in the emerging market economy in the 
country, characterised by a concentration of ownership and political links. Polisiri 
and Jiraporn further identified that the institutions with dominant foreign investors in 
the ownership structure were likely to be shut down. Conversely, financial firms with 
connections with the CPB were likely to remain open. In addition, the study also 
revealed that connections in politics are not important factors that contribute to the 
collapse of the company.  
In Canada, Boardman, Freedman, and Eckel (1986) outlined how the Canadian 
government, by intervening in SOEs, caused an immediate reaction in the market. 
Their evidence is based on the take-over action of a private Canadian pulp and paper 
firm by two government owned companies known as Quebec Crown Corporation. 
The acquisition occurred unexpectedly without insider trading early information and 
a tender procedure. This led to a strong negative reaction from the investors. Besides  
the poor financial position of the Canadian pulp and paper industry, Boardman, 
Freedman and Eckel believed that the loss was caused by the hostile takeover by the 
government  which was motivated by  socio-political goals rather than the pursuit of 
non-profit objectives (1986, 270). 
Among discussions on state-owned enterprises, China has the most literature 
presenting this case. The economic downturn in the 1970s caused substantial 
economic reform in China in 1978, including the reform of SOEs. According to Li 
and Xia (2008), the government firmly focussed on retaining the larger strategic 
SOEs and releasing or privatising the small non-strategic sector SOEs. Li and Xia 
also highlighted that SOEs tend to formulate strategies that favour long-term 
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investment (as compared to non-SOEs that prefer short-term). They document, from 
the national Bureau of Statistics of China, the significant decline of SOE production 
from 81 percent of Chinese industry output before the reform took place to 35 
percent after the reform. Also, Li and Xia argue that the figure represents the 
emergence of new players into the market as a consequence of the Government‟s 
policy on allowing a free market.  
A later study by Bajona and Chu (2010) observes in more detail the impact of China 
joining the WTO. The result shows that by joining the WTO, China was obliged to 
follow WTO protocols, one of which was to reduce Government subsidies to its 
state-owned companies. Surprisingly, the impact of reducing capital subsidy to SOEs 
by 2 percent led to the improvement of the welfare gain to 5.4 percent (2010, 822). 
Bajona and Chu concludes that the action of reducing SOE subsidy funding and the 
reallocation of funds to other more efficient private firms explain the source of the 
increase of welfare benefit. 
In contrast to most SOE examples in the world, Singapore provides an interesting 
case study of SOEs and government control. Based on the study by Feng, Sung and 
Tong (2004) and Chang (2007), it demonstrates that SOEs (known as government 
link companies or GLCs) are as efficient as private companies in doing business. 
When comparing private firms and GLCs on each accounting measure, before and 
after listing, no evidence shows that the performance of GLCs is worse than that of 
private firms. Using comprehensive data from the period of 1964-1998, the study 
also indicates that the high performance of GLCs existed from the very beginning of 
their establishment. Feng, Sung, and Tong conclude that the efficient operating 
GLCs have been a result of the Singapore government‟s policy of creating an open 
economy to stimulate foreign competition as well as establishing a well-functioning 
workforce, goods and services, and capital markets (p.2462-2464).  
Economic elites view countries with free trade competition and a minimum level of 
government regulation as more efficient than those of government ownership. Sikora 
(2005) arrives at this conclusion after extensive research using massive data from 
four countries, Australia, Finland, Poland, and Bulgaria.  He confirms the fact that 
private companies are much more efficient than state owned companies with Eastern 
countries more tolerant to government ownership than Western countries.  In all four 
countries, Sikora observes that the government supports the SOEs through 
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maintaining their economic efficiency, providing subsidies to consumers and 
protecting jobs. 
Furthermore, Sikora also documents the strong support of subsidies in Finland, 
Poland and Bulgaria, particularly during the time of the financial crisis (p.260) 
Researchers pay serious attention to government control as the major difference 
between private companies and SOEs. A state-owned enterprise is normally 
characterised as a business entity that carries a social goal or mission (Peng and Luo 
2000; Tan and Peng 2003; Nugroho and Wrihatnolo 2008; Li and Xia 2008). Often 
this non-financial goal limits their opportunity to play competitively and perform 
well in the market.  
SOEs around the world have a high level of government intervention particularly 
through the application of regulations (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Child and Tsai 
2005; Yuan YongFeng and Yi 2006). Government, which own the SOEs, have 
highly concentrated control rights. When making decisions, Government often 
prioritises political objectives over profit maximization. For example, SOEs have a 
tendency to create more leverage and labour intensity compared to private firms 
(Dewenter and Malatesta 2001). Also SOEs tend to have easier access to political 
elites than private ones (Child and Tsai 2005), which opens an opportunity for 
corrupt practices such as hiring employees with political connections and for 
favourable deals with connected suppliers and customers (Boardman and Vining 
1989; Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; and Dewenter 
and Malatesta 2001. All of these actions lead to inefficiency.  
The findings of Dinç (2005) concluded that SOEs have better access to government-
allocated resources such as bank loans and that non-state firms outperform SOEs in 
labour, productivity, cost control and profitability. Dinç studied the behaviour of 
government owned banks and private banks across 43 countries to determine whether 
they behaved differently in election years. Dinç found that government-owned banks 
increased their lending in election years relative to private banks. These effects were 
robust even controlling for macroeconomic and bank-specific factors. The results 
indicated that political motivations influenced the actions taken by government-
owned banks and could not be attributed to other differences between private and 
government-owned banks in efficiency and objective. 
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Moreover, in explaining inefficiency, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) argue that 
SOEs often adopt strategies which are more conducive to fulfilling administrative 
work  rather than pursuing profits. In China, for instance, SOEs tend to adopt 
strategies to gain support from government (Fung, Kummer, and Shen 2006). They 
infer that from 1998 to 2002, around 50 percent of capital investments in the country 
were generated by SOEs. However, these heavy investments by SOEs did not result 
in output proportional to their investment, unlike investments by non-state firms (Li 
and Xia 2008, 46). Li attributes the results to the differing aims of non-SOEs in 
seeking market return and efficiency, while at the same time lessening policy 
uncertainty and legal risks.  
Li and Xia futher explain that if an SOE wishes to persistently getting government 
funding, the SOE should in return support government in meeting their objectives 
and program instead of concentrating on the profit motive goal. A potential agency 
problem can emerge in this situation, as the managers are the investor agents as well 
as the government officers. This eventually leads to inefficiency of resource usage.  .  
A study conducted by Yuan, YongFeng, and Yi (2006) highlighted that SOEs‟ 
market orientation in transitional stage can be stimulated by “market competitive 
pressure”, “formalized corporate governance” and “less government control”. This 
suggests that government intervention in SOEs affects the degree of market 
orientation. The formulation of the SOE development plan and performance target 
will determine the SOEs‟ orientation in the market. Likewise, the government‟s 
involvement in resource allocation (such as labour/capital/technology) is also an 
important factor in market competition. Yuan, YongFeng, and Yi also concluded that 
there is a strong positive relationship between market orientation and SOE 
performance.  
3.6.2. Government Involvement in Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises  
The law relating to  SOEs outlines five functions - namely to provide a  foundation 
for national economic growth; to promote commercial profit; as a source of revenue; 
as the executor of public service obligation; and as a driver of small and medium 
enterprises and cooperatives (small medium enterprise) (Muchayat 2010; Sembodo 
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2012). The first two functions relate to a corporate/commercial agenda while the 
other three serve as methods for achieving government policy initiatives. 
Under new legal arrangements, Indonesian SOEs follow a unique model of 
governance and recognise a high degree of Government involvement. First, the 
presence of the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (MSOE) which plays the role of  
proxy shareholder on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. This position executes the 
function of the General Meeting of the Shareholders (GMS). Having this supreme 
position, the Government as the shareholder controls the appointment of the Board of 
Directors (management board) and Board of Commissioners (supervisory board) 
(Sari, Halligan, and Sutiyono 2010) with the strategic capability to appoint and 
dismiss both the BOC and BOD. According to the Ministerial Decree on Good 
Corporate Governance
22
, this includes determining the composition of ordinary and 
independent commissioners on the BOC, and the composition of outside and internal 
directors on the BOD.  
Second, the Government is the regulator with the main mission of protecting the 
national economy and state finances.  The Ministry of Finance is involved in SOE 
financial activity in many ways. According to Government Accounting Standards
23
, 
Government capital injection (in the form of permanent investment) is the main 
source of equity of non-listed SOEs. SOEs with a cashflow problem, a market 
expansion plan or a program to restructure can request additional capital to the 
Ministry of Finance via the Ministry of SOE. The Government also injects money in 
the form of subsidies or from a public service obligation fund (Kementerian 
Keuangan 2010). This allocated budget is dedicated to SOEs with a heavy social 
burden, such as energy, railway transportation, fertilizer, and the agriculture industry.  
In addition, the Government earns dividends from profitable SOEs. By law, the GMS 
decide the amount of retained earnings and dividends from the net income of the 
corresponding year. However, in practice, the Government demands the contribution 
of dividends as a part of non-tax income revenue to finance its activity. This situation 
often leads to conflict for internal SOEs since it will affect their business decisions 
(Hamzah 2007; Nugroho and Wrihatnolo 2008).  
                                                 
22 Implementation of Good Corporate Governance for State-Owned Enterprise Minister of SOE Decree (Number 
KEP-117/M-MBU/2002). 
23 Government Accounting Standards Goverment Regulation (Number 24 Year 2005). 
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Third, SOEs are managed via state finance (State Finance Law), therefore, the 
Government including the Supreme Audit Institution compels SOEs to follow a set 
of regulations related to state finance, state treasury, state audit, and anti-corruption. 
This positions the SOE as a highly regulated business entity which is under 
bureaucratic control.  
Fourth, the government is the regulator that coordinates all business activities for the 
sake of national economic stability. Each corresponding line ministry, such as the 
Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of 
Housing, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Transportation, plays a 
significant role in formulating regulations or policies to support corresponding 
industries (Puspasari and Evans, 2012a). In this context, SOEs are set up to 
accomplish a particular goal of the government with the line ministry overseeing this. 
For example, in navigating the national transportation policy, the Ministry of 
Transportation decides to build a new railway to attract investors and support 
economic activity in remote areas. Since there is only one company in this business, 
the government can enforce the new route including the cost of the service so that it 
is affordable for people to use. This policy is based on a social motive since it is not 
necessarily profit making for the company.  
To conclude, SOEs are likely to follow government policy and are more protected by 
the state as compared to private enterprises. In ongoing debate, government 
interference has commonly been seen as a negative influence that inhibits SOEs 
performance (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Dewenter and Malatesta 2001), even though 
Sun, Tong, and Tong (2002) and Feng, Sun, and Tong (2004) oppose this argument 
as they found that the governments  of China and Singapore with their SOEs/GLCs 
were a positive catalyst in the country‟s economic development. In the Indonesian 
context, government involvement can be found in many policies that regulate SOEs 





3.7. Hypothesis Development  
Government involvement in SOE has commonly been seen as a negative influence 
that inhibits SOEs performance (eg Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Dewenter and 
Malatesta 2001) even though study has also found that the involvement can be 
positive to SOE performance (Feng, Sun, and Tong 2004). The purpose of this study 
is to investigate the relationship between government involvement in SOEs and SOE 
performance. To facilitate this, government involvement in SOE has been classified 
into three areas as described below. These are government intervention in the SOE‟s 
governance, financial, and regulatory framework.  
3.7.1. Governance Related Government Involvement  
The Indonesian government intervenes in the governance of SOEs in a number of 
ways. This includes through the direct ownership of state-owned enterprises and also 
in the appointment of members of the Boards of Directors and Boards of 
Commissioners. The influence of intervention in these variables on SOE 
performance is discussed below.  
Government Ownership (H1) 
One of the major principles of corporate governance underpinning the OECD 
Guidelines is the „equitable treatment of shareholders‟ (OECD 2005). All 
shareholders should have fair and equal treatment and access to corporate 
information. Accordingly, the practice must include the presence of a high level of 
transparency across majority and minority shareholders, rules for communication and 
consultation with all shareholders, and the proper provisions for minority 
shareholders to be involved in fundamental decision-making processes and in 
shareholder meetings. Moreover, equal treatment signifies that heterogeneous 
shareholders are more likely to have access to a richer decision- making process and 
outcome. 
Characteristically, majority shareholders have strong control over the firm under 
heterogeneous ownership conditions. This allows them to control decisions in 
relation to monitoring activities that minority shareholders cannot. The most 
common methods are to be a member of the BOC, to conduct regular meetings with 
management teams, to participating in the company‟s daily operation (Fama and 
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Jensen 1983; Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach 2010). As the ownership increases, 
the majority owners are more advantaged, particularly when the ownership reaches a 
certain level (Sheifer and Vishny 1997, 759). 
A study by Hope (2013) claims that there is diversity among different groups of 
majority shareholders: family ownership, institutional ownership, state ownership 
and employees. Companies with family ownership as the controlling shareholders 
demand power through appointing a CEO who comes from the family. As also 
studied by La Porta, Lopex-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), one typical action of a 
controlling shareholder is to use pyramids and be involved in management. This is, 
however, found to improve the company performance (Anderson and Reeb 2003). 
Agency problems as an impact of management and ownership separation were found 
to be less exposed in family firms (Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan 2007). This may 
explain the positive value of family ownership. Meantime, institutional ownership 
(eg pension fund and mutual fund) is argued to be more passive. Their core business 
is portfolio investment and therefore, is more focussed to succeed in absolute money 
terms. On the other hand, state ownership is more sophisticated since the government 
desires to control SOEs through becoming a majority shareholder. This results in 
state owned companies receiving considerable political intervention (Schmidt 1996; 
Kamal 2010). As for employee ownership, being dominant shareholders leads them 
to increasing employee-manager goal alignment and productivity. Both result in 
better returns (Hope cited from Kruse, Blasi and Park 2009
24
). To conclude, as 
observed by Sheifer and Vishny (1997) and Hope (2013), majority shareholders or 
highly concentrated owners prefer to control for their own benefit, where minority 
shareholders do not have such control.  
Examples of a majority shareholder or high concentrated ownership are found in 
both developed and developing economies worldwide. Research across the world 
finds evidence of large shareholders or controlling shareholders, including some 
OECD countries (European Corporate Governance Network 1997), European 
countries (Borisova et al. 2012), and Asian countries (La Porta et al. 1998; Xu and 
                                                 
24 Kruse, Douglas L., Joshph R. Blasi, and Rokeun Park. 2009. Shared Capitalism in the US Economy: 
Prevalence, Characteristics, and Employee Views of Financial Participation in Enterprises. Shared Capitalism at 
Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, University of Chicago 
Press (Chapter 1). 
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Wang 1999; Lukviarman 2004; Yi-Hua, Jeng-Ren, and Yenn-Ru 2010). La Porta et 
al. specify controlling shareholders exist in countries with weak shareholder legal 
protection.  
Furthermore, La Porta, Lopex-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999, 511) looked at the 
ownership structures of  large companies in 27 countries and discovered that in 
instances of family or state ownership, the founder of the companies or their 
successors, were the majority owners. Not only did the controlling shareholders 
monitor management, there are cases where they were part of the top management.  
The proportion of Government ownership in state-owned companies varies across 
nations. A study by Borisova et al. of the European Union community, notes that 
government owned is 11.8 per cent on average of 133 SOEs from 14 EU countries 
(2012, 2920). This level of ownership has substantial increased since 2008 as an 
impact of the global financial crisis. In China, publicly listed companies have more 
government dominance in ownership. According to a China Securities and Futures 
Statistics result summarized by Qiang (2003, 774), state shares account for 41.31 per 
cent among two other groups (legal personnel or organisation shares and tradable A-
shares) in 1994. The figure fluctuates over the years with 38.90 per cent in 2000. 
Between these years, specifically by the end of 1995, Xu and Wang (1999, 76) 
demonstrate that government has been one of the main shareholders controlling 
approximately 30 per cent of shares.   
Furthermore, investigations into four Arab countries by Omran, Bolbol, and 
Fatheldin (2008) concluded that Egypt had the highest government ownership at 34 
per cent, whereas Jordan and Oman documented the lowest level of government 
ownership (9 per cent and 6 per cent respectively) and the largest level of private 
ownership at 80 per cent.  
Research on the effect of government ownership on performance suggests different 
kinds of results. In China‟s privatized SOEs, a number of researchers found a 
negative association between government ownership and company performance (Xu 
and Wang 1999; Sun, Tong, and Tong 2002; Chen et al. 2005; Gunasekarage, Hess, 
and Hu 2007; Chen et al. 2011). Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and Boycko et al. 
(1996) claim that government controlled SOEs made decisions by prioritising 
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political objectives over profit maximization. This policy creates a conflict between a 
social welfare agenda and political interest and explains why SOEs with a controlling 
ownership by government do not serve the public interest better than private ones. 
Employment of political connections (Chen et al. 2011) and favourable deals with 
connected suppliers and customers, over-employment and transfer of resources to 
supporters (Shleifer 1998) are instances that demonstrate how SOEs are rarely 
conducive to efficiency (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 
1997; Dewenter and Malatesta 2001). More specifically, Xu and Wang (1999, 93) 
tested government‟s ownership over employment policy as the source of inefficiency 
in SOEs. They demonstrated a decrease of labour productivity as the ratio of 
government ownership increased. As increased employment is one of the 
government‟s objectives; the inefficiency may have been created as a consequence.  
Considerable research on government ownership in the banking industry has been 
conducted worldwide to see the level of government intervention in bank operations 
(eg La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1998; La Porta, Lopex-De-Silanes and 
Shleifer 2000; Tabalujan 2002; Dinç 2005; Prabowo and Soegiono 2010).  La Porta, 
Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) investigated banks from 49 countries and 
documented that government owned banks were large and common around the world  
and particularly significant in poor and underdeveloped countries with low income, 
weak financial systems, highly involved government yet low protection of property 
rights (2000, 290). They assert that such ownership politicises the process of 
resource allocation and efficiency reduction, leading to lower profitability and 
productivity growth of government owned banks compared to private owned banks. 
Meantime, Dinç asserts further that the lending level of government banks escalates 
during election time in comparison to private banks. It reveals that political influence 
is driving these government companies and macroeconomic factors before the 
election takes place (p.20). Similarly, Indonesia SOEs, particularly banks are known 
to have a higher level of political exposure that potentially harms SOE performance 
(Basri 2009; Rafick and Amir 2010). Despite the high intervention, Probowo and 
Soegiono report that their study could not find enough evidence that the intervention 
led to performance decline (Prabowo and Soegiono 2010).  
On balance the literature supports the proposition that government ownership is 
negatively related with performance. However, this is not consistent across all levels 
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of ownership. Some studies report a non-linear relationship with the negative 
relationship evident at differing (generally higher) levels of ownership (McConnell 
and Servaes, 1990; de Miguel, 2004; Dhnadirek and Tang, 2003). 
Contrary to the above findings, Sun, Tong, and Tong (2002, 22-3) reveal that a 
positive impact on SOE performance occurs when partial government ownership 
takes place. While too few shares owned by government implies too little 
involvement from government, conversely a high level of share ownership means a 
high degree of control or intervention of government in SOE operations. This 
benefits SOEs with financial difficulties such as insolvency since the government can 
release the SOEs from such trouble. However, this pattern is found to be an inverted 
U-shape indicating that a positive association works only at a certain level of share 
ownership.  
Feng, Sun, and Tong (2004) also found that having government ownership can have 
corporate value. Their research in Singapore found that a high level of government 
involvement has been a positive catalyst in Singapore. SOEs or so-called 
„Government-linked companies (GLCs)‟ have gained a strategic role in the country‟s 
economic development due to the government‟s full involvement in planning, 
paving, and managing Singapore‟s development pathway. Ang and Ding support this 
finding as they contrast the GLCs‟ and non-GLCs‟ financial and market performance 
and evidence that GLCs show higher financial performance and more sound 
corporate governance than those of non-GLCs. The Singaporean government control 
GLCs through a holding company named Temasek Holdings, by monitoring and 
partaking as board members of the company (Ang and Ding 2006, 85-86).  
Later study by Tian and Estrin (2008, 85), however, presents new evidence. Their 
investigation of Chinese publicly listed companies finds that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between government ownership and company value. The finding 
suggests a negative association initially when the value drops as the level of 
government ownership increases. However, the value goes up after reaching a certain 
level of shareholding (25 per cent), and the relationship becomes positive. They 
explain the additional shareholders create a positive incremental effect when the 
government becomes a large shareholder (with more than 25 per cent of stock 
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ownership). This finding concludes that Chinese‟ state ownership can associate 
positively with company performance only at high levels of ownership.  
Similarly, Tian and Estrin (2008), Yi-Hua, Jeng-Ren, and Yenn-Ru (2010, 69) also 
demonstrate a positive relationship in China between government ownership and 
SOE performance in the case of dividend preference when the proportion of shares 
reaches a certain level. Interestingly, a later study by Wu, Wu, and Rui (2012) used 
different approaches by investigating private companies with and without political 
connectedness. They found that companies whose managers have political 
connection experienced higher value and attained more subsidies than those without 
politically connected managers.   
The Indonesian legal framework determines that to be recognized as a SOE, a 
minimum of 51 per cent of SOE‟s shares should be possessed by the government. 
SOEs are intended to be majority owned by government yet open for privatisation 
opportunities. Earlier research has shared a one directional perspective on SOE 
privatisation in Indonesia that it leads to better performance (ADB 2001; Nugroho 
2003; Laksanawan 2008; Nugroho and Wrihatnolo 2008; Sugiharto 2008; Siagian 
2004; Astami et al. 2010). While statistically there is a gradual increase in the 
number of privatized SOEs since 1998, it indirectly implies that the privatisation 
policy is preferable because it invigorates SOEs. However, reducing the proportion 
of government ownership of the SOEs believing this will lead to better performance 
is not always correct. For instance, the privatisation of several Indonesian SOEs‟ has 
not always been successful (Kementerian BUMN 2002; Sutianto 2012; 
Metrotvnews.com 2013). Taking into consideration the above discussion, this thesis 
posits that government ownership is a determinant factor explaining SOE financial 
performance. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H1: Government ownership is negatively associated with SOE financial 
performance. 
 
CEO External Appointment (H2) 
There has been extensive discussion in the literature about the preference of CEO 
background. That is whether the new CEO should be appointed from inside - 
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someone inside the organisation, or outside -someone who does not work for the 
organisation before succession takes place. Diacon and O‟Sullivan (1995) and Jiang, 
Huang, and Kim (2013) argue the advantages and disadvantages of each type. The 
successful appointment of a new CEO relies heavily not only on the selection process 
but also the basis for setting up such a process like the motive and preference to 
select candidates from inside or outside.   
Conventional wisdom says that a company elects an insider that they trust for having 
a proven track- record in the company. In this case, the insider is believed to be more 
likely to have better knowledge about the company. His/her involvement starts 
earlier thus they are more familiar with the goals and strategies of the company. 
He/she also has established relationships with the top executive and the board early. 
Because of this, the insider candidate requires a shorter time to adapt than outsider 
candidates (Schnatterly and Johnson 2008, 133). This argument is supported by 
Harris and Helfat (1997) who claim that the outsider is less knowledgeable about the 
company and possibly less skilful within the industry. This leads to a longer learning 
curve for an outsider (Lauterbach, Vu, and Weisberg 1999) compared to an insider 
who is more likely to be familiar with the characteristics of the company.  
The appointment of an inside CEO candidate is also found to be more efficient. An 
established company ought to maintain data about prospective human resources from 
their achievements in the company. This motivates qualified people to stay in the 
company and promotes trustworthiness and confidence (Friedman and Saul 1991). 
Hence having an insider choice for CEO diminishes various recruitment, replacement 
and compensation expenses. In addition, observations by Schnatterly and Johnson 
(2008, 141) found that a significant turnover of CEOs was more likely to happen in 
technology-based firms due to rapid changes in technology. Such firms invest human 
capital for firm-specific knowledge, industry and networking. From this perspective, 
the company can minimize costs if they appoint an insider CEO. An outside 
successor means more expensive operational costs (Naveen 2006, 665).   
Another reason of favouring insiders over outsiders is that insiders can reduce risks 
to the company. As pointed by Harris and Helfat (1997, 899), outsiders represent a 
higher risk to the company. Incorrect judgement and decision making in selecting a 
CEO from outside can happen because of a lack of information about the candidate. 
Particularly, the outsider is more likely to make a rash move that can extend the 
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company risk Gabarro (1987). Consequently, having an insider CEO candidate 
minimises the risk by reducing a possible information asymmetry between managers 
and board members (Schnatterly and Johnson 2008, 134).  
Despite the arguments that value insider CEOs as a more preferable option, 
researchers who have investigated outsider CEOs have come up with opposing 
arguments about the strengths of outsiders CEOs (Tibau and Debackere 2008, 224).  
Firstly, a CEO invited from outside the organisation may provide independent 
leadership that creates value (Said, Zainuddin, and Haron 2009). The company 
presumes that an outsider will convey new information, competence and insight into 
the company (Karaevli 2007, 700). Thus, they have a higher ability to make changes 
in the organisation than insiders since their presence is expected to also influence and 
improve the managerial quality (Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino 2004, 273), whereas 
long-tenured insiders might have narrower viewpoints, and a psychological 
commitment to the existing situation (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson 1993, 
412).  
Secondly, researchers have shown that the selection committee (the board) actually 
benefits from the beginning of the selection process. Westphal and Fredrickson  
(2001, 1127) assert that the selection committee can use the opportunity during the 
process of selection to align the outside candidates‟ successful achievements in their 
past work with the company‟s future strategic direction. They also emphasize that the 
board can place expectations on the appointed outsider to encourage them to obtain 
similar achievements. This assists the new CEO because they are aware from the 
beginning what the expectations on them are (Finklstein and Hambrick, 1996, 192).  
Thirdly, another advantage of a CEO with an outside background is that the presence 
of new outsiders increases the prospect for a substantial system transformation in the 
company. The leader succession in conjunction with a strategic reorientation can be a 
sign of the end of the old order. It also gives legitimacy for new system (Virany, 
Tushman, and Romanelli 1992, 88). This is particularly relevant to companies in 
turbulent situations. In their observation of 59 minicomputer (technology based) 
firms, CEO turnover impacted positively on firm performance. Virany, Tushman, 
and Romanelli also found that both a newly selected CEO and a change in the 
executive team can significantly but impartially improve firm performance. The new 
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formation of a team allows for greater diversity in skills, experience and other factors 
that may benefit the company, which may not be the case with insiders. 
What drives the selection of CEOs given that both insiders and outsiders have their 
own positive and negative values? Past research has identified various factors that 
influence the decision of CEO succession and the preferred background. First, Jalal 
and Prezas (2012, 425) find the level of players within the firm‟s industry influences 
the choice. Companies with more firms in a similar business category have a 
tendency to pick up candidates from a similar industry.  
Second, the characteristic of the business is also a factor to consider. For instance, a 
high technology-based company will desire insiders since the human investment for 
specific expertise or know-how, market knowledge and relationships take time to 
acquire and is normally invested in people who already work for the company 
(Harris and Helfat 1997; Schnatterly and Johnson 2008, 134).  
Third, the type of company also tends to show different preferences on CEO 
background. For instance, private companies are predominantly family owned 
businesses and therefore have a typical preference of having relatives or friends as 
top executives. They also note that the presence of an heir-apparent significantly 
affects the preference of an insider while the non-insider board member reduces the 
preference of having outsider candidate (Jiang, Huang, and Kim 2013, 50). In 
contrast, Jiang, Huang, and Kim find that SOEs decide the CEO background by 
taking into account the firm-specific reasons. High risk SOEs are more likely to 
appoint outsider CEOs. Likewise, SOEs with high market-to-book value also prefer 
outsiders to insiders. Schnatterly and Johnson argue that the decision of inviting 
outsider candidates only occurs when the board believes there is no candidate from 
inside (2008, 140).   
Other considerations in the selection of a successor CEO, such as firm performance, 
growth, size, firm age (Schnatterly and Johnson 2008, 140), organisation similarity 
with industry norms (Kesner and Sebora, 1994) and the composition of Board of 
Directors (Jalal and Prezas 2012, 425) also enrich the literature about the CEO 
selection process.  
71 
 
Empirical findings document numerous descriptive statistics of insider and outsider 
successors where the portion of insiders is likely to be larger than outsiders. Recent 
finding by Jiang, Huang, and Him (2013) document among 1484 CEO turnover in 
China during 2002-2008, 41.4 per cent are made to outsiders (67.7 per cent of the 
samples are Chinese SOEs). By contrast, Schnatterly and Johnson (2008, 136) 
highlight that 30 out of 64 CEO successions (sample taken from 700 observations) 
are insiders; 24 are outsiders, and the remaining 10 are outsiders from board 
members. Jiang, and Huang, and Him found that appointed outsider CEOs associate 
positively with the firm performance only when SOEs hire outsiders due to specific 
reasons such as high risk in the company (p.60). 
A study by Jalal and Prezas (2012) specifically examines outsider CEO turnover. 
Instead of comparing insider CEOs with outsider CEOs, they assess two groups of 
incoming outsider CEOs, i.e. from within similar industry and outside industry. The 
study points out two important facts. First, it reveals the fact that among 528 outsider 
CEO samples during the period of study in 1993-2009, 40.91% are appointed from 
within similar industries indicating that outside industry CEOs are preferred (p.403).  
Second, companies with outsider CEO successors from similar industries enjoy an 
increase in stock performance as an impact of the market reaction in the following 
year after succession than those from outside industries (p.409). However, after a 
number of years, their performance is overtaken. The company with outside industry 
originated CEOs perform better financially by having lower levels of financial 
leverage and greater amounts of dividend, capital expenditure, profitability and 
growth (p.418-423).  Unlike the succession of other management team members, the 
CEO turnover has a direct and immediate impact on the company. As evidenced by 
Kesner and Sebora (1994, 329), the company can experience an increase in 
performance following CEO succession. More specifically, Jiang, Huang, and Kim 
document that firms experience risk reduction and are economically justified (2013, 
58-62).  
In the Indonesian SOE context, CEO turnover is stipulated in the legislation. The 
appointment and dismissal of directors – including the CEO- is conducted by the 
General Meeting of the Shareholders. It is a five year-term for each tenure and for a 
maximum two terms. For nationally strategic SOEs, the CEO turnover is at the 
discretion of the top government group, which is chaired by the President 
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(Presidential Instruction for the Appointment of Directors and or 
Commissioners/Supervisory Board Members)
25
. The presidential instruction, 
however, does not specify CEO background. As such, the selection process becomes 
highly influenced by the government since SOEs are fully or majority owned by the 
state.  
As discussed earlier, government involvement in the SOE might carry multipurpose 
motives and agenda. This includes top management appointment of which the 
preference of outsider or insider SOEs might be determined depending upon this 
exclusive agenda. Chen et al. (2011) assert that top executives with a government 
background or political connection with government is found to have an impact in 
the decline of investment efficiency.  
 Regardless, the most common type of turnover is by internal appointment 
(Lauterbach, Vu, and Weisberg 1999; Ocasio, 1999; Naveen 2006; Schnatterly and 
Johnson 2008; Puspasari and Evans 2012a) even though diverse studies promote 
outsiders because the evidence supports a positive influence after outsider CEO 
succession. With this regard, this study hypothesises:  
H2: CEO external appointment relates positively to the SOE financial 
performance. 
 
Chairperson’ s External Experience  (H3) 
The BOC is a vital element of governance. Under the two-tier board system, its main 
function is as a supervisory board and signifies a formal connection between 
shareholder and management. The initial concept is that a supervisory board is 
formed as an extension of shareholders to represent and defend their rights against 
the executive or management board (Baums 2003). It has the potential to function as 
an effective disciplining mechanism to guarantee a successful alignment between the 
interest of shareholders and the accomplishment of management. This is the core of 
agency theory, which concentrates on the emergence of conflict of interest between 
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principals and agents and how to overcome such conflict (Jensen and Meckling 
1976).  
One of the major concerns about the effectiveness of the BOC is the appointment of 
a chairperson. It should be noted that the chairperson hereafter in this thesis, is a 
person chairing the BOC who can be a former officer of the company or from outside 
the company.  This should be differentiated from the chairperson of the BOD in the 
Anglo-Saxon or one-tier model who has two functions: supervisory and executor, 
therefore having one person being a chairperson as well as the Chief of Executive 
Officer. In this context, a chairperson can be someone from the executive or an 
outsider (non-executive). Meanwhile, the term “Chairperson” used in this thesis uses 
the context of the two-tier Indonesian model, which means a double position of CEO 
and Chairperson is impossible.  
Previously, it was discussed that a CEO could come from outside the company 
(outsider) or from within the company (insider). The main advantage of hiring a 
CEO from outside is the technical competence they have (such as specialisation or 
expertise, including leadership and corporate culture that is expected to increase the 
firm value), which may be absent in current management or insider candidates. 
Meantime, a CEO appointed from within the company is more appreciated for 
his/her experience working in the company as he/she has a better understanding 
about the company's history and business processes, so it does not need long to 
adapt.   
As a BOC coordinator, a chairperson conducts supervisory functions on behalf of the 
General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) or shareholders. Therefore, the background 
of the Chairperson is different from the CEO and should align more closely to 
shareholders or management. Therefore, the role of an independent chairperson 
becomes very crucial to ensure the BOC performs its function effectively (Syakhroza 
2005). An independent chairperson is exceptionally useful in companies where the 
CEO chases a brave and risky approach to secure the company (Campbell 1995, 
108).  In the context of a family firm and a publicly listed company, an independent 
chairperson can be those from professions with specific expertise. In the context of 
government owned companies (SOEs), there are independent commissioners and 
ordinary commissioners (Kamal 2008). As such, those who originate from outside 
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the government or SOEs are called independent chairpersons. The majority of them 
are professionals with specific expertise, for example financial experts and other 
technical experts. Others can be from academia to community leaders. Other than as 
an independent chairperson (from the group of so-called “ordinary members”) is a 
chairperson appointed from the government office or those whose office is affiliated 
with government. A senior government office is the most common one. Others are 
from senior management from other SOEs, retired senior government 
officer/SOE/army or police or other legal enforcement officer (Puspasari and Evans 
2012a).  
If an appointed chairperson comes from the Government, it has the main impact of 
having a close linkage to the government bureaucracy. Wu, Wu, and Rui (2012, 697) 
reveal that a chairperson from a government office leads to better relationships with 
the authorities. This benefits the company for instance, by paying less tax, and giving 
them more opportunity to access debt financing (Johnson and Mitton 2003; 
Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven 2008). However, others argue that having government 
people in the BOC can also invite further intervention. According to Booth and Deli 
(1996), as adviser, he/she can be less objective compared to an independent 
commissioner. His/her political link can affect how the company is steered (Ferris 
and Yan 2007; Fan, Lau, and Young 2007).  The government controls SOEs in 
making decisions by prioritizing political objectives over profit maximization. For 
instance, the Chairperson can influence the team by insisting on the employment of 
people by political connection (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Dewenter and Malatesta  
2001; Xiongyung and Shan 2013). According to Dewenter and Malatesta, this can 
cause inefficiency as it creates more leverage and labour intensity.  
If an independent candidate (outsider) is appointed as chairperson, he/she generally 
has strong experience or a career background that is relevant to the company (Sari, 
Halligan, and Sutiyono 2010). This type of chairperson is likely to contribute 
objectively with the expertise that he/she brought from their business experience 
(Booth and Deli 1996).  
Coles and Hesterly (2000) found another possibility, i.e. the appointment of a person 
to be a chairperson from an independent category but with early past experience 
working in the company, such as a former CEO. In this case, even though he/she is 
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an independent commissioner, he/she is equipped with good experience and 
knowledge about the company, its business processes as well as human resources. 
Intuitively, this is an advantage for the company due to the individual‟s shorter 
learning curve. However, Coles and Hesterly learn that because the chairperson still 
has strong ties with the company due to the relationship that has existed in the past, 
the chairperson is likely to be closer to the company's management rather than to the 
shareholders who has assigned him/her. If this is the case, then the role of 
chairperson as an independent commissioner is not optimal. 
Studies on independent chairpersons have mixed results. For instance, Chau and 
Gray (2010) document a positive relationship between the assignment of independent 
chairpersons and the voluntary disclosure level. They argue that the appointment 
seems to alleviate the family ownership influence as the controlling shareholder. On 
the other hand, a study by Ferris and Yan (2007) evidenced differently. In response 
to trading scandal and abuse cases in the US, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) requested a change to improve governance practice for 
companies by filling their mutual fund boards with an independent chairperson and 
at least 75 per cent independent directors. Ferris and Yan investigated the impact of 
this new arrangement and discovered that there was  no adequate evidence to show 
that independent chairperson succession improved the value of the fund management 
(p. 416-7). 
From the opposite viewpoint, examination of the insider chairperson conversely 
evidences a positive impact on the effectiveness of the board in performing their 
monitoring function (Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma 2004).  
With regard to SOEs in Indonesia, the BOC members consist of independent 
members and ordinary members (Kamal 2008). As specified by the State-Owned 
Enterprise Law, a chairperson of the BOC can be appointed from either independent 
(outside government or SOE environment) or ordinary members. The Government 
(Ministry of SOE), who acts as the General Meeting of Shareholders in fully owned 
SOE or as a majority shareholder in partially owned SOEs, has full control over the 
appointment of a chairperson.  
Having a chairperson with government links can be an entrance point for political 
interference and influence the performance of the SOE (Fan, Lau, and Young 2007). 
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For Indonesia, historically, in the early stages of transformation from Dutch 
companies being nationalised as SOEs in the late 1950s to early 1960s, SOEs were 
under the leadership of the military (Hill 2000; Rafick and Amir 2010) with strong 
patronage and unofficial finance (Abeng 2001). The military and senior officers 
resisted reforms to improve corporate governance.  Even though there has been 
positive progress on the SOE governance practice, a long tradition of business 
approach, such as lobbying and wait-for-instruction instead of take initiative, still 
leaves room for the SOE bureaucracy and the leadership practice to be politically and 
financially oriented (Abeng 2001; Rafick and Amir 2010). Kamal (2008) emphasizes 
that the BOC in Indonesia is in a weak position to ensure professionalism in 
performing its role as they are not a purely independent company organ.  
To conclude, as the chairperson of the BOC is a vital element of governance in 
SOEs, the appointment of a chairperson has a direct impact in promoting an effective 
disciplining mechanism and to guarantee a successful alignment between the interest 
of shareholders (the GMS) and the accomplishment of management (the BOD). 
Jensen (1993) argues that chairperson independence can properly improve the 
supervisory function. Based on the review above, this study will test whether a 
chairperson of the BOC having external experience is associated with SOE financial 
performance, as proposed in the following hypothesis.   
H3: Chairperson’s external experience is related positively to the SOE 
financial performance.   
 
The Proportion of Government Related Directors on the BOD (H4) 
In general, an agency problem arises because of the separation of ownership and 
management functions. As a utility maximiser, managers can potentially take 
advantage of their expertise and accessibility to internal information for personal use, 
but at the cost charged to the owner (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). In the case of SOEs, such relationships can get worse as the government (the 
owner) has very limited ability to monitor the company. According to Li and Xia, 
this lack of ability gives managers greater opportunity to perform opportunistic 
actions that benefit themselves. Likewise, managers must enact administrative 
procedures and government policies, which can lead to inefficiency in resources and 
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indiscretion of management (2008, 42). Such agency problems may disappear by 
effective monitoring, one of which is through having a combination of inside and 
outside directors in a company (Byrd and Hickman 1992; Erickson et al. 2005; Le, 
Kroll, and Walters 2012). Erickson et al. claim that board composition influences the 
management of board monitoring regardless of its level of ownership concentration 
(2005, 389).   
A composition of the Board of Directors (management board) comprises inside 
directors (insider) and outside directors (outsider). Inside directors are those who 
come from within the company. In a company with diverse shareholders, insiders are 
usually considered representative of the controlling shareholder. The main reason 
that a company favours insiders is because they have knowledge about the 
company‟s day-to-day operations and regulations built from their experience 
working in the company, thus they have valuable information and know the company 
better than outsiders (Bryd and Hickman 1992). Meantime, outside directors are 
desirable because of their expertise, knowledge or experience in certain areas 
(Palmieri 1979; Erickson et al. 2005). Outsiders are competitive in the labour market. 
As such, ability and expertise become a way to build reputations (Fama 1980; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Erickson et al. showed that financial experts who were recruited 
from financial institutions increase the performance of the company after they joined.  
Furthermore, there is the assumption that poor performance in a company is caused 
by poor management. As such, a higher level of supervision of management (agency 
theory) is required. That is when outsiders are often brought into the company 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 1988).  Outsiders are expected to create value to the 
company they join (Said, Zainuddin, and Haron 2009).  However, outsiders are 
criticised for their lack of knowledge as opposed to insiders (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson 1990). 
In the instance of SOEs, the insider does not just mean someone from inside the 
company. In Indonesian SOE practice, as a government owned company, an insider 
of an SOE may also come from someone inside a government office or be a military 
officer or from other SOEs (Puspasari and Evans 2012a). For instance, if a senior 
officer from the Ministry of SOE happens to meet the criteria of the BOD member‟s 
fit and proper test, he or she may be invited to join one of SOEs. Military officers can 
also be categorised as insiders. The Indonesian government has entrusted and 
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appointed military officers to lead and manage SOEs (Rosser 2003; Rafick and Amir 
2010).  This occurred in 1966 when an „entrepreneurial military officer‟, which is the 
empowerment of military officers in managing SOEs, took roles as SOE managers 
after the restructuring of nationalised companies took place. Military officers were 
known for their loyalty and discipline; thus this was considered necessary in order to 
secure the SOEs. Likewise, a reshuffling of BOD members among SOEs from the 
construction sector took place in 2008 (Nuria 2008).  
The role of independent directors is very important. Studies (such Bathala and Rao, 
1995; Xie, Davidson Lii, and DaDalt 2003) promote the importance of outsiders to 
increase firm value. However, a number of investigations on board independence and 
firm value result in different conclusions.  For instance, Merhran (1995) and Klein 
(1998) have proved that no significant relationship is found between board 
independence and firm value. Later on, Erickson et al confirm a contrasting result of 
their investigation that board independence associates negatively with corporate 
value (2005). It should be noted, however, that Erickson et al. also have conflicting 
results when examining the relation between board composition and firm value in 
highly concentrated public listed companies in Canada. The period of 1993–1997 is 
used. They document there is a rise in the outside directors proportion in the 
succeeding year. However, the growth of independent board members does not 
improve the firm value, except that directors with financial background can 
contribute to the monitoring benefits.  
In the context of SOEs, BOD independence is an important aspect of governance. 
Distinctively, the SOE board is characterized by state representation, the presence 
and number of employee representatives and the degree of independence (OECD, 
2005). The OECD observed that the composition varies across countries depending 
upon the influence of the government, the employee representation, and the 
importance of independent members. It can be a zero state representation (eg in 
Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and the US), proportional to their ownership (eg 
Austria, the Czech Republic, New Zealand), the fix percentage (eg a one third in 
France and 50 per cent in Mexico) to full members from insiders (Turkey).   
While, the BOD is viewed as the most important internal control mechanism 
responsible for disciplining the actions of insiders (Fama and Jensen 1983) and board 
structure determines the effectiveness of the BOD in monitoring the firm‟s insiders, a 
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BOD with more government representation might lead to less effective management 
and thus a decrease of performance. Cheung et al. (2011) suggest a negative 
corporate governance practice emerged when close connections between the BOD 
and the controlling shareholder exist and leads to decreasing market value for the 
firm. This assumes the more government representation on the BOD as one form of 
insiderness, the more likely the SOE is to have poor corporate governance practice.  
Conversely, effective monitoring through the presence of outsiders on the board, as 
recognised by agency theory (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983), is believed to 
promote an increase of firm value. Therefore, it is hypothesised in this study that:  
H4: The proportion of government related Directors on the BOD will be 
positively related to the SOE financial performance.  
 
The Proportion of Government Related Commissioners on the BOC (H5) 
In agency theory, the disjoint of decision management, i.e. initiating and executing 
decisions, and decision control, i.e. endorsing and supervising decisions, is important 
for an effective decision process (Fama and Jensen 1983, 304). The rationale relies 
on the fact that top managers, who make important decisions, yet not the most 
affected party of their decisions, are not the equity holders who are largely diffused 
by those decisions. In doing so, Bathala and Rao (1995, 59) argue that the most 
important organisational control, among others, is the presence of the Board of 
Directors, which in this thesis is labelled as the BOC. Regardless of the scale of the 
company, the shareholders authorise power to this board with its supervisory 
function to control crucial decisions related to the top-level manager, including their 
appointment, dismissal, and remuneration. Likewise, the board is given power to 
endorse and supervise vital decisions (Fama and Jensen 1983, 311).  
To ensure its supervisory function, the board composition (refers to BOC 
composition) becomes focal by balancing board members from outside or outsiders 
or non-executive directors and those from inside or executive directors. The agency 
literature identifies this board composition as one of the enabling mechanisms that 
alleviate agency conflicts in the company as the background of each group member 
offers certain benefits but the debate on which type of board member is more 
effective is still going on. Researchers have found that board members from outside 
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shelter shareholders in certain ways because their major function is to assure that 
board members from inside engage in and are consistent with the best interests of the 
shareholders (Fama 1980). The importance of inviting independent directors into the 
board can also be seen as a balance of members from outside and inside as a way to 
provide adequate and effective checks and balances (Bain and Band 1996), to 
moderate a dispute among inside board members (Fama and Jensen 1983, 315) and 
to prevent earnings management (Xie, Davidson Iii, and DaDalt 2003, 314). Outside 
members can be effective monitors of the boards‟ decisions due to their 
independence, reputation and value in the market that is associated with their 
company‟s performance (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Kaplan and Reishus 
1990).   
The literature also presents a perspective on the presence of outside board members 
and on which inside board members have the advantage. Bathala and Rao (1995, 60) 
assess the lack of inside information as the less favourable side of outside members 
compared to inside members. Correspondingly, Raheja (2005, 285) concludes his 
investigation showing that those with low verification costs to outside board 
members and low private benefits to inside board members are the most effective 
boards. Raheja also emphasized that inside board members benefit the company 
because of their particular knowledge about the company.  
Several prior studies have identified a positive association between board 
composition and company performance. Hossain, Prevost, and Rao (2001, 143) 
reviewed the implementation of the Companies and Financial Reporting Acts of 
1993 in New Zealand and found that the legislation has a positive influence on 
company performance. Moreover, an  important  role  of  outside  board members in 
corporate  governance as they  tend  to  represent  the  interests  of  shareholders  in  
control  contests, is proven in anti-takeover action too. Investigation by Brickley, 
Coles and Terry (1994, 388) found that the average stock-price  reacts significantly 
positively to  the  adoption  of  a  poison  pill  announcement if the board is 
dominated by outside board members and significantly negatively otherwise. 
Another study, conducted by McWilliams and Sen (1997, 504), investigated 265 
firms proposing an anti-takeover amendment in the US in the period of 1980-1990. 
They found that the stock price reaction appeared more negative. They found that a 
negative association between stock price reaction in the market and the proportion of 
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inside and affiliated outside board members and the increase of shareholdings from 
the board members.  
On the contrary, a study by Erickson et al. (2005, 409) using data on publicly listed 
Canadian companies over 1993-1997 presented evidence that the independence of 
the board was negatively related to firm value. Erickson et al explained that using 
investor demand as a reason for adding outside members does not contribute to 
positive company value. This finding seems inconsistent with the notion that the 
independence of the board provides greater benefit in terms of supervision. Yet, 
Erickson et al. found that the reason was that the action was more to appease 
unsatisfied investors than to fill the expertise gap that existed. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996, 394) examined various mechanisms to mitigate agency problems using an 
extensive sample of 400 firms. The result from empirical evidence suggests a 
negatively significant association between outside board directors and firm 
performance. Agrawal and Knoeber explain the underlying political constraints that 
affect their being given board member positions as the reason for this puzzle. Similar 
results have been reported by Bhagat and Black (2002, 263) on their investigation of 
American public companies which are dominated by outside board members. Using 
a variety of performance measures over a long period of observation, the evidence 
shows that the increased number of outside board members in low-profit firms did 
not increase the company performance.  
In a legal context, SOEs in Indonesia follow the two-tier model with a Board of 
Commissioners (BOC) comprising independent board members and ordinary board 
members. The presence of these two types of board members demonstrates the level 
of independency of the members (Kamal 2008). Independent members of the BOC 
are those who have no financial, management, ownership ties or family relationships 
with a member of the BOC, the BOD or the controlling shareholder or the 
government that may affect its ability to act independently (Kementerian BUMN 
2002; Kementerian BUMN 2011). Examples of independent members comprise 
professionals, experts, academics, and local community representatives. These 
independent members can be equivalent to outside members in the western context 
as they share similar characteristics. The ordinary board members, on the other hand, 
are different from the context of insider or inside board member in the western 
approach. While insiders refers to board members from executive/management, the 
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ordinary members are members appointed from the government office, military 
office (including Police Department and Ministry of Defence) and retired senior 
officers from government, the military and SOEs.  
An advantage of having ordinary board members on the board is a way to synergise 
the government mission with company strategy. Sari, Halligan, and Sutiyono (2010) 
argue that there is a presence for close linkage to the government bureaucracy in 
their own department when the government representative sits as the board member. 
It benefits SOEs by gaining accessibility to the authority inside the government.  
There are, of course, critiques on having government officers on the board. Greater 
government proportion is considered to inhibit SOEs from operating independently 
and competitively (Hamzah 2007). One of the reasons, as criticized by Didu (2011a) 
is the presence of non-corporate interventions by bureaucrats. The form of 
intervention can be for oneself or group interests. Intervention can occur at the 
beginning when the decisions about board composition and board size as well as the 
appointment of board members is associated with the political elite and national 
figures. Bureaucratic intervention can also occur in the membership of the board 
such as in applying the fit and proper test for directors, in the preparation of criteria 
or job requirements or in the goods and service procurement (Didu 2011a).   
Similar to common governance practice, the composition of the BOC or the 
proportion of independent or ordinary board members to the total of BOC members 
is at the discretion of the the GMS, i.e. the Minister of SOEs (The Implementation of 
Good Corporate Government for State-Owned Enterprise Ministerial Decree
26
), The 
GMS must follow the regulations within the specific industry to which the SOE 
belongs or the regulations of the capital market to determine the composition of the 
BOC. A minimum of 20% independent members of the total board is set. However, 
if non-corporate intervention exists, it can jeopardize the quality of the independence 
of the BOC since the appointed member may not act in the best interests of the 
company but to their personal agenda (Didu 2011a).  
Based on the above arguments, the BOC representation is likely to have a strong 
influence on governance practice in the SOEs. Consistent with the principle of 
                                                 
26 Implementation of Good Corporate Governance for State-Owned Enterprise Ministerial Decree (Minister of 
SOE‟ Decree No. KEP-117/M-MBU/2002). 
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agency theory, which suggests that BOC composition has been linked to the 
reduction of agency problems though effective monitoring,  it seems likely that the 
more independent board members sitting on the BOC, the more effective monitoring 
is exercised. Conversely, the more government representation on the BOC, the more 
unlikely performance improvements will be achieved. The hypothesis is therefore,   
H5: The proportion of government related Commissioners on the BOC will 
be positively related to the SOE financial performance.   
 
The Number of Board Sub-Committees (H6) 
In agency theory, corporate governance is regarded as a vital tool for monitoring 
agency problems that occur due to principal-agent relationships, such as abuse of 
power by managers (Mallin 2004). In supervising managers (agent), check and 
balance mechanisms should be applied. One of many ways to address this issue is to 
form a committee or a number of committees (also referred as “board committee” or 
“sub-committee” in the literature) to help the supervisory board in firms (Weir, 
Laing, and McKnight 2001, 9).  
The formation of committees varies across countries depending upon the company 
law applied and the need for governance in each country (OECD 2005). The practice 
is mandatory in some, in others it is not.  The number of specialized committees and 
the members of the committees are set by the Board of Directors (in one-tier models) 
or the Board of Commissioners (in two-tier models). In the UK, all SOEs establish a 
remuneration committee, an audit subcommittee, a risk and nomination 
subcommittee, as they are mandatory according to the Government-Owned Company 
Act, whereas in Spain, the Netherlands and Korea, the three types of committees are 
found in almost all SOEs. Moreover, the OECD also reports that among others, audit 
committees and remuneration committees are the most commonly found in a 
company.   
A board can establish committees based on the need. Different types of committee, 
for example, the audit, nomination, remuneration, insurance, strategy and risk 
management committees, have specific functions assigned to them. An audit 
committee has duties to assign auditors from outside the firm to review the financial 
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statement and to address any major findings by internal auditors (Cadbury Policy; 
OECD 2005). A remuneration committee or compensation committee have tasks to 
formulate the remuneration for directors. This committee is established mainly to 
prevent a conflict of interest by executive directors in setting their own remuneration 
rate. Klein (1998) suggests that the presence of this committee can relieve agency 
problems through a better designed scheme for incentive and bonus that satisfies 
both managers and shareholders. A nomination committee oversees the recruitment 
process for directors. The presence of this committee can avoid personal interests in 
selecting directors based on connections. A risk committee is the committee with 
members that are highly qualified financial experts. A risk committee is usually 
established in particularly large companies. The main mission of this committee is to 
avoid wrong decisions that relate to risky transactions in the business (Mallin 2004).  
A committee is established by the Board of Directors (in a one-tier model) or the 
Board of Commissioners (in two-tier model). In the one-tier, e.g. in the US, members 
of committees are usually independent non-executive directors with particular 
expertise (Knapp (1987) as quoted from AICPA 1978
a
), whereas in the two-tier 
model, members are independent BOC and external members. The number of people 
assigned in one committee also varies. However, according to Cadbury‟s 
recommendation, an audit committee should have at least three members, and should 
be only non-executive directors or an independent supervisory board (Weir, Laing, 
and McKight 2001, 8).  
The benefit of having committees to assist the board has been discussed extensively. 
The audit committee is the most frequently investigated in the literature. The audit 
committee is viewed as the critically important since it mediates between the internal 
auditor, external auditor and the board and management (Klein 1998; Saibaba and 
Ansari 2011, 53).  The committee plays a significant role in monitoring the internal 
control system, reviewing the financial report and external audit process, and making 
sure the information flow to the board and management is proper and unbiased. This 
can alleviate agency conflicts by minimizing information asymmetry. In addition, 
Dey (2008) evidences that a company with larger agency problems is likely to have 
greater governance mechanisms, one of which is the presence of an audit committee.  
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Moreover, study on the impact of audit committees on firm performance has 
suggested mixed results. Wild (1994) reports that the market responds more 
positively to earnings reports after the establishment of an audit committee in the 
firm. Klein (1998) and Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) support Wild‟s findings 
that an audit committee and firm performance associate positively. However, other 
researchers have found that the presence of audit committees has no impact on the 
performance (Vafeas and Theodorou 1998) or even a negative impact to the firm 
value (Rouf 2011).  
These diverse and inconsistent findings are further explained. According to the 
OECD (2005), the impact of having a committee depends on whether the committee 
is independent and able to exercise their task with a clear mandate. This conclusion is 
consistent with other investigations, indicating that the background of committee 
members is important to support the outcome of the committee. Independent audit 
committees increase firm value (Knapp 1987; Saibaba and Ansari 2011). Moreover, 
Klein (1998) also finds a positive relationship between the percentage of inside 
directors on finance and investment committees and accounting and stock market 
performance measures.  
As far as the SOE is concerned, the OECD‟s recommendation states that an SOE 
board should establish a specialised committee to support the board in performing its 
respective functions (2005). It suggests that to increase transparency and disclosure 
the presence of an audit committee is imperative. In order to search for good 
candidates for CEO and  directors and to ensure the independence of the nomination 
process, the establishment of a nomination committee may be effective and 
beneficial. While audit committees are widely investigated, there is limited research 
on other specialised committees. The adoption of specialised committees in SOEs 
has increased (Maassen and van de Bosch 1999; OECD 2005) suggesting an SOE 
may establish an audit committee, nomination committee, remuneration committee, 
risk committee or other type of committee depending upon the need. 
In the Indonesian SOE setting, the law stipulates that the establishment of the audit 
committee is mandatory, while other types of committees are voluntarily based on 
the need of each company. The number and types of committees varies according to 
BOC discretion. Despite mixed results, the committee, as a tool of corporate 
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governance, is expected to work effectively to reduce agency problems and 
eventually increase the company‟s value.  Therefore, this study predicts the larger the 
number of specialized board committees will lead to an increase in firm performance. 
The hypothesis is then:   
H6: The number of Board Sub-committees relates positively to SOE financial 
performance.   
 
3.7.2. Financial Related Government Involvement  
Another way for governments to exercise control over SOEs is through financial 
mechanisms. There are a number of financial or funding activities, two of which are 
attracting attention in the political debate and media: government transfer and asset 
dividend payout policy. The influence of intervention in these two variables on SOE 
performance is discussed below.  
Government Transfer Payment in the Form of Subsidies or PSO (H7)  
One type of government involvement in SOEs is government transfer where 
government money is transferred to SOEs for special purposes other than capital 
investment. Two types of legally recognised government transfer are subsidy and 
public service obligation (PSO). The first type of transfer, subsidy, is defined as the 
government's efforts to maintain stability of the selling price of goods and services 
that help people to buy/afford them. According to the annual budget laws, a subsidy 
is a budget allocation provided to companies/institutions that produce, sell, export or 
import goods and services, which meet the people‟s need in such a way that the 
selling price can be afforded by the public. It is determined by the line ministry and 
channelled through the state or private companies.  
Typically, a subsidy, is recorded as expenditure in the government budget, of which 
the purposes are varied in each country. For Indonesia, as mentioned in the Annual 
Budget Law
27
, economic efficiency  is the reason why  subsidies are provided for 
many strategic economic sectors in Indonesia, such as fuel oil, electricity, food, 
fertilizer, seeds, interest loan and tax. Meanwhile healthcare, housing, food and job 
                                                 
27 The 2012 Annual Budget Law (Number 22 Year 2011).  
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protection are the main targets for subsidy in Poland, Bulgaria, Finland and Australia 
(Sikora 2005, 245), mass transportation in Japan (Sakai and Shoji 2010) and energy 
in the US (Ritschel and Smestad 2003).   
The second type of government transfer is public service obligation (PSO). 
According to the Public Service Law
28
, PSO is an activity or a series of 
activities/projects by the Government in order to fulfill goods or services or 
administrative services to every citizen and resident as part of the Government‟s 
obligation as a public service provider in accordance with laws and regulations. 
Unlike a subsidy, a PSO emerges because the government has a duty to provide 
public services with the purpose of eliminating the disparity of infrastructure 
provided to the community (Priatna 2005). The State-Owned Enterprise
29
 stipulates 
that a PSO is mostly „subcontracted‟ to SOEs. If the SOEs get the task of 
implementing the PSO, the government may provide financial compensation for the 
assignment. 
Government transfer as one type of government intervention, in this thesis, refers to 
both subsidy and PSO for at least three considerations. Both involve a government 
transfer from the State Treasurer to the SOEs account despite having different 
purposes. A subsidy is given to the operator to cover the disparity between 
production costs and the selling price to the public, a PSO is paid to operators in 
order for them to do what the government assigns them in providing a public service. 
However, both share similar goals in providing goods and services to the public. 
Since both originate from the government, they become highly regulated because 
government control over the tasks is very strong. This raises a question of whether 
government transfer of money to the SOEs gives them more advantage or, 
conversely, disadvantage?    
Researchers have been studying the practice of government subsidisation worldwide. 
Sikora highlights difference in the level of magnitude of subsidy across countries and 
finds that support for subsidy is high in transforming countries (Poland and Bulgaria) 
and in crisis-survived countries (Finland), while much lower in steady developed 
countries (Australia). He also notes that among those four countries, healthcare is the 
                                                 
28 The Public Service Law (Number 25 Year 2009). 
29 The State-Owned Enterprise Law (Number 19 Year 2003) article 66.  
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object with the highest allocation of subsidy, following subsidies for housing, food 
and job protection (Sikora 2005, 254).   
Apart from the fact that the level of importance varies across nations, subsidy is 
found to encourage inefficiency. Tye (1980) examines the deregulation policy on 
international air transport in the US. He found that subsidised SOEs experienced 
great losses in efficiency despite an increase of efficiency elsewhere in the industry. 
As Tye explained, SOEs enjoy the subsidy to enable them to be competitive yet end 
up with anti-competitive behaviour and high cost operationalised state carriers. SOEs 
have no immediate demand for profit compared to private companies (p. 204).  
Comparable with Tye‟s finding, Sakai and Shoji (2010) and Sidak (2002) also 
concluded that subsidy policy works against efficiency. Sakai and Shoji‟s study on 
subsidies for public bus operators in Japan discovered that even though statistically 
about 30% of the total revenues were generated through subsidies, their empirical 
result confirmed a negative association between subsidy and the cost structure of the 
publicly owned bus companies. This comprises the increase of employment, capital 
expenditure and maintenance costs indicating that the presence of subsidies leads to 
technical disadvantages on the cost of increased capital by the operator. As such, it 
eventually discourages the overall efficiency (p.69). Meantime, Sidak‟s examination 
on telecommunication policy addressing a partly privatized firm (specifically 
referring to Deutsche Telekom) finds inconsistency between the bond ratings, 
weighted- average cost of capital and the capital subsidy and suggests that the reason 
lies with the fact that the company‟s obligation to maximize profit acts against the 
ability of this partially government owned company to perform competitively. 
The result above is consistent when the adverse situation occurs. Bajona and Chu 
(2010) investigated the impact of direct subsidy reduction to capital in China. As a 
result of China joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the government was 
obliged to sign accession protocols and, accordingly, China reduced the capital 
subsidy rates. The result demonstrated that small reductions in capital subsidy rates 
can produce significant welfare effects in China. Bajona and Chu argue that the 
subsidy cut substantially affected the decline of the rate of capital accumulation as a 
result of changing their strategy in favouring more labour (p.821). This opens wider 
employment opportunities.   
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A number of findings reveal the fact that subsidies involve strong political 
motivation.  Ritschel and Smestad (2003) investigated the effect of government 
intervention in providing energy subsidies following energy deregulation in 
California, USA that lead to a failure in the electricity market. They observed that the 
presence of an electricity subsidy to consumers as a response to the deregulated 
wholesale price and regulated retail prices demotivated consumers from saving 
energy. Consumers took advantage of disproportionately subsidised goods and 
increased their electricity consumption, degrading the energy saving faster (p.1389). 
It also triggered rigorous financial difficulties and environmental issues.  
The impact of government interference through subsidisation is also studied by 
Chen, Lee, and Li (2008, 273) in China as they found that collusions existed between 
local government and listed firms in earning management. In the capital market, the 
Central Government sets rules for IPO and right offering procedures. When listed 
firms were having problems meeting the requirement for right offerings, the 
concerned local governments were willing to help these listed firms‟ earning 
problems through subsidy, causing the ROE to rise.  
Study on non-oil subsidy policy in Indonesia by Handoko and Patriadi (2005, 61) 
pinpoint issues experienced from SOEs managing government transfers. The subsidy 
provided to SOEs is usually less than the cost of production/service delivery. 
Accordingly, one way to cover this cost gap is by cross-subsidy from other profitable 
business units within the company. This means that the subsidy not only does not 
lead to profit generation, it creates a cost for the company.  Furthermore, Handoko 
and Patriadi also emphasize the lag time between the subsidy projects (at the 
beginning of the fiscal year) and the subsidy fund that is ready for disbursement (by 
the mid or end of fiscal year). Such a time gap will affect the company‟s cash flow 
situation.   
With regard to PSO, funding is based on the financial condition of the government 
rather than the nominal need of SOEs as the operator of PSOs. In practice, there are 
discrepancies between the execution time of PSOs and the availability of funds. 
While the payment system follows the disbursement procedure of the government, 
the funding is not always available any time soon (Handoko and Patriadi 2005, 61). 
As such, the project handled by the SOEs does not necessarily generate sufficient 
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profit for the SOEs although technically, in administrating the PSO it is difficult to 
differentiate between revenues which are from PSO activities and those which are 
not. Likewise, misallocation of funds, (such as when funds intended to subsidise 
economy class train tickets are allocated to those of a higher grade type), can be 
caused by the absence of proper guidelines accompanying the PSO arrangement. 
 
On the other hand, if the PSO project assigned to  SOEs  is already in financial 
distress, undoubtedly the SOEs need financial or funding support from the 
government for covering the cost of production of goods or service, tax, and 
permanent investment to support the capital structure (Evaluasi Risiko Fiskal 2013). 
Government transfers can be seen as two sides of one coin. On one hand, 
government transfer is seen as a political due to government control over providing 
goods and services for public welfare. On the other, the legislation still gives an 
opportunity for SOEs to take advantage and make a profit. Priatna (2005) points out 
that while the regulations allows SOEs to earn profits from subsidy or PSO related 
output, in practice, subsidy and PSO have unclear targets and are misdirected due to 
inaccuracies in economic resource allocation.  Priatna observes that, in fact, allocated 
funds for subsidy and PSO are not all disbursed indicating the SOEs did not fully 
utilize the money for subsidy and/or PSO.   
Researchers view subsidy as a way of government controlling SOEs financially (such 
as Tye 1980; Fiskal 2009). They find a reverse association between subsidy as a 
proxy of government intervention and company efficiency or company performance 
(Tye 1980; Sidak 2002; Xiongyuan and Shan 2013). Given the importance of the 
government's subsidy and PSO policy, the financial impact of this intervention for 
SOEs on their ability to make a profit should be also taken into account. Based on the 
discussion above, this thesis hypothesises: 
H7: Government transfer payments to SOEs in the form of subsidies or PSO 




Dividend Payout Policy (H8) 
Dividend payout policy is a fundamental signal of company performance. It signifies 
the capability of a company to generate profit. Stable dividend payment is likely to 
reduce the uncertainty of investors. Conversely, if the dividend amount declines or is 
even unpaid, the level of investor uncertainty increases following the decline of the 
stock value (Muhayatsyah 2005). 
The dividend payout policy of a company also represents the company‟s reputation 
in the market. According to Bernstein Quantitative Research, firms with increased or 
initiated dividends generally outperform the market (Corporate Policy 1999, 51). 
Levy and Sarnat (1990)  describe the dividend decision a company takes in allocating 
the portion of profits for shareholder dividend and the portion to be retained. 
Likewise, dividend payout policy resolves the disagreement over the payout ratio 
between large and small shareholders (Aggrawal and Kyaw 2010, 337; Khan et al. 
2011).  
There are a number of factors to be considered when the decision on dividend is 
made. Ownership is one of the very important factors. A study using four dividend 
models of 211 listed firms in the UK discovers a positive link between dividend 
payout policy and institutional ownership (Short, Zhang, and Keasey 2002, 118). 
They argue that the UK tax system, which provides tax exemption for particular 
institutions, is a possible explanation for the effect of institutional ownership on the 
dividend payout ratio (p.107). Using different predictors, Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) 
also examine institutional ownership and its impact on the dividend payout policy. 
They evidence that capital structure and the presence of multinational firms in the 
company interrelate with the dividend payout policy. In China, an investigation using 
a large sample of 1024 listed companies by Wang, Manry, and Wandler (2011, 370) 
found that state ownership is more likely to pay a dividend compared to private ones.  
Furthermore, the development strategy of a company is another substantial factor 
that navigates the dividend payout policy. An investigation of emerging markets in 
Tehran, Kangarlouei et al. (2012, 180) revealed that dividend payout policy 
correlates negatively with investment opportunity. This indicates that if a company 
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has an investment plan that requires big fund or capital expenditure, one way to 
finance it is to retain earnings. A reduction of dividend payout leads to an increase of 
the level of retained earnings. Other researchers, for example Gugler (2003), Truong 
and Heaney (2007), Liang, Moreau, and Park (2011), and Kangarlouei et al. (2012) 
have similar findings about the magnitude of investment on dividend distribution.  
In addition, Kangarlouei et al. also found that cash flow uncertainty is a significant 
contributor to the dividend payout policy. They identify the negative association 
between indicating a high degree of uncertainly in cashflow leading to a low payout 
ratio of dividend. Similar to this finding, Wang, Manry, and Wandler (2011) 
investigated the Chinese corporate‟s dividend payout policy that had government in 
the ownership structure and discovered that the companies‟ dividend payout ratio 
reacted responsively to the change in earnings. It implied that a larger amount of 
earnings and previous dividend payments improves the likeness of a current dividend 
(p. 370).    
More specifically, Wang, Manry and Wandler (p. 370) found that state ownership 
related positively to the dividend payout policy in cash dividend payouts. As the 
amount of state ownership decreased, the regular cash payouts also diminished at a 
similar rate. A cash dividend is a reflection of the controlling shareholder using its 
power and position to control the corporate economy from individual investors. 
Roberts (2012, 17) strengthened this argument later, on his discovery that about 
100,000 SOEs in China were required to pay larger dividends to the Government.  
Resembling China, Indonesia‟s SOE dividend payout policy is reflective of the 
unique intervention of the government. According to the regulation, the government 
treats SOE dividends not only as a portion of profits paid regularly by an SOE, but 
also is one of the main sources of non-tax revenue for the government. Consequently, 
as regulated under ministerial decree on the payment mechanism of the dividend 
sourced non-tax revenue,
30
 the practice of direct intervention by the Government (i.e. 
Ministry of Finance) can be observed in the dividend formulation, payment 
procedure and penalty for late payment.  
                                                 




The ministerial decree also describes government involvement in policy dividend as 
below. Dividend payout policy formulation starts when the Ministry of Finance sets 
the non-tax revenue of the state budget and formulates a dividend annual target. To 
target the non-tax revenue, the dividend payout ratio is set high in the budget 
document and is detailed in the State Budget Law. Then financial audits of SOEs are 
conducted ahead of schedule to determine the interim dividend (Kementerian BUMN 
2008, 2010b). Separately, the Ministry of SOEs develops the analysis and justifies 
the dividend payout ratio for each SOE, whereas SOEs set up their own target based 
on their financial position and investment strategy. These procedures then converge 
in the Parliament, which determines the final targets for the dividend and payout 
ratios of individual SOEs as ruled by the State Budget Law
31
. This nature of activity 
is "transactional" between the SOE, Ministry of SOE, Ministry of Finance and the 
legislature (BUMN Track 2012, 28). 
Furthermore, dividend payout ratio formulation is determined without a fixed 
standard. The current financial circumstances and political policy are often the 
deciding factors (Sunarsip 2012a, 30). The formulation adjusts the government 
policy on SOEs and national development plan every year. Then, the Ministry of 
SOE sets the priority for SOEs. Not all profitable SOEs are obliged to pay dividends 
to the government. Those with accumulated losses or under restructuring programs 
are exempt. For instance, SOEs from  energy, telecommunications and banks, are set 
with very high payout ratios,  whereas SOEs from the forestry industry are exempt 
from paying dividends due to their obligations towards environmental sustainability 
(Kementerian BUMN 2008, 2010b).  
The main challenge in the formulation setting occurs every time the government sets 
up the annual budget. It undermines the SOE‟s ability to reinvest for maintenance 
and growth. This means less opportunity for the SOEs to build infrastructure and to 
stimulate economic development (Hamzah 2007; Nugroho and Wrihatnolo 2008; 
BUMN Track 2012). The absence of an adequate legal basis for determining the 
dividend is an indication that the Government can intervene very deeply in the 
development of state-owned enterprises.  
                                                 
31 Eg. The 2009 State Budget Law (Number 4 Year 2012).  
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With regard to financial performance, high dividend payouts are presumed to be an 
indicator of the financial success of SOEs. The rationale is because only companies 
with a high level of earnings can pay greater dividends. Often, the dividend or tax 
paid by the SOE to the state indicates a strong financial performance (BUMN Track 
Number 57 Year VI April 2012, 24; Kinerja Pertamina 2013). While, a low rate of 
dividend payout can improve the company performance since the investor has 
confidence in the SOEs to develop the company with a capital gain arising from the 
retained earnings (Kementerian BUMN 2008, 2010a).  
The practice of strong government controls over the SOEs‟ dividend payout policy 
shows certain characteristics. An examination of around 100,000 state owned 
companies in China demonstrated that SOEs were required to pay larger dividends to 
the Government as the owner (Roberts 2012, 17). Subsequently, they provided 
funding for indispensable government programs. With the Government‟s need for 
cash flow, the method of cash dividend was more preferable (Wang, Manry, and 
Wandler 2011). 
While government control of SOEs over dividend payout policy provides funding for 
indispensable government programs as explained above, this is different from the 
common approach of a dividend payout policy (Levy and Sarnat, 1990). Dividend 
payout ratios set by the government that characteristically prioritises the need of 
government, conflicts with the need of SOEs to expand the business. As discussed 
above, government intervention may inhibit SOEs from retaining funds which could 
be used efficiently in the business and therefore, over time, inhibits the returns to the 
business. However, in the short term it is likely that governments seeking to 
maximise revenue will target those companies with high returns, with the highest 
payout ratio.  
As a result it is hypothesised that dividend payout ratio will be positively related to 
the financial performance of the SOE.  





3.7.3. Regulatory Framework Related Government Involvement  
Government involvement in SOEs is frequently conveyed through policies providing 
legal boundaries. In previous hypotheses, government involvement cascaded into 
governance and financially related measures and impacted on how these types of 
involvement contributed to the financial performance of SOEs. For the following 
hypotheses, government involvements are proxies of the regulatory framework set by 
the government.  There are a number of ways, two of which are the variables in this 
thesis: asset transfer and legal cases resulting from non-compliance with regulation.  
Asset Transfer (H9) 
Government intervention in the SOEs as the full or majority owner is the main 
concern of the principal-agent problem in government-owned company practice. 
This is because the government is not only in a position as the shareholder of a 
business entity, but also a regulator.  As an owner of SOEs (shareholder), the 
government pushes the SOEs to focus on adding economic value (profit 
maximization), whereas as a regulator, the government also possesses social goals to 
target public welfare so that the economic sector is regulated to be in the best interest 
of the people (Peng and Luo 2000; Tan and Peng 2003). However, often when these 
two goals collide, the government controls the decision to prioritise social and 
political objectives over profit maximisation (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Sapienza 
2004).  
One of the direct interventions by the Government in the SOE to prioritise social 
objectives over profit making is through “asset transfer”. The government (executed 
by the technical ministry) has obligations to provide public facilities, such as 
transportation. Often, the assets acquired by the government are transferred to SOEs 
without following legal procedures. This type of transfer is known as “Government 
unassigned status assistance” (Bantuan Pemerintah yang Belum Ditetapkan 
Statusnya or BPYBDS). The State Budget Law
32
 defines it as:  
….a government project funded by the State Budget (Revenue and 
Expenditure) who had been handed over to the State Owned Enterprises to 
support operational activities SOEs based on the letter of acceptance of the 
                                                 
32 The 2013 State Budget Law (Number 19 Year 2012). 
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goods, and recorded in the balance sheet of line ministry or of State Owned 
Enterprises (Article 1 paragraph 28).  
 
Based on the definition, it shows that the transferred asset has not been entitled as a 
“permanent investment of the government”. According to the State Budget Law
33
, to 
legalise it as equity, a government regulation should be issued. The delay of 
legalising this asset causes problems in determining whether it should be recognised 
as an asset or a liability in the financial statements. A disclosure issue arises due to 
the unclear status of the transferred asset. It is administratively unclear because both 
parties record them in their financial reports (Avianti 2011). The presence of unclear 
transferred assets in the face of the financial statements and Notes to the Financial 
Statements indicates a legal and accounting issue. This suggests the potential 
emergence of audit findings that leads to an obligation for legal administration and 
accounting recognition in the near future. 
Currently there is no standard or uniform accounting policy on how the unclear 
transferred asset should be presented in the financial statements. This opens up room 
for different reporting and audit treatment (Avianti 2011, 8). It is because the line 
minister recognises and reports the assets in the balance sheet that may be overvalued 
or undervalued. The asset is recognised as the government asset until the regulation 
on government capital investment on SOEs is issued.  On the other hand, the 
transferred assets have been handed over and been used for SOE operations even 
though they have not been recognised and recorded as SOE‟s assets. Thus, there are 
irregularities in the SOE financial reports as the asset utilisation is not accepted by 
legal formalities. This leads to the second problem, where the evaluation of the SOEs 
efficiency in asset utilisation is difficult to measure (Hadiyanto 2012). Such practice 
is categorised as non-compliance to the regulation and becomes audit findings 
(Sukamto 2012; Biro Humas dan Luar Negeri 2013). Asset transfer activity has been 
part of audit findings by the Supreme Audit Institutions since 2004. Thus the 
presence of an asset transfer represents a non-governance practice.  
                                                 
33 The 2013 State Budget (Number 19 Year 2012) article 23 paragraph 1: “assets derived from or line ministry‟s 
budget, which are used and / or operated by the SOEs and have been recorded in the financial statement of SOEs 
as BPYBDS or similar accounts, are set to be state permanent investment at the SOEs concerned”. Paragraph 2: 
“assets as a result of government capital are to be used by the SOEs since the acquisition of those assets, are set 
as the state permanent investment in the SOE whose utilise the asset.” Paragraph 3 “Execution of the state 
permanen investment at SOE as referred to paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) is set by a Government Regulation. 
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Moreover, the presence of asset transfer brings another disadvantage to the SOE. 
While it is not yet entitled as a state permanent investment, the asset is still “unclear” 
since it is recorded as fixed assets but not fully recognised as equity. This creates a 
polemic in the taxation perspective. First, if it is not yet an asset, the amount of asset 
cannot be part of non-taxable income even though the asset has already generated 
revenue resulting in a gap between the cost and revenue recognition (Hadiyanto 
2012). Second, if government regulation has already been issued, but there is 
disagreement over the amount of deductable tax due to different treatment of fiscal 
correction (Ikbal 2013).   
Furthermore, when the project is executed, the government intentionally acts as an 
operator without a profit orientation. This does not fit in the context of government 
as a regulator as well as the SOE as a business operator. It gives rise to a conflict of 
interest and leads to unequal treatment since as a regulator, the government should 
overshadow all the players in an industry (Muchayat 2010).  For example, the 
Ministry of Transportation is the regulator for land, sea and air transportation. When 
they execute the project and spend the budget for capital expenditure to build new 
railways tracks, they also have set the location. The reason for selecting a location 
might be for social or economy motives, which may not be for a sound business 
decision.  
Asset transfer is another form of political interference. Based on their function, the 
government allocates the budget, purchases goods or services „sub-contracts‟ those to 
the SOEs to do all the work. An official handover of assets is marked by an 
acceptance letter (Avianti 2011).  Moreover, the government‟s decision to spend 
money to acquire an asset is a legal act. This is stipulated under the State Finance 
Law
34
 and the State Treasury Law
35
 that the money spent for asset purchase is 
obtained from the government budget. To be included in the budget document, it 
would require a long process of budget planning that involves Ministry of Finance, 
the line ministry and parliament. Hence, if a line ministry executes the asset 
purchase, this suggests that there has been a level of political consensus from the 
beginning.  The asset transfer is not based on a profit-motive. This regulatory 
intervention affects work plans and performance indicators of an SOE.  According to 
jpnn.com, unless the work plan was prepared based on the results of consultation 
                                                 
34 The State Finance Law (Number 17 Year 2003). 
35 The State Treasury Law (Number 1 Year 2004). 
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with the SOE, the asset transfer may be less beneficial if the project is not aligned 
with the annual work plan of the SOE. When the government insists on the project, it 
may end up with inefficiency issues (jpnn.com 2011). Likewise, an SOE is exposed 
to the burden of recognising additional amounts of equity and additional asset 
capitalisation based on the value of assets purchased by the government‟s money. 
This allows discrepancy in the fair value of the assets to be more expensive than if 
the SOEs purchased the assets. Once the asset is recorded, SOEs are also burdened 
with the obligation of recognising asset depreciation, which depresses the financial 
performance and does not add profit to the company.   
Studies in SOEs indicate no early investigation on the asset transfer. Therefore, there 
is very limited discussion on the impact of asset transfer to the SOE as one of type of 
intervention by the government. However, the presence of an asset transfer is most 
likely recognised when the Supreme Audit Institution announces the audit findings 
related to the transfer of assets in the Central Government Financial Statements (23 
BUMN 2011; Sukamto 2012; Biro Humas dan Luar Negeri 2013). Therefore, 
intuitively, it is speculated that asset transfer has a negative impact on the financial 
performance of an SOE. Taking into account the above discussion, this thesis 
hypothesises:  
H9: Asset transfers from Central Government to SOEs are negatively related 
to the SOE financial performance. 
 
Legal Case Resulting From Non-compliance Regulation (H10) 
The OECD Guidelines require the assurance of an effective legal and regulatory 
framework for SOEs to encourage fair competition in the market (OECD 2005). This 
means the government should encourage a situation where there is equality in 
treatment of market regulation implementation. Rules that private companies are 
obliged to follow should also be complied with by SOEs. Correspondingly, 
regulations that bind SOE operation should be also applied to non-SOEs.  
What happens with SOEs in Indonesia is strikingly different. SOEs are subjected to 
more regulations than private ones. Currently, there are many regulations that every 
business entity has to follow, including the Limited Liability Company Law, the 
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Capital Market Law, the Public Information and other economic regulations law. 
However, in addition to the law listed in the table (see Appendix B), there are at least 
13 other regulations that are specific to SOEs, such as the State-Owned Enterprise 
Law, the State Finance Law, the Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism- Clean and 
Free State Governance Law.  
According to Muchayat (2010), the different legal treatment occurs because the 
establishment of SOEs is aimed not merely to make profit. The State-Owned 
Enterprise Law specifies the five purposes of SOEs. These include (1) to contribute 
to the development of the national economy, in general, and state revenues, in 
particular; (2) to pursue profits; (3) to organize public goods and services of a high 
quality and adequate to meet the needs of the people; (4) to pioneer business 
activities that cannot be implemented by the private sector and cooperatives, (5) to 
actively provide guidance and assistance to small-medium enterprises, cooperatives 
and communities. Therefore, regardless of their profit-oriented characteristic, SOEs 
are also expected to carry out a social function. Likewise, the Government is not only 
a shareholder, but also a regulator.  Because of this, the management of SOEs cannot 
be separated from the bureaucracy. Muchayat suggests that one of the obstacles in 
the SOEs‟ operation is the length of the process taken by the SOEs in implementing 
corporate action, which is longer compared to private firms because of the 
bureaucracy involved. By looking at the position of SOEs as government and 
businesses entities under the regulations that encapsulate them, the SOEs may spend 
more time to take action (2010, 128). In this case, bureaucratic procedures may 
hamper business particularly when a guarantee letter from the minister or a 
regulation is required to be issued as evidence of approval. Such a delay is highly 
risky and may result in  lost business opportunities (p.132).  
The regulatory framework for SOEs is not limited to business aspects, but also to the 
function of providing public welfare which is mandated to the SOEs by the 
government. In addition, publicly listed SOEs shall comply with the mandate of the 
State-Owned Enterprise Law, the Limited Liability Company Law and the Capital 
Market Law
36
. The highly regulated business environment of SOEs affects the way 
they do business. Because the SOEs must adapt to a variety of binding regulations, 
                                                 
36 The Capital Market Law (Number 8 Year 1995).   
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businesses are stuck in bureaucratic processes that must be faced before the company 
can take action.  For instance, procurement policy requires SOEs to follow certain 
procedures that takes longer or is non-transparent and less accountable or results in 
high cost/low quality production (Muchayat 2009, 128). Another frequently practiced 
example is to maintain bank accounts to accommodate revenues that are not reported 
as part of the company‟s earnings. However, highly regulated environments can also 
trigger the managers to abuse their power or authority (opportunistic behaviour of 
managers in the agency theory). Among these are the emergence of acts in violation 
of the laws and regulations. Violation of rules, either fraud or negligence, that leads 
to enriching themselves is called corruption. Corruption is defined as an unlawful act 
by any person who intends to enrich themselves or someone else or a corporation 
that could hurt the economy or harm the state finances; or any person to benefit 
themselves or another person; or a corporation, abusing the authority of opportunity 
or advice available because of their position or the financial position that could harm 
the economy of the country or countries (Sulaiman 2011, 15).  
According to Wang and You (2012), the presence of widespread corruption 
decelerates economic growth and investment in the majority of developing countries. 
Dal Bó and Rossi  postulate that corruption is strongly related to an increase in 
inefficient firms in a country as that they employ more inputs to generate a certain 
amount of output (2007, 959).  
However, empirical evidence presents a striking fact that not all countries suffer from 
corruption. In fact, some countries in East Asia have experienced an increase in 
growth in spite of corruption practice. Wedeman (2002) labels this as the “East Asian 
paradox” referring to some East Asian countries, including China, Indonesia, South 
Korea and Thailand, that cope well in the corrupt environment.  A later study by 
Rock and Bonnett (2004) supports Wedeman‟s argument about the country that 
experiences both corruption and economic growth at the same time, which seems to 
be less harmful to the county‟s economic development.  They find that corruption 
and investment relate positively in the large East Asian industrialised countries like 
China, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. Among others, China is the most 
striking example as it has had nearly 10% of annual growth in the economic reform 
era since the early 1980s (Rock and Bonnett 2004) while being one of the most 
corrupt countries, ranking 71 of 145 on the Transparency International‟s Corruption 
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Perception Index (La Porta, et. al.  2004). A more recent finding by Fan, Rui and 
Zhao (2008) also underpins the paradox of corruption in China. They investigated 23 
Chinese listed companies involved in scandals of bribing senior bureaucrats, or 
senior managers abusing past job relationships. They found that companies that have 
relationships with corrupt government officials enjoy the benefit of debt 
accessibility, especially for long-term loans. This benefit, however only remains as 
long as the corrupt officers are available to help. Once they are arrested, the benefit 
of this debt-financing advantage vanishes.   
Another example of the East Asian Paradox can be found in Vietnam. Nguyen and 
van Dijk (2012) observed around 900 Vietnamese companies (public and private) 
and discovered that the level of corruption varies throughout Vietnam subject to the 
quality of governance (such as the cost of entering a new business, access to land, 
and changes to regulations applied to each industry). More interestingly, they 
document that the corruption negatively affects the growth of private firms, yet 
relates positively to that of SOEs.  
Researchers, such as Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Edgardo Campos, Lien and 
Pradhan (1999), claim that the presence of corruption is less destructive if the 
practice is more coordinated.  Likewise, well-organized corruption creates a network 
that can shrink uncertainty and limit damage. This argument is used by Rock and 
Bonnett to further explain their findings on how corruption is treated as an alternative 
to rigid regulations, which eventually leads to an increase in efficiency and economic 
growth. Similarly, it can also justify Nguyen and van Dijk‟s finding that the 
relationship between SOEs and government officers can give SOE‟s management 
more chance to negotiate or lobby government officers to achieve the targeted 
growth (Nguyen 2006).   
However, it is worth stressing that “the corrupt but growing regime” works only in 
the transition stage of development and cannot remain in the long run (Rock and 
Bonnett 2012). When there is institutional reform to build well-functioning 
institutions, corruption cannot survive. Likewise, corruption may work in low 
technological industries with a low labour intensity environment. They argue that 
with a corrupt government, it is difficult to move to technological learning and skill-
intensive industries (p.1010). Nguyen and van Dijk (2012) suggest that improvement 
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in the quality of public governance alleviates corruption and promotes economic 
development.  
Corruption seems to have similar patterns in international practice. In the US, as 
Glaeser observes, American utility and public transportation moved from private to 
public ownership as a result of corruption. Private firms bribed government officers 
in exchange for lower input prices of buying or higher output prices of selling 
(Glaeser 2001).  
Glaeser examined large-scale corruption and found corrupt dealings between the 
high-level officials or politicians and utility managers. The practice of corruption 
exists when government overpays for goods/services that private firms sell or, 
conversely, under-charge for goods/services the private companies buy.  Cases of  
inflated salaries are the most frequent ones. Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) argue that 
the increased number of corruption cases in the 19
th
 century follows the growth in 
business scale. Thus, as the private companies improve their purchase capacity from 
the government, it stimulates more bribery cases. In contrast to Glaeser‟s result, 
Clarke and Xu (2004) investigated small-scale bribery cases in 21 transition 
countries in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. They documented that most bribe-
takers (employees) are those who are in many utility sectors in SOEs with a low level 
of labour competition. Meanwhile, bribe-payers (service-using companies) usually 
induce them with money for the sake of greater profits or to resolve debt maturity 
problems. Clarke and Xu also generated robust evidence that bribery in utilities were 
lower if the countries had larger capacity and were more competitive within the 
industry.  Also, less bribery is found in privatised utility companies. Clarke and Xu 
are also convinced that macroeconomic policy and politics are two factors that 
enable the level of corruption to increase in the country (p.2093-4).   
Corruption practices in Indonesian SOEs can be seen in many forms. Nirwanto 
(2012) illustrates how the Supreme Court documented the typology of corruption in 
the SOEs. He identified that there is a common practice of conspiracy between the 
SOE Board (directors, commissioners and employees of state-owned) with third 
parties. The conspiracy leads to unlawful acts or abuses of power associated with the 
implementation of the SOEs. The form includes, among others, the procurement of 
goods and services of SOEs, SOE investment activity, SOE‟s fixed assets for sale 
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below the market price, misuse of funds relating to corporate social responsibility, 
bribery to speed up the business process or approval, embezzlement of state property, 
falsification of transaction records of SOEs for the purpose of fake receipts of 
fictitious activity (Muchayat  2010; Nirwanto 2012). 
A clear separation of function between Government as the owner and Government as 
regulator should be made (OECD 2004, 2006). Otherwise, Government intervention 
(the principal) to the SOEs (agent) becomes domineering and the SOEs become 
highly regulated. When agency problems arise (managers, as economic maximisers, 
look for opportunities to pursue personal interests rather than the interests of the 
company) (Jensen and Meckling 1976), it triggers various legal incompliance 
actions, both fraud or negligence, which eventually affects the company‟s overall 
performance. This study found that a highly regulated environment and violations 
against those regulations are a burden to sound governance practice. Good corporate 
governance regulations were introduced from 2002 (Ministerial Decree on Good 
Corporate Governance for SOE
37
), therefore it is hypothesised that violations of 
regulations by SOEs will lead to a negative impact on their financial performance. 
H10: Legal cases resulting from non-complience regulation is negatively 
related to the SOE financial performance. 
 
3.8. Summary of the Chapter  
Despite the ongoing debate on the impact of government intervention in various 
international practices, the Indonesian government (i.e. Ministry of SOEs, Ministry 
of Finance, line ministries, legal enforcement institutions) is involved in many ways 
in regulating SOEs as an agent of economic development and as the operator of the 
government‟s role in delivering public service. The law gives an exclusive mandate 
to SOEs to perform five main functions (the foundation of national economic growth, 
the institution for commercial profit, the source of revenue, the executor of public 
service obligations and the driver of small and medium enterprises (Muchayat 2009; 
Sembodo 2012). 
                                                 
37 Good Corporate Governance for SOE Minister of SOE decree (No. KEP-117/-MBU/2002).  
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By structure, the governance model of Indonesia applies a unique concept from the 
international practice of two-tier models with the emphasis in the Indonesian model 
of the BOC being less powerful than the European Continental model.  The 
Indonesian model suggests that the GMS is in full control over the BOC and BOD. 
With the level of ownership at least (51%), the government holds the highest voting 
rights in the GMS which opens the opportunity for a negative entrenchment effect. 
This is the main concern of the principal-agent problem in this thesis.  
Hence, this study aims at investigating the government's relationship with SOEs, 
especially linking the relationship between government intervention and its impact 
on the performance of Indonesian SOEs. Based on the research objectives and 
direction of the models, this study adopts agency theory as a basis for constructing 
and testing the hypotheses. Agency theory accommodates the approach of this study, 
i.e. investigation of the relationship between the government (principal) and SOEs 
(agent) due to the presence of vertical agency problems (opportunistic behaviour of 
the agent (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and the dominating role of the controlling 
shareholder).  
This research extends the study of agency theory to test the entrenchment effect in 
the context of the high degree of control of the Government as the majority 
shareholder in the governance system of SOEs. It follows positivist ontology since it 
uses quantitative methods to measure the constructs and to identify latent variables 
and causal relationships to validate the theory (Neuman 2006). The proposed 
conceptual framework of this study is developed based on the entrenchment 
hypothesis (Wright et al. 1996; Oswald, Muse, and Rutherford 2009) within agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Zhou and Wang 2000). The hypotheses are 
constructed based on three areas of intervention: governance intervention by the 
Government in the General Meeting of the Shareholders (representing the Ministry 
of SOE), Government financial intervention (representing the Ministry of Finance) 
and Government regulatory intervention (representing the entire legal system in the 





Table 3. 2: Summary of Hypotheses 
No. Hypothesis 
H1: Government ownership is negatively associated with the SOE financial 
performance. 
H2: CEO external appointment relates positively to the SOE financial 
performance.  
H3: Chairperson‟s external experience relates positively to the SOE financial 
performance.  
H4:  The proportion of government related Directors on the BOD will be 
negatively related to the SOE financial performance.  
H5: The proportion of government related Commissioners on the BOC will be 
negatively related to the SOE financial performance.  
H6: The number of Board sub-committees relates positively to the SOE financial 
performance.  
H7:  Government transfer of payment in the form of subsidies or PSO is negatively 
associated with the SOE financial performance.  
H8:  Dividend payout policy relates positively to the SOE financial performance.  
H9: Asset transfer from central government to SOEs is negatively related to the 
SOE financial performance.  
H10: Legal cases resulting from non-compliance regulation is negatively related to 
the SOE financial performance.  
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CHAPTER 4: SAMPLE SELECTION AND VARIABLE 
DEFINITIONS AND MEASURES   
 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter developed specific hypotheses constructed from agency theory. 
The premise underpinning them proposed that government involvement in the 
controlling of SOEs leads to either performance growth or decline. This chapter 
describes how the sample for the proposed hypotheses was selected and data 
collected. Then it discusses how individual variables are defined and measured. The 
structure of this chapter is as follows: sample selection and data sources, variable 
definition and summary.    
 
4.2. Sample Selection and Data Sources  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, this research extends the study of agency theory to test 
the entrenchment effect in the context of a high degree of government intervention as 
controlling shareholder in the governance system of SOEs. Following a positivist 
ontology, this study applies quantitative method to measure the hypothesis as well as 
identifying underlying variables and causal relationships for theory validation 
(Neuman 2006).  In developing the analysis of government intervention, the years 
2007-2009 were selected. Some considerations for the selection of these years were 
as follows: first, these are important years because they were the first three 
consecutive years following the requirement of the SOEs to disclose a summary of 
their financial statements as a part of the Notes to the Financial Statements of Central 
Government. This is stipulated in the State Finance Law.  Even though the obligation 
for preparing the financial reports based on Indonesian Financial Accounting 
Standards was introduced earlier in 2002, SOEs were still in the implementation 
stage at this time, and not all were available to issue their financial statements.  As a 
consequence of state finance reform, the Ministries of Finance and  SOE, agreed to 
enforce transparency and accountability as part of the good corporate governance 
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practice of the state, by requiring SOEs to submit their Summary of Financial 
Statements at the end of every  financial year; second,  five years from the 2002 
commencement date of the introduction of the Indonesian Financial Accounting 
Standards should have given the SOEs transition time to fully implement the concept 
of good corporate governance; third, this thesis commenced in mid-2009, therefore, 
using the year 2009 as the end date for the research data timeline was the most 
optimal.  
Furthermore, all SOEs were initially included in the sample selection in this thesis. 
There were 141 SOEs falling into three categories: SOE Perum (public corporation), 
SOE Persero (limited liability corporation) and SOE Persero Terbuka (publicly 
listed SOEs). These SOEs represented 9 available industry groups based on 
Indonesian Stock Exchange categories, namely agriculture; mining; basic industry 
and chemicals; miscellaneous industry; consumer goods industry; property, real 
estate, and building construction; infrastructure, utilities, and transportation; finance; 
and trade, services, and investment. The selection of all industry group categories in 
the sample will also test whether industry group is a significant factor contributing to 
government intervention in SOEs.  
While there are five-fold objectives of establishing SOEs in Indonesia, for this thesis, 
however, the focus is on those established with a primary profit maximising 
objective. Hence the sample group covers only the “SOE under Persero” and “SOE 
under Persero Terbuka” types, namely profit maximising SOEs, both publicly listed 
and non-listed. This group is required by government to maximise profits and hence 
the key success measure is financial performance. 
To meet the criteria that only profit-oriented SOEs would be considered in the 
sample, SOE Perum was then excluded. This left 125 SOEs remaining. It is worth 
stressing that the use of an entire population of profit orientated SOEs has never been 
attempted before in a study. This approach allows a deeper analysis to understand 
whether there is a consistency in the characteristic of profit-oriented SOEs that are 
diverse in size, industry type and level of competition. Overall, this research uses 375 




The data for dependent, independent and control variables were collected from a 
number of sources. Firstly, the annual reports and Central Government Financial 
Statements were used as the main source of financial and non- financial information.  
Secondly, additional sources such as SOE performance reports and government 
documents were used. The definition, measurement type and detail sources of each 
variable are presented in the following section.  
 
4.3. Variable Definition  
4.3.1. Dependent Variable: SOE Financial Performance  
In  the study of social science, corporate financial performance is often used as an 
indicator of success or failure of a business entity, for example in the implementation 
of corporate governance, investment decisions, capital structure and policy on the 
company‟s board of directors. In the study related to state-owned enterprises, SOE 
financial performance is also assessed to gauge the impact of government ownership, 
government intervention and other practices of governance.  
There are two commonly researched methods of measuring financial performance, 
namely accounting based performance and stock market based performance 
(Lukviarman 2004).  Accounting based financial performance is measured using a 
variety of figures to illustrate profitability, effectiveness, efficiency, and financial 
leverage. The indicators vary including revenue, net profit, leverage, growth, 
production and revenue. There are also ratio measures including the current ratio, 
quick ratio, inventory turnover, dividend yield, return on assets (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), and return of sales (ROS).   
Meanwhile, researchers who adopt stock market based performance to measure 
financial performance tend to use rate of return, the weighted average cost of capital, 
earning per shares or EPS, market to book equity and Tobin's Q (Salim and Yadav 
2012; Liao and Young 2012; Park and Jang 2013). More comprehensive research has 
involved a group of financial indicators from both accounting and stock market 
value. Feng, Sun, and Tong (2004) examine the relationship between government 
ownership and GDP growth with various indicators of performance before and after 
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privatisation and applies more than one proxy for each factor of profitability, 
efficiency, output and leverage. Meantime, Salim and Yadav (2012) investigate the 
relationship between capital structure and corporate performance using indicators of 
ROA, ROE, earnings per shares and Tobin's Q all together. Similar to Salim and 
Yadav‟s approach, Yu (2013) examines state ownership and its association with firm 
performance using ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q as proxy variables.   
This study will apply accounting based performance to measure the variable of 
financial performance. As discussed in Chapter 2, Indonesian SOEs consist of non-
listed and listed SOEs. Since this study accommodates both groups of SOEs in the 
sample, it is preferable to use indicators that do not involve stock market data.  
Alternatives to ROA as a financial performance measure were considered, however 
only ROA was finally chosen. Return on equity (ROE) was not adopted as the 
dependent variable representing performance for two reasons. First, in the case of 
SOEs, government injection of equity is a politically motivated decision made by 
the Government and approved by the Parliament which would potentially distort 
any performance measure. Second, a number of SOEs have negative equity. In 
commercial situations, these companies would cease to exist, however for this 
sample they survive through government subsidies, distorting the ROE 
performance measure.  
Return on sales (ROS) was also excluded as the measure of performance. The vast 
majority of SOE are capital intensive where the use of ROS (predominately a retail 
based performance measure) would be distorting.  
The ROA was selected as the measure of SOE‟s financial performance. This view 
follows the argument of Goel, He, and Karri (2011) that firm performance is best 
measured using the traditional measure of ROA if the context is set in the developing 
economies. They specifically stress that the use of capital market measures such as 
market-to-book or Tobin‟s Q to assess the company performance is not appropriate 
(Joh 2003; Goel, He, and Karri 2011), especially in Indonesia where the number of 
companies issuing debt and the securities market is still small (Lukviarman 2004).   
Furthermore, among the accounting profit based measures, this thesis will utilize a 
financial ratio of Return on Assets (ROA) to gauge SOE‟s financial performance. 
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ROA quantifies the capacity of a company‟s assets to generate profits (Arosa, 
Iturralde, and Maseda 2010). It underlines the overall performance of the company 
and presents the annual measured return to the historical value of investments the 
company has achieved (The Government Regulation on Government Investment
38
). 
ROA is referred to as an indicator of a company‟s profitability and therefore a key 
determinant for the future investment in the company.  
In this thesis, ROA is selected as the most representative indicator of SOE financial 
performance for several reasons. To begin with, ROA is widely used to measure a 
firm‟s profitability. According to Jewell and Mankin (2011), ROA is one of the most 
frequently referred to financial ratios, the third after current ratio and inventory 
turnover ratio. They calculate that ROA is referred to in 70 of the 77 business 
textbooks (Mankin and Jewell 2010). Also, ROA is frequently adopted by 
researchers including those who investigate government intervention and its impact 
on SOE financial performance (Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells 1998; Li et al. 2008; 
Goel, He, and Karri 2011).  The same is true in the Indonesian context in this study, 
as ROA is also used in much of the literature to describe the financial performance 
figures of SOEs (eg Rafick and Amir 2010; Laksanawan 2008; Nugroho 2008; 
Muchayat 2011). This indicates the reliability of ROA as a tool to represent the 
financial profitability of a company.  
Most importantly, ROA has been selected as it is used by Indonesian authorities to 
measure SOE success, including the revitalisation program (Muchayat 2011, 145) 
and the privatisation program (Laksanawan 2008; Nugroho 2008). For this reason, 
most of the Government‟s documents, including the Government‟s report on SOEs to 
the public, the SOE performance report by the Ministry of SOEs and the SOE 
administration report by the Ministry of Finance uses ROA to illustrate the increase 
or decrease of overall performance.  
It should also be noted that the selection of ROA as a measure of SOE financial 
performance also faces a main drawback. Morman et al. (1998) argue the proper use 
of ROA as a measure can only be achieved if the presentation of accounting data is 
adequate and is supported by sound application of accounting standards. Since 1994, 
all limited liability companies are obliged to issue and present financial reports based 
                                                 
38 The Government Regulation on Government Investment (Number 8 Year 2007). 
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on the Indonesian Accounting Standards.  Therefore, it can be assumed that the use 
of financial data in this case is less of a problem.   
While there are many variations of the formula used in accounting ratios (Mankin 
and Jewell 2010), this thesis measures ROA as a fiscal year‟s earning profit before 
tax, interest, and extraordinary items (EBIT) divided by its total book value of assets 
and expressed as a percentage. The selection of EBIT among other many possible 
numerators is based on avoiding the influence of debt, tax and dividend in the 
formula. According to Jewell and Mankin, this approach is useful, particularly in 
comparing the pre-tax return of companies with different capital structures (2011, 
89). In other words, EBIT excludes capital cost as it only consists of operating 
margins and operating incomes (Arosa, Iturralde, and Maseda 2010). Moreover, 
Jewel and Mankin also argue that the use of EBIT as a numerator in the ROA 
formula is useful for predicting failure as they point out Altman‟s Z-Score who used 
EBIT to Total Assets (EBIT/TA) to forecast business failure forecast study (2011, 
81). In addition, the use of total asset (as opposed to Average Total Assets) as a 
dominator is aimed for simplicity as it needs less data for ROA calculation (p. 85). 
With regard to the diversity of the tax situation in the SOE samples as well as 
availability of data, the formula of ROA as EBIT/TA is considered the best fit for the 
needs of this analysis.  
To measure ROA, annual reports and financial statements of 125 SOEs were 
collected over a 3-year period from 2007 to 2009. This includes 14 publicly listed 
SOEs and 111 non-public listed SOEs.  
4.3.2. Independent variables  
This thesis tests three areas of government intervention (in governance, in finance 
and in the regulatory framework) and develops these into ten independent variables. 
As defined, all SOEs are more than 50 per cent government-owned. This gives the 
Government ultimate control over all investigated variables.  Six variables represent 
the governance related government intervention. These include Government 
Ownership (OWN), which is also frequently called state ownership. Government 
ownership has been consistently studied in research (for instance Gunasekarage et al. 
2007; Li, Yue, and Zhao 2009; Borisova et al. 2012; Yu 2013). In this study, 
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Government ownership is defined as the total proportion of shares owned by the 
central government in the SOE to the total share ownership and is expressed in 
percentage. Government ownership represents the government‟s voting rights in the 
General Meeting of Shareholder (GMS). The data is collected from the Central 
Government Accounting System (SAIP) database maintained by the Ministry of 
Finance.  
The second governance related variable is CEO external appointment (CEO), which 
is defined as an appointment of a CEO from outside the company or a government or 
political appointment. Previous studies refer to government or politically connected 
CEOs as a CEO who has special links with presently serving bureaucrats due to the 
friendship, collegial or family relationships (Johnson and Mitton 2003); similar 
regional background (Siegel 2007) or prior experience at a government office 
(Xiongyuan and Shan 2013). This thesis takes into consideration all contexts of 
government or political connections as specified above, indicating that an external or 
outsider CEO is someone who is really independent from any formal and informal 
links to incumbent bureaucrats, whereas an internal CEO is an individual whose 
career background prior to his or her appointment as the CEO is from the 
government office or SOEs or politically connected as specified above. It is 
expressed as 1 for outsider CEO or 0 otherwise.  This measure has been adopted in 
prior studies, e.g. Xiongyuan and Shan (2013). 
The next variable, Chairperson External Appointment (CHAIR), is defined as an 
appointment of a Chairperson of the BOC from outside the government or from 
political connections. Similar to the context of a CEO external appointment, a 
Chairperson from outside indicates the presence of an independent board. Meantime, 
the Chairperson from inside the government or from political connections can be a 
government officer, or retired government officers including former ministers, those 
from the military, policy and other law enforcement units. Taking up from the study 
conducted by Ferris and Yan (2007), this is a dummy variable, assuming a value of 1 
if the assigned chairperson is from external appointment or otherwise 0.  
The fourth independent variable is the Proportion of Government Related Directors 
on the BOD (BOD). Studies regarding the BOD focus more on the outsiderness of a 
board composition and try to infer the impact of having outsider directors on 
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company improvement. For instance, a study by Arosa, Iturralde, and Maseda (2010) 
using a two-tier approach categorises outside directors on the board as independent 
and affiliated directors. The former, independent director is characterised as a person 
who has no prior business links with the company other than being their director, 
whereas the latter, affiliated director is described as a director with potential or 
current business links but not on a full-time basis with the company. Or, if it is 
reserved-interpreted, then an inside Director can be a person with prior or current 
business links with the SOEs. Taking into consideration Arosa, Iturralde, and 
Maseda‟s approach, this thesis defines a government related director on the BOD as 
a director who is a government or SOE connected individual or who has prior 
working experience with the SOE. Therefore, in this thesis, the proportion of 
government related Directors on the BOD, is defined as the total proportion of non-
outside directors assigned as management board members (BOD member) divided 
by the total number of BODs.  
Moreover, unlike conventional supervisory boards in the Continental European 
system whose every member of the BOC is independent, Indonesian SOEs recognize 
two types of BOC memberships: ordinary commissioners and independent 
commissioners
39
 (Kamal 2008). Due to the uniqueness of the Indonesian system, 
there is no exact study found applying similar approaches, yet some former studies 
using a Western context can be used as a comparison with caution. For example, a 
study by Pombo and Gutiérrez (2011) specified an outsider director as a member of 
the supervisory board who had no working experience in the company or any related 
companies with similar scope as either management or supervisory board members, 
had no family links with controlling shareholders or the CEO and had no more than 
10 percent of share ownership in the company. Therefore, referring to the Indonesian 
SOE model of BOC membership, this thesis extends the definition of outside 
commissioners or so-called independent commissioners in the SOE to individuals 
who are from non-government or are non-politically connected or have no business 
link or previous experience working with the SOE. Or in other words, an ordinary 
commissioner is an individual from a government office or is politically connected 
(for instance a former government officer, ex-military or people from policy or law 
                                                 
39 The term „independent commissioner‟, which was adopted from the practice of outside directors in the one-tier 
board system in Australia, refers to outside commissioners in the BOC as opposed to ordinary commissioners 
(Kamal 2008).  
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enforcement units) or has a business link or previous experience working with SOEs. 
The next variable, the Proportion of Government Related Commissioners in the 
BOC (BOC), is defined as the total proportion of ordinary commissioners assigned in 
the BOC within the total BOC.  
Data on 125 SOEs collected over three years (2007-2009) on the background of 
CEOs, chairpersons and members of the Board of Directors as well as members of 
the Board of Commissioners were mainly collected from government documents 
produced by the Ministry of SOEs. This includes the ministerial decrees, the BOC 
and BOD database and SOE performance reports from 2007 and 2009. It is worth 
emphasising that, the source of this data is considered valid and reliable because the 
government documents sourced are legal documents. In addition, information on 
organizational structure and biography of the BODs and BOC from the SOE annual 
reports and SOE formal websites are also used to complete the missing data.  
The last governance related government intervention variable, the Number of Board 
Sub-Committees, refers to the number of Board sub-committees established or 
appointed by the BOC. The majority of prior studies using this variable focus on the 
relationship between the presence of specific sub-committees (most frequently, the 
audit committee) and its impact on the firm performance. This study, however, 
investigates the number of Board sub-committees that were established. It is 
measured by the total number of Board sub-committees formed by the BOC.   
The data regarding the total number of Board sub-committees for 125 SOEs is 
gathered from the Ministry of SOE database. Since the database does not present 
each year of information, additional information from the three consecutive years of 
annual reports (2007-2009) was also used.   
The next two variables relate to financial related government intervention. To start 
with, Government transfer payments in the form of subsidies or PSO (TF), is 
defined as money transferred from the central government to the SOEs in the form of 
subsidies or public service obligations (PSO). This variable is particularly important 
to investigate as one of the financially related government interventions because of 
the large amount of the central government budget that is allocated to this funding 
activity each year (Puspasari and Rob 2012b). While the nature of subsidy and PSO 
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is unique to the Indonesian context (subsidy is meant to close the gap between a 
determined selling price of a product to the public and the SOE‟s production cost; 
PSO achieves the government‟s function in delivering goods and services to the 
public), the use of similar characteristics in variables in other samples cannot be 
found in past studies.  
The government transfer payment in the form of subsidies or PSO is a dummy 
variable and measured as 1 if the company receives a subsidy or PSO or both and 0 if 
the company does not obtain any of the two.  The data set for the year of observation 
is gathered from the Central Government Financial Statement for 2007 to 2009.  
The second financially related government intervention variable is Dividend Payout 
Policy. It is defined as the payout ratio of the dividend paid to the Government on a 
yearly basis. This thesis seeks a different approach towards dividend payout policy 
and investigates the power of government in enforcing the company to allocate 
money to pay non-tax revenue to itself while other priorities, such as investment, 
come after. Despite having a different purpose, prior studies apply dividend payout 
policy in a number of ways. For instance, Chen et al. (2005) measures dividend 
policy proxy as the total dividend divided by net profit.  Deng et al. (2013) refers to 
dividend policy as dividends per share divided by lagged total assets per share. 
Meantime, Wang (2010) measures dividend policy as the value of cash dividend per 
share over earnings per share. As for this thesis, dividend policy is expressed in 
percentage as a result of the total value of the dividend divided by the total net 
income (Puspasari and Evans 2012b). Data on dividend payout is collected from the 
Central Government Financial Statement for 2007 to 2009 while total net income is 
collected from the SOE‟s financial statement for corresponding years.  
The next variable, Asset Transfer from the Central Government to SOEs (AT), is 
one of a regulatory framework related government intervention variables. It is 
defined as assets that are acquired or generated from a government project and 
handed over or granted to an SOE by the Central Government with the purpose of 
achieving the government‟s social agenda.  Due to the nature of government control 
enforcing this responsibility onto SOEs, this variable is considered as one of the 
substantial examples of government control over SOEs and therefore should be 
included in the analysis.  
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The asset transfer from Central Government to SOEs is measured as a dummy 
variable and is stated as 1 if the SOE receives any transferred asset and 0 otherwise. 
The data on the three years succeeding asset transfer activities for each SOE is 
collected from the Central Government Financial Statement for 2007-2009.  
The second and last regulatory related government intervention variable is the Legal 
Case Resulting from Non-Compliance with regulation (LEG). It is a dummy 
variable for the presence of legal cases related to any violation against the law or 
regulation that is bound to the SOEs operations. It is expressed as 1 if there is one or 
more legal case(s), or 0 otherwise. Like asset transfer, this variable is considered 
specific to the characteristic of SOEs and the legal environment in Indonesia, 
therefore this variable is considered another newly used in research.  
The dummy variable is constructed using data gathered from various government 
documents from the Supreme Audit Institution (BPK), the Agency for Financial and 
Development  Supervision (BPKP) and the Commission for Anti-Corruption (KPK). 
Another important source of data utilized for this variable is pulled from the LKBN 
ANTARA database.   
4.3.3. Control variables  
This study considers other specific characteristics or factors of the SOEs as a form of 
government intervention that potentially affects SOE financial performance. Those 
factors are treated as control variables, consisting of history of establishment, size, 
capital intensity, industry competition, leverage, year 2008 and year 2009. History of 
establishment is one control variable which has been utilized for the first time, while 
the others are frequently used in many studies. 
The first control variable, the History of Establishment (HIST), provides a 
background of initial establishment of SOEs in Indonesia. It is a dummy variable 
representing 1 if the SOE is originally set up from a previous Dutch company and 
handed over to the Indonesian government as a nationalised company, or 0 




Secondly, Size (SIZ) is a natural log of total assets. This variable has been adopted 
by many researchers (eg Chen et al, 2005; Gunasekarage at al., 2007; Arosa, 
Iturralde, and Maseda 2010; Jiang, Huang, and Kim 2013).  The data on total assets 
for three years of observation is captured from SOE financial reports (2007-2009).  
Thirdly, Capital Intensity (CI) refers to dummy variables characterising the level of 
capital intensity of a company.  It is measured as 1 if it is a high capital intensive 
company, or 0 if it is low capital intensive company. A company is categorised as 
high capital intensive if it has a capital expenditure greater than 5 per cent to total 
assets in any year between 2007-2009.   
Fourth, Industry Competition (IC) is another dummy variable for expressing the 
level of competition of an SOE in the corresponding industry. It is measured as 1 if 
the level of competition is medium to high, identified by more than 5 competitors 
within the industry, or otherwise. The data set of this variable comes from various 
sources including Industry Sector Summary Reports from the Ministry of Industry 
(2010), a list of banks from the Bank of Indonesia, a list of insurance companies and 
financial institutions from the Ministry of Finance.   
Fifth, Leverage is measured as total debt scaled by total assets. Various studies 
utilizing leverage as a control variable include, for example, Chen et al. (2005), 
Akhigbe and Martin (2008), Jiang, Huang, and Kim (2013) and Gunasekarage, Hess, 
and Hu ( 2007). The data element for leverage is obtained from the SOE financial 
statement for 2007-2009.   
The last two control variables are dummy variables of Years 2008 and 2009.    
 
4.4. Summary of the Chapter   
This thesis broadens the research of agency theory to examine the entrenchment 
effect in the context of government as a controlling shareholder of SOEs in 
Indonesia. Following a positivist ontology, this thesis tests three areas of government 
intervention – in governance, financial and regulatory framework; and relates the 
impact of the interventions to SOE financial performance. Using Return on Assets as 
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the dependent variable, this thesis investigates 10 predictors of independent variables 
and 7 control variables. The summary of variables is presented in the Table 4.1 
below.  
The next two chapters present statistical analysis (Chapter 5 for univariate analysis 
and Chapter 6 for multivariate analysis) for testing samples. 
 
Table 4. 1: Summary of Variables  
Variables Measurement Type Data Type Data Source 
 
Dependent variable: SOE financial performance  
Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
A fiscal year‟ EBIT (earning 
profit before tax, interest, and 
extraordinary item) divided by 
its total assets, expressed as a 
percentage. 
Continuous SOE Annual 
Report and/or 
SOE Financial 
Report  for 
2007-2009  





Total proportion of shares 
owned by the Central 
Government in the company to 
the total share ownership, 
expressed as a percentage 








Dummy variable for career or 
professional experience or 
background of a person prior to 
his or her appointment as the 
CEO. It is expressed as 1 for 

















appointment   
(CHAIR) 
Dummy variable for 
independence of career or 
professional background of the 





As above  
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Table 4.1: Summary of variables  (continued) 
 
Variables Measurement Type Data Type Data Source 
Chairperson 
external 
appointment   
(CHAIR) 
(continued) 
It is expressed as 1 if the 
Chairperson is independent from 
the Government and political 
connection or 0 otherwise. 
Internal or insider Chairpersons 
can be from the government 
officer/retired government 
officer including those from 







Dummy variable for career or 
professional experience or 
background of a person prior to 
his or her appointment as the 
CEO. It is expressed as 1 for 

















appointment   
(CHAIR) 
Dummy variable for 
independence of career or 
professional background of the 
Chairperson of the Board of 
Commissioners. It is expressed 
as 1 if the Chairperson is 
independent from the 
Government and political 
connection or 0 otherwise. 
Internal or insider Chairpersons 
can be from the government 
officer/retired government 
officer including those from 
military, policy and law 
enforcement unit.  
Categorical 
 




on the BOD  
(BOD) 
The proportion of directors from 
inside (internal SOE or 
Government assigned as the 
BOD) within the total BOD.  




 Table 4.1: Summary of variables (continued)   





in the BOC 
(BOC)  
 
The proportion of ordinary 
commissioners assigned in 
the BOC within the total 
BOC.  
Continuous As above  





The number of board sub-
committees established or 
appointed by the BOC. 














Dummy variable for SOE 
receiving government transfer 
payment for subsidy or PSO, 
measured as 1 if the company 
receives subsidy or PSO or 
both; 0 if the company does 












Refers to the dividend payout 
ratio of an SOE to be paid to 
Government, measured in 
percentage as result of total 
value of dividend by the total 
net income.  















Dummy variable for fixed 
assets handed over or granted 
to an SOE by the Central 
Government with specific 
purpose. It is measured as 1 if 
the SOE receives transferred 
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Table 4.1: Summary of variables (continued)    





with regulation  
or Legal case 
(LEG)  
Dummy variable for the 
presence of legal case related 
to any violation against the 
law or regulation that is 
bound to the SOEs 
operations. It is expressed as 
1 if there is one or more legal 























Dummy variable for the 
initial set up of an SOE, 
expressed by 1 if it is initially 
established as nationalised 
SOE from Dutch‟s company, 











Dummy variable characterising 
the level of capital intensity of 
a company.  It is measured by 
1 if it is a high capital intensive 
company, or 0 if it is low 
capital intensive company. A 
company is categorised as a 
high capital-intensive one if it 
has a capital expenditure 
greater than 5 per cent to total 
assets in any year between 
2007-2009.   






Table 4.1: Summary of variables (continued)     




Dummy variable for the 
level of competition of an 
SOE within the industry, 
expressed by 1 if medium to 
high level of competitions 
(>5 players in the industry), 
or 0 if zero (monopoly) to 






Industry, Bank of 
Indonesia, 
Ministry of 
Finance   
Leverage (LEV)  Total debt scaled by total 
asset. 





Year 2008 (Dummy), 
expressed as 1 if it is year 
2008, or 0 otherwise  
Dichotomous  
Year 2009  
(YR09) 
Year 2009 (Dummy), 
expressed as 1 if it is year 





with regulation  
or Legal case 
(LEG)  
Dummy variable for the 
presence of legal case 
related to any violation 
against the law or regulation 
that is bound to the SOEs 
operations. It is expressed as 
1 if there is one or more 













(KPK), database of 




Dummy variable for the 
initial set up of an SOE, 
expressed by 1 if it is 
initially established as 
nationalised SOE from 












CHAPTER 5: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
 
5.1.  Introduction 
Chapter 4 defined the sample selection and the variable definition and measures. 
Following the positivist ontology, it explained the three areas of government 
intervention cascaded into proxies of 10 independent variables and 7 control 
variables. As such, a quantitative method is applied.  
This chapter discusses descriptive statistics. The first section explains the statistical 
method used for the analysis. Then an in-depth discussion on the results of 
descriptive statistics is presented by each dependent, independent and control 
variable.  The last section describes the summary of this chapter.  
 
5.2. Approach for Univariate Analysis   
It is essential to examine sample data and ensure that there are no violations of any of 
the assumptions before proceeding to further analysis. To do so, obtaining 
descriptive statistics of each variable is useful for data description as it informs the 
centre, dispersion and form of data distribution (Cooper and Schindler 2006) by 
measuring mean, median, standard deviation, score range, skewness and kurtosis 
(Trihendradi 2005). Descriptive statistics can provide sound but rough initial 
measurement, which, according to Ott and Longnecker (2001), makes more sense for 
significant summary measures.  
After completing testing of assumptions, further statistical analysis is conducted 
using two types of techniques: non-parametric and parametric.  The non-parametric 
technique is ideal for measuring nominal (categorical) and ordinal (ranked) scale. 
Using various cross-tabulation tables and Chi-square, this technique is primarily 
performed for group comparison (Pallant 2007, 210). In this thesis, the non-
parametric tool is also used for confirmatory purpose. On the other hand, the 
parametric tests use assumptions about the population from which the sample was 
124 
 
drawn. Techniques used on the parametric tests for this thesis include independent 
sample t-test and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA).  One-way ANOVA is 
used to compare more than two groups, i.e. one independent variable with more than 
two groups and one dependent continuous variable. It compares the variability in 
scores (variance) between the different groups to validate whether the observed 
difference is significant. To further observe each group difference, this analysis also 
conducts the Tukey Honestly Significant Difference (the Tukey HSD) to detect the 
significant difference between every set group (Pallant 2007, 242).  
In applying those techniques, this study uses some categorisations. First is the 
company size group, where SOEs are categorised into five groups based on the 
amount of the total assets. This category was previously used by Laksanawan (2008, 
253). It comprises Group 1 (less than IDR 1 trillon), Group 2 (IDR 1 trillion to <IDR 
5 trillion), Group 3 (IDR 5 trillion to < IDR 10 trillion) Group 4 (IDR 10 trillion to < 
IDR 50 trillion), and Group 5 (equal or more than IDR 50 trillion. Second is the 
industry group. Adopting the industry group categorisation of the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (IDX), SOEs are grouped into 9 industry sectors. It includes agriculture; 
mining; basic industry and chemicals; miscellaneous industry; consumer goods 
industry; property, real estate, and building construction; infrastructure, utilities, and 
transportation; finance; and trade, services, and investment. Third is listing status. 
This simply divides SOEs by publicly listed and non-listed ones. Fourth is the SOE 
establishment history that differentiates between nationalised and non-nationalised 
SOEs. The reminder of this chapter discusses the result of this univariate analysis. 
 
5.3. Dependent Variable- Return on Assets (ROA)   
In this study, Return on Assets (ROA), derived from accounting rates of return, is 
used as a measure of SOE financial performance. To measure ROA, the SOE annual 
reports and financial statements of all SOEs were collected over a 3-year period of 
observation from 2007 to 2009. This includes 14 publicly listed SOEs and 111 non-
publicly listed SOEs. Among non-listed ones, 8 companies presented unaudited 
financial statements. These companies are categorised as small with total assets less 
than IDR 3 trillion. Financial constraint is the reason for not appointing a public 
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accounting service to audit on an annual basis. As the total assets of these 8 
companies is less than 1% of the total size of the entire samples, it is considered that 
it will not significantly affect the result of the study.  
Return on Assets (ROA) is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, 
extraordinary items and taxes to total assets and is expressed as a percentage 
(Mankin and Jewell 2010). The mean of ROA exhibits an upward trend over the 
three year period of study (Table 5.1), from 4.83% of ROA mean in 2007 to 7.20% 
in 2009. This significant growth 49.07% reflects the improved effectiveness on how 
the SOEs utilized their assets. The gradual rise of median has been consistent with 
the fact that SOE performance has steadily improved over times.  
Table 5. 1: Descriptive statistics for Return on Assets (ROA) measure in percentage 
Year N
a
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
2007 122 -29.97 31.19 4.83 3.91 10.53 
2008 121 -28.02 37.16 6.08 4.68 10.94 
2009 122 -28.65 37.68 7.20 6.40 9.78 
Note:
 a
 Outliers are identified following the SPSS convention as those 





percentile range (Weinberg and Aramowitz 2008, 43). For the purpose of the 
descriptive statistics, data with outliers are eliminated.  
The ROA performance is detailed by industry category. Using the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (ISX) classification, the mean comparison is presented in the Table 5.2 
below. As shown in the table, two of nine industry groups, mining and infrastructure 
utility and transportation, experienced a decline in performance in 2008. The ROA 
mean dropped from 8.75% in 2007 to 3% on mining and 7.07% to 6.44% on 
infrastructure, utility and transportation. The most plausible explanation is that both 
occurred during the 2008-2009 global economic crisis. Even though the economy of 
Indonesia was less affected by the crisis (Tambunan 2009, 6), a report issued by 
ASEAN and the World Bank noted that when the global economic crisis pulled in 
Indonesia, GDP growth of most sectors slowed in Quarter 4 2008 while remaining 
positive. Consequently, some economic sectors were vulnerable, nonetheless others 
were less affected or not at all by the crisis. For instance, mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, oil and gas, construction, trade, hotel and restaurants experienced 
negative growth. Conversely, other economic sectors, such as agriculture, livestock, 
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forestry and fishery, transportation and communication, finance, real estate and 
business services, were not influenced by the crisis. This is consistent with the 
statistical evidence suggesting that the decline of two groups of SOEs as stated above 
happened because of the effect of the global financial crisis (Muchayat 2001, 66).   
 
Table 5. 2: Return on Assets (ROA) mean comparison by industry group 
 N 
a
 ROA Mean (in percentage) 
2007 2008 2009 
Agriculture 23 7.19 7.65 6.03 
Mining 3 8.75 3.00 5.04 
Basic industry and chemicals 7 3.90 7.59 7.86 
Miscellaneous industry 7 1.69 5.77 7.49 
Consumer goods industry 5 4.76 5.08 7.45 
Property, real estate, & building construction 15 3.80 5.72 8.12 
Infrastructure, utilities, and transportation 19 7.07 6.44 8.34 
Finance 19 4.56 5.42 5.60 
Trade, services, and investment 18 6.45 7.77 8.68 
Total 116 5.59 6.51 7.25 
Note:
 a
 Outliers are identified following the SPSS convention as those observations 




 percentile range 
(Weinberg and Aramowitz 2008, 43). For the purpose of this descriptive statistics, 
data with outliers are eliminated.   
 
On the other hand, SOEs in transportation and communication, finance, real estate 
and business service exhibited a positively increasing performance, which is 
consistent with the less affected economic sectors during and after the crisis. Several 
groups of SOEs (manufacturing, construction, trade, hotel and restaurant) achieved 
positive growth of ROA when the market was actually weakening as the crisis 
impacted. Agricultural industry is the only one with a slight increase of ROA mean 
in 2008. This industry group belongs to 23 SOEs from small to medium size 
companies.   
The ROA performance is also grouped by company size. Adopting of Laksanawan‟s 
approach (2008, 253), the result of ROA mean comparison is illustrated in the Figure 
5.1. Among the five groups, about half of the SOEs belong to the small group with 
less than IDR 1 trillion of total assets and almost 30% belongs to the group of IDR 1 
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to < IDR 5 trillion of total assets. Only nine companies fall into the very large size 
company category owning more than IDR 50 trillion of assets.   






 Outliers are identified following the SPSS convention as those observations 




 percentile range 
(Weinberg and Aramowitz 2008). For the purpose of this descriptive statistics, data 
with outliers are eliminated.   
 
The consistency of this upward trend is shown by Group 1, 2, 3, and 4 in comparison 
with the total ROA mean. Group 4 (SOEs with total assets between IDR 10 trillion to 
<IDR 50 trillion) exhibits the highest growth and level of mean among others in 
2009, far higher than the total figure. Among others, group 3 (total assets of IDR 5 
trillion to <IDR 10 trillion) has been the most effective group in utilizing their assets 
until 2008. Group 5 (the highest group with total assets equal to or more than IDR 50 
trillion) is the only group with a different trend. While the ROA mean of group 5 
experienced growth in 2008, other groups weakened. Conversely, the figure of 




5.4. Independent Variables: Governance Related Government 
Involvement      
In this study, governance in SOEs is measured using a number of governance 
methods: including the General Meeting of the Shareholder (GMS), the Board of 
Directors (BOD), and the Board of Commissioner (BOC).  In the context of GMS, 
governance is measured through government ownership. Data is collected from three 
years of Central Government Financial Statements (audited) for 2007-2009.   
For the BOD, governance practice is measured through CEO External Appointment 
and the Proportion of Government Related Directors on the BOD. In three 
succeeding years (2007-2009) names and career background of members of the 
BOD‟s are gathered from two main sources including the Ministry of SOE‟s 
database and management information on SOE annual reports or general information 
on SOE financial statements. Some data is missing as the companies do not disclose 
an adequate amount of information to the public or they do not report sufficiently to 
the Ministry of SOE. These reduce the data on CEO career backgrounds by six; and 
by 11 the data on government representation on the BOD available for study. 
For the Government‟s involvement in the governance of the BOC, governance is 
measured using three predictors - the Chairperson‟s external experience, the 
proportion of Government related commissioners on the BOC and the number of 
board sub-committees on the BOC. Archive data maintained by each Deputy of the 
Ministry of SOE are employed as the main source of data. SOE annual reports 
produced by limited SOEs as well as the SOE Performance Report, annually updated 
and printed by the Ministry of SOEs, are also collected to complete the data.  
5.4.1. Government Ownership 
Government ownership refers to the total proportion of shares owned by the Central 
Government in the SOE to the total share ownership and is expressed in percentage. 
The descriptive statistics (Table 5. 3) shows the mean (median) of the government 
ownership accounting for 0.94 (1.00) for the subsequent three years. It indicates that 




Table 5. 3: Descriptive statistics for government ownership 
Year N Min Max Mean  Median Std. Deviation 
2007 125 0.51 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.14 
2008 125 0.51 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.14 
2009 125 0.51 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.14 
 
To further investigate the diversity of SOE ownership, the data is transformed to 
ordinal-level data and is distinguished in four categories as 0 for fully owned by the 
Government, 1 for 90-99% of ownership, 2 for 70-89% of ownership, or 3 otherwise. 
Majority of the populations (101 companies or 81% of the total) are fully owned by 
the Government. The rest of the companies, as presented in Figure 5.2, comprise 9 
companies having a maximum of 20% of non-government ownership and 15 
companies containing more diverse shareholders with 31-50% of share ownership.  
 




Additional analysis of comparing means is presented in the appendix D. It reveals 
that the larger size companies are likely to have less government ownership than the 
smaller size ones. Also, there is a significant difference of government ownership 
among different industry groups, of which mining industry, the consumer goods 
industry, and property, real estate, and the building construction industry are the 
companies with least government ownership.    
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5.4.2. CEO External Appointment 
For the purpose of this study, a CEO external appointment is defined by a dummy 
variable for career or professional experience or background of a person prior to his 
or her appointment as the CEO. It is expressed as 1 for external or outsider CEO or 0 
for an internal CEO. An internal CEO means that the CEO is appointed from within 
the current SOE, or another SOE or government bureaucracy, including those who 
work at local government officers, military and policy offices. Nine sets of data are 
missing due to the unavailability of information from three companies. As such, for 
the purpose of frequency analysis, the internal group is further divided into two sub-
groups: CEOs from internal SOEs or other SOE and CEOs from Government, police 
and all military office.  
Overall, SOEs are dominated by internally appointed the CEOs. The percentage of 
SOEs with a CEO from internal management/other SOE is 78.40 per cent in 2008 
(Figure 5.3), dropping to 76%in 2009.The number of CEOs with an SOE career 
background is far larger than those from Government and external (six and eight 
times, respectively).   
The composition figure in 2008 is particularly interesting since it portrays that the 
high number of CEO substitutions is linked to the decrease in number of independent 
CEOs from 17 to 12 people. This suggests very strong intervention of the 
Government as the General Meeting of the Shareholders are likely to appoint internal 
CEOs from internal to replace some external CEO positions in that specific year.  
In addition, CEOs originating from outside the Government/SOE are more likely to 
be appointed to larger sized companies as compared to smaller sized ones. Similarly, 
such significant difference can also be found among different industry groups. Both 








Figure 5. 3: Frequency distribution of SOE’s CEO external appointment for 2007-
2009 
 
5.4.3. Chairperson’s External Experience 
The external experience of the chairperson of Board of Commissioners is a dummy 
variable for independence of career or professional background. It is expressed as 1 
if the Chairperson is independent from the Government and political connection or 0 
otherwise. An internal or insider chairperson can be from government officers/retired 
government officers. A retired government officer includes a former Minister or 
retired senior civil servant, former police or military or legal enforcement officer. An 
outsider/independent chairperson refers to professionals who come from private 
sectors, expert, or academic. For the purpose of frequency analysis, the insider 
chairperson is divided into two, namely government officer and other insider.   
 
Table 5. 4: Frequency distribution of chairperson external experience for 2007-2009 
 2007 2008 2009  
Freq Percent Freq Percent Freq Percent 
Internal         
Government Officer 83 66.40% 85 68.00% 91 72.80% 
Other insider 
a
 18 14.40% 13 10.40% 11 8.80% 
External/Independent 24 19.20% 27 21.60% 23 18.40% 
Total 125 100.00% 125 100.00% 125 100.00% 
Note:
 a
 Other insider includes retired Government officer/police/military unit and 




Table 5.4 reveals that the majority of the chairpersons are government related (a 
government officer plus other insiders accounted for 80.80 percent in 2007), 
consisting of those who are functionally still active in one of the important positions 
in the Government bureaucracy (about 66.40 percent) and the remaining 14.40 
percent of those who retired from government or are working for SOEs. The figure 
gradually rises every year as the number of chairpersons from other insiders slowly 
declines. On the other hand, the figure of external or independent chairpersons peaks 
in 2008 to 27 (21.60 percent) and declines afterwards to the lowest level at 23 (18.40 
percent of the total). The fact that independent chairpersons increased in 2008 was 
part of the Ministry of SOE‟s restructuring program (Kementerian BUMN 2010b). 
To add, additional analysis, presented in Appendix D, reveals that SOEs from certain 
industry groups tend to employ more independent chairpersons than those from other 
industry groups.   
 
5.4.4. The Proportion of Government Related Directors on the BOD  
The proportion of Government related directors on the BOD refers to the ratio of 
directors from inside (internal SOE or government assigned to the BOD) within the 
total BOD. As illustrated in Table 5.5, the mean of government related directors on 
the BOD descends slowly over the three-year period, from 0.92 (2007) to 0.89 
(2009).  
 
Table 5. 5: Descriptive statistics for government related directors on the BOD  
Year N 
a
 Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Percentiles 
25 50 75 
2007 121 0.33 1.00 0.92 0.16 0.86 1.00 1.00 
2008 121 0.17 1.00 0.90 0.17 0.82 1.00 1.00 
2009 122 0.17 1.00 0.89 0.19 0.80 1.00 1.00 
Note:
 a
Eleven data are missing since the companies do not disclose adequate 





5.4.5. The Proportion of Government Related Commissioners on the BOC  
BOC representation describes the proportion of appointed members of the BOC who 
have a career background in the government. Table 5.6 displays that in 2007 the 
mean and median of government related commissioners in the BOC is at a similar 
level, 0.77 and 0.80 respectively. This is in contrast with the figure of the BOD 
structure that has shown the decline of government officers employed in the three 
year period of study (Table 5.5).  
 
Table 5. 6: Descriptive statistics for government related commissioners on the BOC 




25 50 75 
2007 125 0.17 1.00 0.77 0.22 0.60 0.80 1.00 
2008 125 0.14 1.00 0.79 0.23 0.67 0.80 1.00 
2009 125 0.17 1.00 0.80 0.22 0.67 0.80 1.00 
 
In addition, company size is found to be an important determinant in selecting BOC 
membership. The BOC is strongly dominated by government representatives in 
majority of small to medium size SOEs. Likewise, industry group is significant 
factor in selecting the composition of government and non-government background 
in the BOC. Both analyses are illustrated in Appendix D.  
 
5.4.6. Number of Board Sub-Committees  
The last predictor of governance related intervention associates with the number of 
board sub-committees. A sub-committee serves special tasks (such as the audit sub-
committee, nomination sub-committee, remuneration sub-committee) assigned by the 
BOC. Based on the three years of data relating to 125 SOEs, the mean (median) 
number of board sub-committees is 1.34 (1.00) within the range of 0 to 6 (Table 5.7). 
The increase of mean over the years of observation indicates that a number of SOEs 
are adding more sub-committees to assist the board.   
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Table 5. 7: Descriptive statistics for the number of board sub-committees  




25 50 75 
2007 125 0 5 1.34 1 1.26 1 1 2 
2008 125 0 5 1.41 1 1.28 1 1 2 
2009 125 0 6 1.45 1 1.27 1 1 2 
 
Law Number 19 Year 2003
40
 stipulates that every SOE is obliged to establish an 
Audit Sub-Committee as part of corporate governance practice. In addition, the Law 
spurs SOEs (BOC) to create additional sub-committees, such as remuneration sub-
committees and corporate governance sub-committees, based on need and financial 
strengths. The pie chart shown in Figure 5.4 shows that 25 SOEs (20 per cent of the 
total) are not equipped with any board sub-committee, even an audit sub-committee.   
 
Figure 5. 4: Distribution of number of board sub-committees in 2007-2009 
 
 
Table 5.8 shows the greatest priority for the BOC is the audit sub-committee as 101 
SOEs have this. Among other types of board sub-committee, risk management 
appears to be the next preferred (31 SOEs). Others frequently formed are 
remuneration and nomination sub-committees (24 and 22 SOEs) with some 
companies merging these two functions under one sub-committee. In addition, other 
                                                 
40 The State-Owned Enterprise Law (Number 19 Year 2003). 
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types of sub-committee include corporate governance, investment, corporate social 
responsibility, ethics, oversight, and commerce marketing.   
 
Table 5. 8: Types of board sub-committees under the BOC 
 Number of SOEs 







Corporate Governance 12 
Risk Management  31 
Investment  6 
Corporate Social Responsibility 1 





 Remuneration and nomination function can be found in one 
board sub-committee (nomination and remuneration sub-committee) or 
two sub-committees (remuneration sub-committee and nomination sub-
committee).   
 
In addition, company size as well as industry group appear to be determinant factors 
in deciding the board sub-committee numbers of a company. Figures of both 
analyses are depicted in Appendix D.  
 
 
5.5. Independent Variables: Financial Related Government 
Involvement  
The second group of independent variables concerns financially related government 
intervention. There are two measures: (i) government transfer payments in the form 
of subsidy and public service obligation (PSO) and (ii) dividend payout policy. The 
former is in the form of a cash outflow from the Indonesian Ministry of Finance (i.e. 
State Treasurer Account) to receiving SOEs; whereas the latter is a cash inflow 
activity from SOEs to the State Treasurer Account. All data are gathered from 
Central Government Financial Statements for 2007- 2009 (audited).  
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5.5.1. Government Transfer Payment in the Form of Subsidies or Public 
service obligation (PSO) 
Government transfer payments show funding activities between the Central 
Government and the SOE. In this study, government transfer is in the form of 
subsidies and PSO. Subsidy is a government transfer of funds to the SOE to support 
the cost production, selling, export or import of goods and services so that the selling 
price is affordable by the public (Law No. 47 of 2009 and Law No. 10 of 2010), 
whereas PSO is an activity or a series of activities provided by a public service 
provider with the purpose of providing goods and services to every citizen and 
resident in accordance with the laws and regulations (Law No. 25 of 2009). The data 
is collected from the Central Government Financial Statements for the year 2007-
2009.  
Table 5.9 documents the fluctuating figures of government transfer in the 
consecutive years of observation. Government transfer experiences a significant 
increase by approximately 74.18 per cent in 2008, reaching a peak of total amount 
(mean) of IDR 232,382.47 billion (IDR 33,197.50 billion). Conversely, the figure 
drops substantially again by 57.84 per cent in 2009 even lower than that of 2007 with 
the government transfer total amount (mean) of IDR 97,981.38 billion (IDR 
13,997.34 billion).  
 
Table 5. 9: Descriptive Statistics for government transfer 
Descriptive Statistics  2007 2008 2009 
Total N 7 7 7 
Mean 
a
 19,058.88 33,197.50 13,997.34 
Minimum 
a
 100.00 150.00 175.00 
Maximum 
a
 88,200.24 145,802.30 49,546.47 
Sum 
a





To further understand the value of this government allocated budget for subsidy and 
PSO, Figure 5.5 above depicts the trend of government transfer and the comparison 
to operating revenue. As can be seen, the movement of government transfer is 
proportionate to operating revenues. This indicates the consistent contribution of 
government transfer to the total operating revenue. Also, based on the ratio table, the 
137 
 
proportion of government transfer to the operating revenue of the seven SOEs 
(subsidy/PSO receivers) is relatively significant amounting 26.01% (2007), with the 
rise of 31.82% (2008) and the fall of 18.47% (2009). Compared to the total operating 
revenue from 125 SOEs, the ratio of government transfer to seven SOEs accounts for 
15.74%, 20.53% and 10.23 in 2007, 2008 and 2009. This suggests that while only 
seven SOEs receive a government transfer, the value is very significant to the total 
operating revenue for 125 SOEs.   
 
Figure 5. 5: Trend of government transfer (Subsidy or Public Service Obligation) for 
2007-3009 
 
Ratio (%) 2007 2008 2009 
Government revenue of 7 
SOEs transfer to Operating  26.01% 31.82% 18.47% 
Government transfer to 
Operating revenue of 125 SOEs 15.74% 20.53% 10.23% 
 
5.5.2. Dividend Payout Policy  
Dividend payout policy signifies the dividend payout ratio of an SOE to be paid to 
government as its shareholder. The amount paid out is the portion approved by both 
the government and the House of Representative as shown in the annual budget and 
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the execution is presented in the financial statements. In this thesis, dividend payout 
policy is measured in percentage as a result of the total value of dividend by the total 
net income. Three years of data on dividend payout is collected from the Central 
Government Financial Statements (audited) for 2007-2009.  
As shown in Figure 5.6, 57 SOEs (45.60 percent of the total) generated and paid out 
a dividend to the government in 2007. The number of SOEs paying out dividends 
increased every year to 59 and 62 for years 2008 and 2009 respectively.  
 
Figure 5. 6: The composition of SOEs paying out dividend for the 2007-2009 
 
The table 5.10 below outlines the descriptive statistics for the dividend payout 
variable. Overall the mean is relatively low (0.12 in 2007 to 0.11 in 2009). Among 
those who paid a dividend, the mean is 0.26 in 2007, declining to 0.21 in 2009.  
Table 5. 10: Descriptive statistics for dividend payout ratio 
Based on 125 SOEs N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Dividend Payout 2007 125 0 2.01
a
 0.12  
Dividend Payout 2008 125 0 0.53 0.11  
Dividend Payout 2009 125 0 0.60 0.11  
Based on 67 SOEs    N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Dividend Payout 2007 57 0 2.01
a
 0.26 
Dividend Payout 2008 59 0 0.53 0.23 
Dividend Payout 2009 61 0 0.60 0.23  
Note:
 a
 A very high dividend payout ratio occurred because of the computation 
was formulized using retained earnings of 2006.  
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With regard to dividend value, the mean of dividend falls in 2008 despite the fact 
that there is an increased number of SOEs paying a dividend. The global financial 
crisis of 2008 is suspected to be the cause of this decline (Table 5.11).  
 
Table 5. 11: Descriptive statistics for dividend value (in IDR billions) 
Year Mean Med Std. Deviation Min Max 
2007  0.22  0  1.34  0  14.11  
2008  0.19  0  0.99  0  10.47  
2009 0.22 0 0.99 0  9.51  
 
Table 5.12 below indicates the frequency and comparative mean for dividend among 
SOEs from different size groups. The table illustrates the presence of a significant 
difference amongst SOEs from different sized groups where larger companies are 
likely to produce a greater dividend. A one-way ANOVA test for dividend 
empirically supports that size is an important factor determining the value of 
dividend with p-value significance of 0.000, p<0.01.  
 
Table 5. 12: Mean comparison dividend by company size in pooled year   
In IDR  N 
Percent of 
SOEs 
Dividend Mean  
(IDR billions) 
Group 1: <1 trillion 185 49.33%  4.43  
Group 2: 1 trillion to < 5 trillion 108 28.80%  32.52  
Group 3: 5 trillion to < 10 trillion 35 9.33%  174.65  
Group 4: 10 trillion to <50  trillion 24 6.40%  377.81  
Group 5: ≥ 50 trillion 23 6.13%  2,598.11  
Total 375 100.00%  
 
As noted in the Table 5.13, another type of analysis using industry groups as the 
dependent variable reveals that the industry sector is a substantial determinant of a 
dividend payout policy. This indicates that SOEs from certain industries have greater 
dividend payout than others, for instance the mining sector, infrastructure, utilities 
and transportation sector, and finance sector pay higher rates of dividend than the 




Table 5. 13: Mean comparison analysis of dividend by industry group in pooled year  
 N Percent of 
SOEs 
Mean  
(in IDR billions)  
Mean 
(rate) 
Agriculture 72 19.20% 46.26 .12 
Mining 15 4.00% 2,470.24 .22 
Basic industry and chemicals 30 8.00% 93.03 .10 
Miscellaneous industry 21 5.60% 1.42 .04 
Consumer goods industry 18 4.80% 3.31 .03 
Property, real estate, and 
building construction 
45 12.00% 20.93 .07 
Infrastructure, utilities, and 
transportation 
63 16.80% 362.35 .15 
Finance 57 15.20% 212.79 .15 
Trade, services, and 
investment 
54 14.40% 1.95 .08 
Total 375 100.00% 11.38 .11 
 
 
5.6. Independent Variables: Regulatory Framework Related 
Government Involvement  
Two measures relating to government involvement through regulatory framework 
include asset transfer from the Central Government to SOEs and the legal case 
resulting from non-compliance with regulations. Both variables are newly introduced 
in this thesis.  
5.6.1. Asset Transfer from Central Government to SOEs   
Asset transfer from the Central Government to SOEs is a dummy variable for fixed 
assets granted to an SOE by the Central Government for a specific purpose. The 
physical asset transfer leads to obligations for an SOE to present the additional 
amount of assets and equity on their balance sheet. It is measured as 1 if the SOE 
receives a transferred asset, or 0 otherwise. Three years of data of asset transfer 
during 2007-2009 was collected from Ministry of Finance and below is the result of 
the descriptive statistics analysis. 
Figure 5.7 below illustrates that only 10 SOEs (8 percent of the total) received an 
asset transfer from the government during 2007 and 2008.  The number of SOEs 








The descriptive statistics as shown in the Table 5.14 presents that a small number of 
SOEs receiving government transfer yet with very significant value (26.01 per cent 
of the total operating revenue of 125 SOEs). The figure fluctuates and peaks in 2009. 
 
Table 5. 14: Descriptive statistics for Asset Transfer in IDR billions 
Year N Mean Std. Deviation Med Min Max 
2007 125 313.31 2287.18 0 0  23,855.89  
2008 125 243.16 2143.55 0 0  23,855.89  
2009 125 336.46 2749.67 0 0  30,376.63  
 
Since transferred assets are mostly related to machinery and heavy equipment, asset 
transfers are very likely to occur in the SOEs from capital-intensive industries. Table 
5.15  illustrates that SOEs related to infrastructure, utilities, and transportation obtain 
the highest mean of IDR 1,596.34 billions of transferred assets value, followed by 




Table 5. 15:  Mean comparison of transfer assets by industry group in pooled year  
 N Percent of SOEs Mean  
(in IDR billion) 
Agriculture 72 19.20% 0.09 
Mining 15 4.00% 613.63 
Basic industry and chemicals 30 8.00% - 
Miscellaneous industry 21 5.60% 86.45 
Consumer goods industry 18 4.80% - 
Property, real estate, and 
building construction 
45 12.00% - 
Infrastructure, utilities, and 
transportation 
63 16.80% 1596.34 
Finance 57 15.20% - 
Trade, services, and investment 54 14.40% 0.39 
Total 375 100.00% 297.64 
 
5.6.2. Legal Cases Resulting from Non-Compliance with Regulation  
In this study, legal case relates to any violation against the law or regulation that is 
bound to the operation of SOEs but not private firms. The relevant legal instrument is 
the State on Enterprise Law, the State Finance Law, the State Treasury Law, the 
Audit on Accountability of State Finance Execution Law, the Corruption Eradication 
Commission Law, and the Criminal Act on Corruption Law. The violation includes 
yet not limited to, embezzlement, , bribery and fictitious projects found by the law 
enforcement institutions such as the Indonesia Attorney, Indonesian National Police 
(known as POLRI), Corruption Eradication Commission (known as Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi or KPK), Finance and Development Supervisory Agency 
(known as Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan or BPKP), Supreme 
Audit Institution (known as Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan or BPK).  
To measure legal case, data over three years from four different sources was 
collected. These sources include KPK, BPKP, BPK, and the Indonesia News Agency 
(known as LKBN ANTARA). Each institution provides data related to the outcome 
of the institution. Data provided by KPK relates to legal cases on violation against 
the law, abuse of power, or bribery by law enforcement officer or government 
officers that causes the state losses of minimum IDR 1 billion. Data maintained by 
BPKP relates to investigative audit results based on the request from the Indonesian 
Attorney or POLRI or KPK. Data from BPK is concerned with findings in financial 
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and special audits to the SOE, which are reported in the semi-annual audit report 
(known as Hasil Pemeriksaan Audit).  Data from the ANTARA database relates to 
SOE legal cases as they release new information associated with on-going 
investigation or legal court issues.  
The legal case dummy variable is expressed as 1 if there is 1 or more legal case(s), or 
0 otherwise. Frequency distribution, as presented in the Table 5.16, document that at 
least 12 percent of the total SOEs have violated the regulations . The number slightly 
fluctuates and declines to 15 in 2009.   
Table 5. 16: Frequency distribution for legal case variable 
 2007 2008 2009 
Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Legal Case        
 No case  109 87.20% 108 86.40% 110 88.00% 
 With case 16 12.80% 17 13.60% 15 12.00% 
 
Furthermore, Table 5.17 describes the relationship between the presence of a legal 
case within an SOE and the size of the company using the Independent sample t-test. 
The test result confirms that there is a significant difference between the two groups 
(t=4.3812, p<.05) suggesting that  cases are more likely occur in larger companies 
than smaller ones.   
Table 5. 17: Independent sample t-test for legal case by company size 
Dependent 
variable 
Levene's Test t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t  Sig-2 tailed Mean Difference  
(in billion) 
Company Size  434.614 .000 4.381  .000** 80,491.52 
 
With regard to industry group, legal cases are also more dominant in certain 
industries. The cross-tabulation (Table 5.18) exhibits that most cases can be found in 




Table 5. 18: Legal case by industry group in  pooled years 
 Legal Case 
No case With case Total 
Agriculture 17.33% 1.87% 19.20% 
Mining 3.20% 0.80% 4.00% 
Basic industry and chemicals 7.73% 0.27% 8.00% 
Miscellaneous industry 4.80% 0.80% 5.60% 
Consumer goods industry 4.27% 0.53% 4.80% 
Property, real estate, and building construction 11.47% 0.53% 12.00% 
Infrastructure, utilities, and transportation 12.27% 4.53% 16.80% 
Finance 12.53% 2.67% 15.20% 
Trade, services, and investment 13.60% 0.80% 14.40% 
 Total  87.20% 12.80% 100% 
 
Table 5.19 provides the summary of the Independent sample t-test result to assess the 
nature of legal case differences between SOEs receiving capital investment and 
SOEs not receiving in the corresponding year; SOEs with PSO and SOEs without 
PSO; SOEs paying dividends to the government and SOEs without dividends; and 
SOEs with transferred assets and SOEs without . Overall, the t-test results show that 
significant difference occurs between SOEs with PSO and ones without PSO, SOEs 
with dividends and ones without dividends, and SOEs with transferred assets. 
 
Table 5.19:  Independent sample t-test for legal case in pooled year  
 Levene's Test t-test for Equality of Means Mean Difference 
F Sig. t df Sig-2 tailed (in IDR billion) 
PSO 173.110 0.000 2.313 47.000 0.025 9,509.09 
Dividend 158.633 0.009 2.776 47.094 0.008 1,158.36 
Asset Transfer 107.944 0.00 1.965 47.039 0.055 1,839.53 
Note: ** very significant p<.01 
 
 
5.7. Additional Descriptive Analysis  
5.7.1. History of SOE Establishment   
In this thesis, history of establishment is defined as the initial set up of an SOE by the 
Central Government of Indonesia or by the Dutch Government during its occupation 
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of Indonesia. It is a dummy control variable for the initial set up of an SOE, 
expressed by 1 if it is initially established as a nationalised SOE from a Dutch 
company, or 0 otherwise.  
As exhibited in the Table 5.20, there are 35 SOEs established by the Dutch 
Government before being nationalised (28 percent of the total). These nationalised 
companies exist in all industry sectors with the biggest portion in the infrastructure, 
utilities, and transportation sector (5.60 percent), agriculture and property, real estate, 
and building construction sector (4.80 percent each).  
 
Table 5.20: Distribution of nationalised SOEs by industry group  
 Nationalised SOE Non-nationalised SOE 
Count Percent Count Percent 
Agriculture 6 4.80% 18 14.40% 
Mining 2 1.60% 3 2.40% 
Basic industry and chemicals 3 2.40% 7 5.60% 
Miscellaneous industry 1 0.80% 6 4.80% 
Consumer goods industry 4 3.20% 2 1.60% 
Property, real estate, and building 
construction 
6 4.80% 9 7.20% 
Infrastructure, utilities, and 
transportation 
7 5.60% 14 11.20% 
Finance 4 3.20% 15 12.00% 
Trade, services, and investment 2 1.60% 16 12.80% 
Total  35 28.00% 90 72.00% 
 
With regard to the size of the company, 66.67 percent of the nationalised SOEs are 
small to very small companies with total assets of less than IDR 5 trillion. The rest of 
these Dutch heritage companies vary from IDR 5 trillion or above, including 9.52 
percent of  SOEs with total assets of IDR 50 trillion or more (Figure 5.8).  
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5.7.2. Company Size  
As a control variable in this thesis, company size is computed as a natural log of total 
assets. For this univariate analysis, company size has also been presented in groups 
to examine whether or not it is a determinant factor of many predictors.  The 
company size is categorised into five groups, as adopted from Laksanawan (2008).   
The illustration of the five categories is presented in Figure 5.9. In 2007, the majority 
of SOEs were in the category of very small (50.40 % of Group 1) to small (31.20 % 
of Group 2).  While there were some changes over time, SOEs continue to be 
dominated by very small companies in 2009 (47.20 % of the total). With only 7.20% 
of very large SOEs, it leaves the remaining 45.60% SOEs spread within small to 
large size companies.  
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Figure 5. 9:  SOE distribution based on company size in 2007-2009 (in IDR)  
 
 
With respect to the distribution of SOEs based on the company size, it is interesting 
to observe whether this size category associates with industry type. The cross-
tabulation table portraying the distribution of companies based on the industry group 
is shown in the Table 5.24 below.  
SOEs are spread in all industry or economic sectors with the largest proportion in 
agriculture (19.20%), followed by SOEs from infrastructure, utilities and 
transportation (16.80 %) and finance (15.20%). Conversely, mining and consumer 
goods are documented as having the least number of SOEs (4% and 4.80%, 
respectively).  
With regard to size, it shows that SOEs from agriculture, miscellaneous industry, 
consumer goods industry and trade, service and investment consist of very small to 
small size companies only, unlike other sectors that have wider range from very 
small companies to large or very large ones. It is worth emphasizing that mining 
industry, infrastructure, utilities and transportation, and finance are only areas where 




5.7.3. Leverage   
According to Gul (2001, 10) leverage might function as a governance mechanism as 
it results in the lenders monitoring company activity.  Leverage refers to the total 
debt divided by the total assets. As illustrated in the Table 5.21, there is an increase 
in overall leverage as it went up from mean 0.69 (2007) to 0.71 (2008 and 2009).  
Table 5.21: Descriptive statistics for leverage for 2007-2009 
Year N Min Max Mean Median SD Percentiles 
       25 50 75 
2007 125 0.03 3.64 0.69 0.67 0.47 0.36 0.67 0.91 
2008 125 0.00 3.02 0.71 0.64 0.47 0.34 0.64 0.93 
2009 125 0.02 4.20 0.71 0.65 0.55 0.33 0.65 0.91 
 
The following comparisons are meant to explore the determinant factor of leverage. 
First, Table 5.22 presents the results of mean comparison based on the industry 
groups. The mean varies among 9 industry sectors where the least leverage is 0.51 
(for trade, service and investment) and 0.53 (for mining) and the highest is 1.05 (for 
basic industry and chemicals) and 0.87 (for property, real estate and building 
construction).  
Table 5.22: Mean comparison of leverage by industry group in pooled data  
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Agriculture 72 0.67 0.36 
Mining 15 0.53 0.30 
Basic industry and chemicals 30 1.05 0.77 
Miscellaneous industry 21 0.60 0.26 
Consumer goods industry 18 0.66 0.48 
Property, real estate, and building construction 45 0.87 0.20 
Infrastructure, utilities, and transportation 63 0.66 0.75 
Finance 57 0.73 0.36 
Trade, services, and investment 54 0.51 0.39 
Total 375 0.70 0.50 
 
A similar technique is applied for the second analysis using the company size group. 
Exhibited in the Table 5.23, the result of mean comparison shows variations of 
leverage among 5 size groups without a clear direction. Both the smallest size 
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companies (Group 1) and the largest size companies (Group 5) are high, 0.790 and 
0.817 respectively, while the lowest rate is experienced by middle size companies 
(Group 3 and 4).  
Table 5.23:  Mean comparison of leverage by company size group in pooled data 
 In IDR N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Group 1: <1 trillion 185 0.790 0.609 
Group 2: 1 trillion to < 5 trillion 108 0.791 0.499 
Group 3: 5 trillion to < 10 trillion 35 0.430 0.300 
Group 4: 10 trillion to <50  trillion 24 0.627 0.281 
Group 5: ≥ 50 trillion) 23 0.817 0.209 
Total 375 0.748 0.530 
 
 
5.8. Summary of the Chapter   
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics and means comparison of variables of 
interest.  Overall, the financial performance of SOEs increases gradually over the 
three years of observation despite the global financial crisis in 2008. The ROA figure 
demonstrates an upward trend indicating an improvement of companies‟ efficiency 
in asset utilization. The analysis reveals that government involvement in SOEs exists 
in various types and level of depth. In governance practice, government involvement 
is very strong, characterized by the high level of ownership that represents the 
government‟s role in the General Meeting of the Shareholders, particularly in 
mining, consumer goods, as well as property, real estate, and the building 
construction industry. With regard to governance practice on the BOD, government 
involvement is also very strong with the preference to appoint CEOs from inside the 
SOEs rather than outside, and the high level of government related directors on the 
BOD. Governance practice in the BOC is characterized by a high preference in the 
appointment of officers from government as chairpersons as opposed to outsiders. 
Government representation on the BOC is also very strong and with an upward trend, 
except for larger size companies. The number of board sub-committees rises over the 
years following an increase in company size.  
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< 1trillion 9.60% 1.60% 5.60% 4.80% 3.20% 6.40% 3.20% 3.20% 12.80% 50.40% 
1 to < 5trillion 9.60% - 0.80% 0.80% 1.60% 4.80% 6.40% 5.60% 1.60% 31.20% 
5 to<10trillion - 0.80% 0.80% - - - 4.80% 0.80% - 7.20% 
10 to<50trillion - 0.80% 0.80% - - 0.80% 0.80% 2.40% - 5.60% 
> 50 trillion - 0.80% - - - - 1.60% 3.20% - 5.60% 






< 1trillion 8.80% 1.60% 5.60% 4.80% 4.00% 6.40% 3.20% 2.40% 13.60% 50.40% 
1 to < 5trillion 8.80% - 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 3.20% 5.60% 6.40% - 26.40% 
5 to<10trillion 0.80% 0.80% - - - 1.60% 4.80% 0.80% 0.80% 9.60% 
10to<50trillion 0.80% 0.80% 1.60% - - 0.80% 1.60% 2.40% - 8.00% 
> 50 trillion - 0.80% - - - - 1.60% 3.20% - 5.60% 






< 1trillion 8.00% 1.60% 5.60% 4.00% 3.20% 6.40% 2.40% 2.40% 13.60% 47.20% 
1 to < 5trillion 8.80% 0.80% 0.80% 1.60% 1.60% 3.20% 6.40% 4.80% 0.80% 28.80% 
5 to<10trillion 1.60% 0.80% - - - 1.60% 4.80% 2.40% - 11.20% 
10to<50trillion 0.80% - 1.60% - - 0.80% 1.60% 0.80% - 5.60% 
> 50 trillion - 0.80% - - - - 1.60% 4.80% - 7.20% 




With regard to financial activity, an upward trend in dividend paid to the government 
shows that financially related government involvement has been stronger over the 
study period. Company size and type of industry are two factors determining the 
amount of dividend. For government transfer, the value fluctuates (increase by 
74.18% in 2008, then decreases by 57.84% in 2009) with the peak of IDR 
232,382.47 billion. Even though only seven SOEs received government transfer, the 
value is very significant when compared to the total operating revenue of the 125 
SOEs. Four out of nine industry sectors obtained a government transfer (agriculture, 
mining, infrastructure, utilities, and transportation, and trade, service and investment) 
indicating that industry group is a factor driving government transfer policy. 
In the regulatory framework, the increased level of asset transfer from the 
government to the SOEs signifies government involvement in the financial area, with 
the asset distribution targeted to SOEs from certain industry groups only. 
Government involvement in setting regulations for SOEs leads to the appearance of 
SOEs in legal cases for non-compliance. It seems the cases are more likely to occur 





CHAPTER 6: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
 
6.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter reveals that Indonesian SOEs are characterized by strong 
government intervention of various types and levels of depth.  In governance 
practice, government involvement is represented by very dominant voting rights in 
the General Meeting of the Shareholders leading to strong influence in the BOD and 
BOC governance. With regard to financial activity, Government involvement has 
been increasing over the study period with company size and type of industry as the 
main determinants.  The following chapter conducts further statistical analysis. The 
remainder of this chapter consists of the following sections: a description of the 
statistical tool for multivariate analysis, a discussion of the assumptions, correlation 
analysis, and multivariate regression model and sensitivity analysis. The concluding 




6.2. Statistics for Multivariate Analysis 
This thesis consists of a set of hypothesis relating to the potential relationships 
between a group of independent variables and a dependent variable. To test these 
hypotheses, correlation and multiple regression are used as the main statistical 
techniques. Initially correlation analysis is applied to observe the direction and the 
degree of the relationship between two variables among the dependent variable, 
independent variables and control variables. 
                                                 
41 Parts of this chapter have been presented in an international conference and issued in the proceeding of the 
conferenceas shown below. 
1. Paper “Governance Practice in Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Presented in the 2nd 
International Conference on Business and Banking, held in Denpasar, Indonesia, 2-3 February 2012,   
(Puspasari and Evans 2012a).  
2. Paper “Government Control of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)”. Presented in the 13th Asian Academic 
Accounting Association Conference, held in Kyoto, Japan, 9-12 November 2012 (Puspasari and Evans 





There are several different statistical options for correlations. Pallant (2007, 126) 
argues that the selected option depends on the measurement level and the 
characteristics of the data element. This thesis adopts the Pearson product-moment 
coefficient or Pearson correlation coefficient since the variables contain interval level 
(continuous) and dichotomous variables (Field 2009). Correlation is also used to 
assess any multi-collinearity problems. According to Gujarati (1995), a coefficient of 
equal to or higher than 0.80 is suggests multi-collinearity.  
The second technique applied is multiple regression analysis. This study applies 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for hypothesis testing.  
Assumptions   
The OLS technique provides flexibility for the use of dummy variable coding to 
include grouped explanatory variables and data transformation methods (Moutinho 
and Hutcheson 2009). It is powerful mainly for its ability to test the model 
assumptions. Assumptions of multiple regressions include ratio of cases to 
independent variables, normality, multi-collinearity and singularity, linearity, 
homoscedasticity and independence of residuals (Tabachnick and Fidell 1996, 132-
139; Pallant 2007, 148-149).   
Assessment of those assumptions is conducted prior to the regression analysis to 
avoid statistical problems. One assumption to be met is the ratio of cases to 
independent variables or sample size. Adopting the formula from Tabachnick and 
Fidell, the number in the sample size is calculated using N ≥50+8m where N equals 
to number of samples and m equals to the number of independent variables (IV). 
With the total IV is 10, the required N should be at least 130. Since this study uses 
the entire population of Persero SOEs with three consecutive years of data and 375 
samples, the assumptions is not violated.  
The normality assumption concerns the continuous variables, in that they should be 
close to a normally distributed condition (Allen and Bennett 2010, 180).. The 
assessment of normality is undertaken by investigating skewness and kurtosis. Both 
components can be inspected either statistically or graphically. However, Tabachnick 




sensitive for large samples and thus suggest that examining the distribution shape to 
evaluate the normality as a better alternative. As this study is considered using a 
large sample, the assumption of normality is explored through graphs, i.e. histograms 
of variables. 
On inspection the majority of the variable patterns, meet the normally distributed 
assumption, except for the histogram of company size.  For this variable data 
transformation is undertaken to improve the distribution.  
In order to resolve skewness in the data that occurs with company size, a logarithm 
method is applied. This is a common transformation method to produce normality if 
the figures are positively skewed (Field 2009, 155) and the distribution diverges 
substantially from normal (Tabachnick and Fidel 1996, 82; Pallant 2007, 87). 
Appendix E capture the result after the data has been log transformed, indicating that 
company size is more normally distributed.  
Another potential violation of the assumptions of multiple regression analysis is the 
presence of multi-collinearity i.e. when two independent variables are highly 
correlated with each other as can be detected from their correlation coefficient. 
Statistics literature provides various limits on correlation coefficient as an indication 
of multi-collinearity, such as 0.80 (Gujarati 1995; Field 2009, 224), 0.85  (Allen and 
Bennett 2010, 181) or 0.90 (Pallant 2007). For the purpose of benchmarking, a 0.80 
correlation coefficient is set as the limit. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) can 
also be a diagnostic tool to detect multi-collinearity (Field 2009, 224) as it gives an 
indication about whether a predictor has a strong liner relationship with another 
predictor. A value of VIF 10 or more is considered an indication of multi-
collinearity. Therefore, this study will examine the correlation coefficient (produced 
by the correlation test) and the VIF (generated from a multi regression test) to assess 
the presence of multi-collinearity and whether the assumptions are violated. The 
assumption of homoceasticity is met when each level of predictor variables have the 
same variance. Homocedasticity presents a series of uncorrelated, purely random 
errors, ϵ, with the assumption of a normal distribution with mean zero and constant 
variance (Aczel and Soundarapandian 2005). The examination of homoscedasticity 




generated from the multiple regression procedure. The homocedasticity assumption 
is met if the variance of residuals about dependent variable is equal to all predicted 
scores. The linearity assumption is met when the residuals shows a straight-line 
relationship with dependent variables (Pallant 2007, 149). Results are presented in 
the section below.  
 
6.3. Correlation Analysis  
This section examines the relationship among dependent, independent, and control 
variables and the level of association among variables observed. As previously 
mentioned, this analysis investigates correlations based on the Pearson approach. 
Table 6.1 demonstrates the correlation matrix between the dependent variable (ROA) 
and both independent and control variables. The result suggests that based on the 
Pearson correlation, coefficient correlations between SOE financial performance and 
governance related involvement provide preliminary support for CEO external 
appointment, chairperson external appointment, government related commissioners 
in the BOC, and number of board sub-committees, with  the highest correlation 
occuring between ROA and number of board sub-committees (Coef: 0.286, p<0.01). 
With regard to financial involvement, ROA appears to have highly significant 
association with both government transfer and dividend payout policy (Coef: -0.092 
and 0.469, p<0.01). None of the regulatory involvement associated variables seems 
to have initial support. In addition, among others, coefficient correlations of five 
control variables, history of establishment, size (log), capital intensity (dummy), 
leverage and year 2009 (dummy) indicate the presence of significant correlation with 
ROA, with  leverage the highest correlation coefficient of -0.358 with p<0.01). 
Therefore, based on Table 6.1, it concludes that coefficient correlations provide 
initial support for hypothesis 2 (H2: CEO external appointment), hypothesis 3 (H3: 
Chairperson external background), hypothesis 5 (H5: government related 
commissioners in the BOC), hypothesis 6 (H3: number of board sub-committees), 






Table 6. 1: Pearson correlation analysis of the ROA and government intervention 
Variables ROA 
 Coef.  Sig. 
1. OWN 129*** 0.007 
2. CEO -.096** 0.034 
3. CHAIR .089** 0.044 
4. BOD 0.020 0.354 
5. BOC -.130*** 0.006 
6. SC .286*** 0.000 
7.TF -.092** 0.040 
8.DIV .469*** 0.000 
9.AT 0.06 0.126 
10.LEG 0.020 0.352 
11.HIST -.086** 0.049 
12.SIZ .220*** 0.000 
13.CI .183*** 0.000 
14.IC -0.041 0.219 
15.LEV -.358*** 0.000 
16.YR08 0.008 0.443 
17.YR09 0.083* 0.057 
Note: *** Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). ** Correlation 
is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). * Correlation is moderately significant at 
the 0.10 level (1-tailed). Independent Variable: OWN=Government ownership; 
CEO= CEO external appointments; CHAIR = Chairperson external appointment ; 
BOD = The proportion of government related directors on the BOD; BOC = The 
proportion of government related commissioners in the BOC; SC = The number of 
Board sub-committees; TF = Government transfer payment in the form of subsidies 
or PSO (government transfer); DIV =Dividend payout policy; AT= Asset transfer 
from central government to SOEs (asset transfer); LEG= Legal case resulting from 
non-compliance with regulation (legal case). Control Variables: HIST= History of 
Establishment; SIZ= LogSize; CI=Capital intensity; IC = Industry competition; LEV 
= Leverage; YR08=Year 2008; YR09= Year 2009.    
 
Investigation of relationships between independent variables are presented (Table 
6.2). Government ownership correlates with all governance related variables, except 
CEO external appointment. The coefficient correlations are all highly significant 
with the highest correlation between government ownership and number of board 
sub-committees (Coef.:-0.364, p<0.01).  
Coefficient correlation detects an association between government ownership and all 
financial related variables and between government ownership and all regulatory 
framework related variables. Among others, dividend payout policy experience the 




Table 6. 2: Pearson correlation analysis of independent variables and control 
variables 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1.OWN Coeff. -0.129*** -0.06 -.275** .150** .301** -.364** .106* -.218** 0.083 -.161** .090* -.232** -.244** -0.002 0.05 -0.006 (0.005) 
Sig. 0.007 0.127 0 0.002 0 0 0.021 0 0.056 0.001 0.043 0 0 0.485 0.169 0.454 0.461  
2.CEO Coeff. -0.06* 1 .161** -.712** -.131** .099* -0.017 -0.011 -0.035 .114* .136** .104* -.122** -0.003 .121* -0.04 0.012  
Sig. 0.127 0.001 0 0.006 0.03 0.373 0.415 0.252 0.015 0.005 0.023 0.01 0.48 0.011 0.223 0.410  
3.CHAIR Coeff. -.275*** .161*** 1 -.202** -.508** .208** -0.063 0.061 -.094* .139** -0.023 .197** -.167** .205** .088* 0.032 (0.015) 
Sig. 0.000 0.001 0 0 0 0.115 0.122 0.036 0.004 0.327 0 0.001 0 0.047 0.27 0.391  
4.BOD Coeff. .150*** -.712*** -.202*** 1 .240** -.226** -0.052 -0.058 0.017 -.143** -0.029 -.243** 0.055 -0.009 -0.042 -0.008 (0.047) 
Sig. 0.002 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.163 0.134 0.371 0.003 0.29 0 0.147 0.435 0.21 0.442 0.185  
5.BOC Coeff. .301*** -.131*** -.508*** .240*** 1 -.264** 0.024 -.116* 0.082 -.144** .122** -.288** .112* -.114* 0.015 0.017 0.047  
Sig. 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0 0.325 0.013 0.059 0.003 0.01 0 0.016 0.015 0.386 0.373 0.183  
6.SC Coeff. -.364*** .099** .208*** -.226*** -.264*** 1 .133** .358** .135** .327** -.270** .671** .326** -0.016 -.110* 0.016 0.033  
Sig. 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0 0.005 0 0 0 0 0.381 0.018 0.378 0.262  
7.TF Coeff. .106** -0.017 -0.063 -0.052 0.024 .133*** 1 0.014 .234** .221** -.235** .244** 0.063 -.201** -0.041 0.001 -       
Sig. 0.021 0.373 0.115 0.163 0.325 0.005 0.397 0 0 0 0 0.116 0 0.216 0.489 0.500  
8.DIV Coeff. -.218*** -0.011 0.061 -0.058 -.116** .358*** 0.014 1 .173** .172** 0.027 .448** .188** -.101* -.370** -0.01 0.018  
Sig. 0.000 0.415 0.122 0.134 0.013 0.000 0.397 0 0 0.302 0 0 0.027 0 0.427 0.363  
9.AT Coeff. 0.083* -0.035 -.094** 0.017 0.082* .135*** .234*** .173*** 1 .175** 0.005 .212** .313** -.409** -.216** -0.037 0.078  
Sig. 0.056 0.252 0.036 0.371 0.059 0.005 0.000 0.000 0 0.465 0 0 0 0 0.24 0.069  
10.LEG Coeff. -.161*** .114** .139*** -.143*** -.144*** .327*** .221*** .172*** .175*** 1 -.138** .418** .100* -.101* 0.045 0.008 (0.012) 
Sig. 0.001 0.015 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0 0.028 0.026 0.198 0.439 0.413  
11.HIST Coeff. .090** .136*** -0.023 -0.029 .122*** -.270*** -.235*** 0.027 0.005 -.138*** 1 -.242** -.155** -.128** -0.044 -0.008 (0.004) 
Sig. 0.043 0.005 0.327 0.290 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.302 0.465 0.004 0 0.002 0.007 0.2 0.44 0.467  
12.SIZ  Coeff. -.232*** .104** .197*** -.243*** -.288*** .671*** .244*** .448*** .212*** .418*** -.242*** 1 .141** -.122** -0.035 0.026 0.036  
     (log) Sig. 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.01 0.252 0.31 0.249  
13.CI Coeff. -.244*** -.122*** -.167*** 0.055 .112** .326*** 0.063 .188*** .313*** .100** -.155*** .141*** 1 -.335** -.114* 0.001 0.008  
Sig. 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.147 0.016 0.000 0.116 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.002 0.003 0 0.015 0.49 0.441  
14.IC Coeff. -0.002 -0.003 .205*** -0.009 -.114** -0.016 -.201*** -.101** -.409*** -.101** -.128*** -.122*** -.335*** 1 .288** -0.017 (0.014) 
Sig. 0.485 0.480 0.000 0.435 0.015 0.381 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.026 0.007 0.010 0.000 0 0.373 0.396  
15.LEV Coeff. 0.018 0.050 .146** 0.009 -0.044 -0.048 0.000 -.348** -.293** 0.066 -.159** 0.016 -.184** .364*** 1 0.0463 (0.052) 
   (log) Sig. 0.366 0.171 0.003 0.428 0.201 0.180 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.001 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.189 0.161  
16.YR08 Coeff. 0.366 0.171 0.003 0.428 0.201 0.180 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.001 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.189 0.161  
Sig. 0.454 0.223 0.270 0.442 0.373 0.378 0.489 0.427 0.240 0.439 0.440 0.310 0.490 0.373 0.268 -       
17.YR09 Coeff. -0.005 0.012 -0.015 -0.047 0.047 0.033 0.000 0.018 0.078 -0.012 -0.004 0.036 0.008 -0.014 -0.051 -.497*** 1.000
Sig. 0.461 0.410 0.391 0.185 0.183 0.262 0.500 0.363 0.069 0.413 0.467 0.249 0.441 0.396 0.165 0.000  
Note: *** Correlation is highly significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). ** Correlation 
is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). * Correlation is moderately significant at the 
0.10 level (1-tailed). Independent Variable: OWN=Government ownership; CEO= 
CEO external appointments; CHAIR = Chairperson external appointment ; BOD = 
The proportion of government related directors on the BOD; BOC = The proportion 
of government related commissioners in the BOC; SC = The number of Board sub-
committees; TF = Government transfer payment in the form of subsidies or PSO 
(government transfer); DIV =Dividend payout policy; AT= Asset transfer from 
central government to SOEs (asset transfer); LEG= Legal case resulting from non-
compliance with regulation (legal case). Control Variables: HIST= History of 
Establishment; SIZ= LogSize; CI=Capital intensity; IC = Industry competition; LEV 
= Leverage ; YR08=Year 2008; YR09= Year 2009.              
    
It is also relevant to highlight interactions among independent and control variables. 
As documented in Table 6.2, significant correlation is found between CEO external 




chairperson external appointment and government related commissioners on the 
BOC (Coeff.: -0.508, p<0.01), and number of board sub-committees and government 
related commissioner on the BOC (Coeff.: -0.264, p<01). In financial related 
variables, a high correlation is shown between two variables: dividend policy and the 
number of board sub-committees (Coeff.: 0.358, p<0.01). In the regulatory 
framework related variable, highly significant correlation is shown between legal 
case and all independent variables. With reference to control variables, size is the 
only control variable that indicates the presence of significant to highly significant 
correlations with all independent variables. Capital intensity is another influential 
factor for most of the independent variables. 
To conclude Table 6.2 infers that government related directors on the BOD and CEO 
external appointment are two independent variables with the strongest correlation 
(Coef: -0.712, p<0.01), while the number of board sub-committees and size show the 
highest correlation between independent and control variables (Coef: 0.671, p<0.01). 
All coefficients in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 are below the critical limit of 0.80 (Field 
2009, 149). This signifies that multi-collinearity amongst independent variables is 
not a serious issue in this analysis.  
 
6.4. Multivariate Regression Analysis 
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis is executed as the main 
statistical method to test the hypotheses in this study. The analysis helps to model 
how SOE performance in Indonesia can be predicted by the explanatory variables 
The model tests pooled data association between one dependent variable (Return on 
Assets) and 17 predictors comprising 10 independent variables and 7 control 
variables. The independent variables consist of Government Ownership, CEO 
External Appointment, Chairperson External Appointment, Government Related 
Directors on the BOD, Government Related Commissioners on the BOC, Number of 
Board Sub-Committees, Government Transfer, Dividend payout policy, Asset 
Transfer and Legal Case; while the control variables include History of 





The dependent variable is metric, whereas independent variables and control 




β0   = Intercept  
ROA  = Return on Assets   
OWN  = Government Ownership 
CEO   = CEO External Appointment  
CHAIR  = Chairperson External Appointment  
BOD   = Government Related Directors on the BOD  
BOC   = Government Related Commissioners on the BOC 
SC  = Number of Board Sub-Committees  
TF = Government Transfer Payment in the Form of Subsidies or 
PSO or Government transfer (dummy) 
DIV  = Dividend Payout Policy  
AT = Asset Transfer from Central Government to SOEs or Asset 
transfer (dummy) 
LEG  = Legal case resulting from non-compliance with regulation or 
Legal case (dummy) 
HIST  = History of Establishment  
SIZ  = Company Size (log)  
CI  = Capital Intensity  
INDC  = Industry Competition  
LEV  = Leverage  
Yr 08   = Year 2008 (dummy)  
Yr 09  = Year 2009 (dummy)  
 
The hypotheses in this study are directional and a one-tailed test for significance of 
independent variables is applied (Bryman and Cramer 2005, 136). The p-values 
generated from the regression analysis in this study are interpreted at the 5% 
significant level (p<0.05). The reason for using one-tailed test at 5% significant level 
is for consistency and comparability with prior social studies, eg Setyadi (2009).   
Before running the OLS regression test, possible outliers of dependent variable 
(ROA) are detected. Multiple regression is very sensitive to outliers, therefore both 
univariate outliers and multivariate outliers are observed and the course of action for 
ROA = β0 + β1OWN + β2CEO + β3CHAIR + β4BOD + β5BOC + β6SC + 
β7TF + β8DIV + β9AT + β10LEG + β11HIST + β12LogSIZ + β13CI + 





each level is decided.  Univariate outliers, where cases with extreme values on the 
dependent variable, are detected graphically with boxplots.  The result identifies 9 
possible outliers. Allen and Bannett (2010, 182) suggests that deleting outliers leads 
to a more robust model. Hence 9 outliers are excluded resulting in 366 remaining 
samples.  
Multicollinearity is tested using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance 
score in order to test the assumptions of multiple regression. The VIF value of 10 or 
above is an indication of multicollinearity in the data sample (Pallant 2007, 155-156; 
Field 2009, 224). The tolerance score, in converse, shall be above 0.1 or otherwise is 
identified as a serious problem of multicollinearity. According to the test results, 
there is no evidence of multicollinearity. The result is presented in Table 6.3.  
Multivariate outliers are detected using the Cook‟s distance score. Field asserts that 
the Cook‟s distance counts the effect of every case on the model as a whole. The 
Cook‟s distance score of 1 or above shows the presence of an outlier issue (Field 
2009, 217). The test result indicates that no value is more than 1 suggesting no 
multivariate outliers exist. 
The OLS regression test result associating various government intervention related 
predictors with company performance (ROA) is presented in Table 6.3. According to 
the model summary, the value of the adjusted R-square score of the model is 0.324 at 
the F-value of 1% level of significance (F-stat=11.269, p<0.01).  
Amongst independent variables, three governance related variables are significant 
predictors of the extent of ROA. These include government ownership, Chairperson 
external background (both moderate significant at p-value<0.10) and number of 
board sub-committees (significant at p-value<0.05). Two variables related to 
financial involvement (government transfer and dividend payout policy) are found 
highly significant (each p-values<0.01). Only one variable from regulatory 
framework related involvement (asset transfer) is a moderately significant 
contributor to ROA. Among control variables, leverage is regarded as highly 
significant predictors with p-value<0.01 while the remaining control variables are 
significant (history of establishment, capital intensity and Year 2009 with p-




Table 6. 3: Multiple regression analysis: Return on Assets 
Model Summary      
N 366     
R-Squared 0.355     
Adj. R-Squared 0.324     
 F-statistic  11.269      
 Significance  0.000
b



























(Constant)   (1.003) 10.831 
 
(0.093) 
    
0.463    
  
H1 - OWN  NEG 6.010 3.869 0.079 1.553 0.061   *  0.714 1.400 
H2 -CEO  POS (1.140) 2.094 0.035) (0.544) 0.293    0.455 2.200 
H3 -CHAIR POS 2.026 1.402 0.076 1.445 0.075   *  0.665 1.503 
H4 -BOD NEG 2.041 4.024 0.033 0.507 0.306    0.440 2.271 
H5 -BOC NEG (2.613) 2.572 (0.054) (1.016) 0.155    0.646 1.547 
H6 -SC POS 1.032 0.575 0.118 1.794 0.037   **  0.425 2.351 
H7 -TF NEG (5.549) 2.187 (0.122) (2.537) 0.006 *** 0.799 1.252 
H8 -DIV POS 23.512 3.920 0.327 5.998 0.000   ***  0.622 1.607 
H9 -AT NEG (2.293) 1.813 (0.065) (1.265) 0.103     0.709 1.410 













HIST   (1.860) 1.145 (0.079) (1.625) 0.053   **  0.775 1.290 
SIZ (log)   0.098 0.759 0.009 0.129 0.449    0.382 2.619 
CI   2.339 1.161 0.110 2.014 0.022   **  0.620 1.612 
IC   0.773 1.347 0.031 0.574 0.283    0.644 1.552 
LEV   (6.448) 1.137 (0.289) (5.669) 0.000   ***  0.714 1.400 
YR08 
(dummy)   1.404 1.127 0.063 1.246 0.107    0.736 1.359 
YR09 
(dummy)   2.206 1.127 0.098 1.956 0.026   **  0.732 1.367 
Note: ***Highly significant at p<0.01 (one-tailed).** Significant at p<0.05 (one-
tailed).*Moderate significant at p<0.10 (one-tailed).   
a
 Dependent Variable: ROA 
b.
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Year 2009 (Dummy), Government Transfer (dummy), 
CEO External Appointment , Dividend Payout Ratio, Chairperson External 
Appointment, History of Establishment , Capital Intensity , Legal Case, Leverage, 
Asset Transfer (dummy), Government Ownership , Year 2008 (Dummy), 
Government Related Commissioners on the BOC, Industry Competition , Number of 
Board Sub-Committees, Government Related Directors on the BOD, Size log. 
To conclude, the main analysis reveals that there is significant support for hypothesis 
3 (H3: chairperson external experience), hypothesis 6 (H6: number of board sub-




payout policy) suggesting that these variables make the strongest contribution to 
explaining the SOE financial performance. For hypothesis 5 (H5: government related 
commissioners on the BOC), hypothesis 9 (H3: asset transfer) and hypothesis 10 
(H10: Legal case), the evidence failed to support these hypotheses. Table 6.9 
summarizes the hypotheses result.  
 
6.5. Interview: Additional Analysis 
6.5.1. Semi-structured Interview  
The univariate analysis has indicated strong government involvement in many ways, 
including dominant voting rights and strong influence in the governance process of  
BOD and BOC as well as dominant intervention in financial activity. Moreover, the 
result of multivariate analysis suggests that CEO, Chairman, and BOC size have 
positive relationship with financial performance, both BOD and BOC result in 
negative association with financial perfomance, but only Chairman and BOC size 
that indicate highly significant relationship. To understand comprehensively the 
government intervention level, an extended qualitative information is required.   
To do so, in this study, an interview process was conducted following the 
quantitative data collection. The interviews serve two main objectives. First, to 
improve the validity and reliability of the overall result (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill 2009, 320). The qualitative result is useful to support the quantitative data, 
mainly sourced from the financial statements and government documents. Thus, it is 
expected the collection of qualitative data from this set of interviews can confirm or 
otherwise the robustness of the findings as well as adding richness and depth to the 
discussion as a whole. Second, is to explore new information and perceptions of key 
players that explains the SOE‟s situation in the absence of such information in the 
financial statements and other sources used for this study.  
It should be noted that this interview has been conducted to supplement the main 
analysis. It focuses on an explanatory approach to understanding and interpreting 




not intended to build the hypotheses as it might be used in the mixed-method context. 
Because of this, all interviews were conducted after the quantitative analysis was 
completed.  
For the best results, semi-structured interviews were conducted. There were several 
advantages of adopting such a method for this study. First, the semi-structured 
interview technique offered an opportunity for discussion and to elicit a broader 
range of issues, opinions and views of interviewees (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
2009, 230). Second, the technique gives the freedom to explore further explanations 
required in particular areas in detail by maintaining the consistency across 
interviews. Third, the form of the interview is more flexible than a structured 
interview, yet more focused than a non-structured interview. Dunn (2005) explains 
that a predetermined order, yet still maintaining the flexibility in addressing the 
issues, is possible in this technique. Last, a semi-structured interview is 
conversational and informal in tone. It allows for an open response in the 
participant‟s own words.  In this interview, the majority of the questions addressed 
were in the form of open-ended questions (what, why or how questions). This was 
intended to allow respondents to express their fresh and personal opinion on the 
actual circumstances.  
6.5.2. Sample Selection and Demographics 
To choose respondents, purposive sampling is applied. Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill (2009, 237) assert that purposive sampling allows the examiner to select 
issues that provide the best answers to the research questions as well as meeting the 
research objectives. In this investigation, the respondents met the following 
conditions:  First, a respondent must be in a key position, either in an SOE or 
government institution that relates to SOEs. Second, the position held should be 
within any year of the observation years (2007 to 2009).  
Saunder, Lewis and Thornhill suggest that in purposive sampling, it is the purpose 
and the concentration of the study that matters more than the sample size (2009, 
233). Therefore, among 125 SOEs involved in this study, 13 respondents were 
selected from two groups that represented the key players of 13 SOEs (10 per cent of 




The first group consisted of seven respondents. They were either current or former 
senior government officers who had BOC membership experience. Among these 
seven, one is a former top level government officer, one is a current top level 
government officer, and the remaining five are the second top level government 
officers from either the Ministry of SOE or Ministry of Finance. The rationale to 
select this group was due to the context of variables of which government 
involvement is relevant to their experience. Current or former senior government 
officers were selected because of their experience in the role of making regulations 
and policy in relation to SOEs as well as monitoring the impact of the 
implementation. The chairperson and members of the BOC from both government 
offices and non-government offices were included as interview participants because 
they could contribute to specific areas of this study that were relevant to their role on 
the BOC. In addition, the chairperson and members of the BOC were chosen from 
small, medium and large SOEs so that all groups of company size were represented. 
The second group comprised six respondents with BOD membership experience 
(either current or former) representing all size company groups (small, medium and 
large). With similar backgrounds to the first group, CEOs or members of the BOD, 
both from inside and outside, were also invited to participate in this interview to 
share their specific insight on related governance issues. In particular chief financial 
officers (CFO) were targeted to elicit information related to financial and regulatory 
frameworks related government intervention. The information on the demography of 
the respondents contributing to this interview is presented in the table 6.4 below. The 
abbreviations used as a code is G for government (G1–G7) and S for state-owned 
enterprise (S1-S6).  








G1 Government  Former Top Level Officer, GMS, BOC Large  
G2 Government Former Senior Officer, Proxy GMS, 
BOC 
Medium 
G3 Government Senior Officer, Proxy GMS, BOC Medium 
G4 Government Senior Officer, Proxy GMS, BOC Small 
G5 Government Senior Officer, Proxy GMS, BOC Large 












G7 Government Senior Officer, Proxy GMS, BOC Small 
S1 SOE  Former CEO  Medium  
S2 SOE  Director  Small 
S3 SOE Director  Large 
S4 SOE Director (CFO)   Large  
S5 SOE Director (CFO)   Medium 
S6 SOE Director (CFO)   Small 
 
After determining the sample, an invitation letter was sent to each respondent. The 
letter informed them of the research objectives and significance. Informal contact 
with relevant colleagues or their secretary was made to confirm the interview and set 
up an interview schedule. Once confirmed, the respondents were asked to sign a 
consent letter to take part in the interview. All interviews were subject to the 
respondents‟ voluntarily agreement. Some interviews were rescheduled several 
times. Due to their very tight time availability, the duration of the interview varied 
yet most of them were at around 60 to 90 minutes length. All interviews were per 
respondents‟ convenience in time and place. Therefore, there were no unnecessary 
interruptions during the interview process. Prior to interview, respondents were 
briefed on the interview protocol, research questions and objectives, and information 
that the respondents were expected to share. All interviews were communicated in 
the Indonesian language. The majority of the respondents agreed to the interview 
being tape-recorded. Two respondents declined to be recorded thus the interview was 
documented by writing notes.  
6.5.3. Technique and Approach  
The interviews were intended to understand and interpret phenomena about 
government involvement in SOE‟s operations to further explain the findings 
identified in the main analysis. Because it adopted a semi-structured technique, 
questions addressed to the interviewees were tailored and different one to another. 
The questions, however, were constructed into three groups, i.e. governance related, 




respondent received at least one set of group questions that were tailored to the 
context of the person's relationship with the SOE. A respondent could be addressed 
with more than one group of questions depending upon their background and 
experience relevant to the issue. For example, a respondent with a background as a 
senior government official at the Ministry of SOE was asked questions related to 
government involvement in governance and regulatory frameworks. A person 
currently serving as chief financial officer received a question related to government 
involvement in financial and regulatory frameworks. Starting with basic questions, 
the interview was developed and directed to more specific information that the 
respondent was familiar with.  
After conducting 13 interviews, all data was gathered. Transcripts in Indonesian were 
prepared immediately after a group of first interviews was completed so that all 
significant information was recalled and captured while they were still fresh in the 
researcher‟s memory. Transcripts of each recorded interviews were done in 
Indonesian and contextual translation and interpretations were conducted only on the 
relevant parts.   
Interestingly, the majority of responses provided by the interviewees showed some 
commonality. Therefore, the results of the interview are presented in two ways. First 
is by finding common terminology or phrases that could accommodate similar 
answers. All answers were then compiled, grouped and presented in a matriculation 
table based on the similarity of the answers. This provides information about the 
variety of views or opinion on the subject matter. Second is to present the results of 
the interview in the form of quotations of respondent statements. This was 
determined based on the respondent‟s statements that provided the most substantial 
information in further explaining the quantitative findings.  
6.5.4. Results and Interpretation  
Because it was a semi-structured interview, a set of questions was prepared starting 
with basic questions that led to further detailed questions. These basic questions were 
split into two groups, i.e. governance, financial and regulatory framework related 
government involvement. The first group of questions regarding government 




the results of hypothesis 2 (CEO external appointment), hypothesis 3 (chairperson 
external experience), hypothesis 4 (government related directors on the BOD) and 
hypothesis 5 (government related commissioners on the BOC). Table 6.5 presents the 
summary of interviews related to CEO and BOD member appointments in which the 
government may be involved in the governance process.  
The summary of data depicts strong government involvement in the CEO 
appointment process. When 10 respondents were asked about the process of CEO 
selection (Question 1), they referred to the importance of the fit and proper test in 
generating a shortlist of CEO candidates. These candidates can be recommended by 
the BOD (4 respondents), BOC (3 respondents), directly by the Minister or the 
special team chaired by the President (8 respondents) or external stakeholder such as 
the Supreme Audit Institution (1 respondent).   
The next question addressed the factors they considered when choosing a candidate 
(Question 2). The response to this question varied. As summarized in Table 6.5, the 
answer is condensed into seven factors. It shows that track record, leadership and 
performance are the three strongest factors that determined the selected CEO. 
Interestingly, respondents from the Ministry of SOEs responded differently using 
their own experience and context. On top of the criteria on the list for the fit and 
proper test, each respondent tended to have their own view on what characteristics 
were the most significant for a CEO to have, such as ability to work within a team, 
independence, being visionary, persistent and fearless in making tough decision that 
may disadvantage people from outside the company, the GMS or BOC. This 
indicates that the government impacts in selecting the CEO based on the personal 
preference of the selection team, which in this case is the deputy ministry unit.  
The third question (Question 3) mines information on the factors affecting the choice 
of CEOs from outsider over internal candidates. In principle, there were four reasons 
explaining why an outsider was more preferable to an insider. This included the need 
for specific expertise that insiders may not have (10 respondents), the need to 
eliminate internal conflicts (1 respondent), the need to change corporate culture (7 










G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 S1 S2 S3 
1 What is the process 
of appointing CEO?  
H2 Ministry of SOE (GMS) conducts fit and proper test √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 BOD recommends CEO candidate from internal  √   √   √  √  
 BOC recommends CEO candidate from internal    √  √  √ √  
 Minister or joint-team led by the President decides 
their own candidate (prerogative)  
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Others recommend a CEO candidate (eg. SAI)       √             
2 What is the 
important factor(s) 
to consider in CEO 
selection? 
H2 One‟s leadership skill √ √ √ √   √   √ √ √ 
 One‟s performance  √ √ √ √ √ √       √ 
 One‟s track record  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 One‟s integrity √ √ √   √ √ √       
 One‟s business competence        √ √ √ √ √     
 One‟s technical competence    √   √ √ √ √ √   √    
 Others (eg attitude, teamwork, independent, 
visionary) √ √   √ √   √   √ √ 
3 What is the factor(s) 
to consider in 
appointing a CEO 
candidate from 
outside? 
H2 The company is in need of specific expertise  √ √ √ √ √ √ √   √   √   √ 
 The company is in need for resolving conflict    √                 
 The company is in need for corporate culture change √ √     √ √ √  √    √ 
 Politically related special request  


















What is the 
important factor(s) 
to consider in BOD 
member 
appointment?   
H4 Performance  √ √ √   √ √       √ 
 Work history/track record  √   √   √ √ √ √ √   
 Integrity  √ √     √ √ √       
 Business competence          √   √ √     
 Technical competence  √ √     √ √ √ √   √ 
5 What is the 
factor(s) to consider 
in appointing a 
BOD candidate 
from outside? 
H4 The company is in need of specific expertise √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √  √ √ 
 To meet the legal condition requirement            √         
 Politically related special request    √           √  √    
6 What is the 
factor(s) to consider 
to determine BOD 
size? 
H4 Business complexity      √ √ √ √ √     √ 
 The need /problem of the company  √ √ √ √ √   √       
 Request from higher authority   √ √   √      √ √ √ 
 Company size (larger company, larger BOD 
size  
  √ √ √ √ √     √     
 CEO request for more members of BOD.  √                   






Follow up investigation related to government involvement in governance, the 
questions were extended into the BOD related governance areas. Like CEOs, 
government involvement can be predicted to occur in the process of BOD member 
recruitment. The first question to interviewees (Question 4) was about the criteria for 
BOD member appointment. The responses varied and can be grouped into five 
answers with overall track record and technical competence the most frequently 
mentioned by the respondents (7 out of 10 respondents for each). Besides the two, 
performance, integrity and business competence were also stated as the criteria for 
selecting BOD members. It should be noted that these answers reflected the 
individual view of what was the main factor(s) they considered in nominating BOD 
members regardless of the fact that there was common guidance applied in 
conducting the fit and proper test of BOD member candidates.   
Furthermore, the respondents were asked about the reason for nominating outsider 
candidates as BOD members, if they were facing the situation of preferring outsiders 
to insiders (Question 5). It is apparent that all ten respondents indicated that the 
outsider candidate was preferable if the company needed specific expertise in the 
absence of that expertise within internal candidates, one example of which was a 
finance specialist needed for the chief financial officer position. Another answer 
related to special requests with a political motive (3 respondents) and the need for 
legal compliance (1 respondent).  
To gain more understanding of government involvement on the BOD member 
selection process, respondents were questioned about factors that determined the 
number of BOD membership (Question 6). Among various answers, the respondents 
stated that business complexity, the company needs, company size or special requests 
from authority were the strongest factors determining the BOD size. In addition, one 
respondent pointed out that CEO request or competition level in the industry could  
also influence the GMS decision on the BOD size.  
The second part of government involvement in the governance group of questions 
investigated government involvement in the chairperson and BOC member selection. 










G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 S1 S2 S3 
1 
 
What is the important 
factor(s) to consider 
in chairperson 
appointment? 
H3 One‟s track record  √       √ √     √   
 One‟s ability to handle political intervention   √                 
 One‟s expertise or competence        √ √   √       
 One‟s integrity          √ √  √       
 One‟s knowledge about the industry       √ √   √       
   Minister of SOE (GMS)‟s prerogative  √ √ √ √ √ √      
2 
 
What is the important 
factor(s) to consider 
in BOC member 
appointment? 
H4 One‟s accessibility to bureaucracy 
(networking) √     
√ 
√    
√ √ √ √ 
 One‟s ability to evaluate BOD performance            √         
 One‟s track record in career     √   √  √ √       
 One‟s ability to control political intervention    √                 
 One‟s integrity    √     √           
 Expertise or competency   √   √ √   √ √     
 Minister of SOE (GMS)‟s prerogative  √ √ √ √ √ √         
 Politically related special request √ √ √ √ √ √     √   
3 What is the factor(s) 
to consider in 




H4 Specific expertise to support business process √     √ √  √ √     √ 
 Highly complex business     √     √       √ 
 Politically related special request  √ √ √ √   √       √ 
 Regulatory compliance (for public listed SOE)         √      
4 What is the ideal size 
for BOC? 
H6 No basic rule for BOC size √ √ √   √ √          
 At least equal to BOD size   √ √ √ √ √ √     √ 
 Depends on each industry regulation              √    
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Ten respondents were asked to explain the criteria for electing the chairperson of the 
BOC (Question 1). A number of respondents confirmed that there was no clear 
standardised criteria for chairperson appointment as their answer indicated a GMS 
prerogative or Ministerial discretion (6 respondents). Other answers given to this 
question were due to the track  record of the candidate (4 respondents), expertise in 
the specific area of competence, integrity of the candidate and knowledge about the 
company or industry (3 respondents for each answer) and ability to handle non-
corporate intervention (1 respondent).  
Question 2 surveyed the criteria for BOC member appointment. This question 
generated the most varied answers indicating that BOC membership was less 
regulated than that of BOD. This might be due to the absence of standardised criteria 
for BOC membership as well as the shareholder‟s prerogative in determining the 
criteria. It should be noted that among others, “special request” and “President or 
Minister‟s prerogative” were the main determinants of the appointment of BOC 
members (stated by 7 and 6 respondents, respectively) indicating that the BOC has 
more chance for non-corporate intervention. Other factors considered when selecting 
BOC membership included the power to provide access or networking to the 
government, ability to monitor the BOD, track record in his/her current position, 
ability to control intervention, integrity and specific competence.  
Question 3 explored the factors explaining the reason for preferring an independent 
member to an ordinary member (government). The response to this question was 
varied with “specific need of expertise to support business process” and “political 
demand” as the most frequently mentioned by the respondents (each question has 6 
respondents answering). Other factors suggested by the respondents were business 
complexity (3 respondents), regulations and company size (1 respondent each).  
When the ideal number of BOC size was inquired about (Question 4), 5 respondents 
stated that there was no basic regulation. However, at least 7 people pointed out that 
the number of BOC should not exceed the number of BOD.  
The second part of the interview addressed government involvement in the financial 
and regulatory frameworks, which both impact on government funding. This 
involved five respondents, comprising three chief financial officers in SOEs, one 
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director and one senior government officer. Six main questions were addressed to 
each individual. The questions were specifically targeting information with regard to 
hypothesis 7 (government transfer), hypothesis 8 (dividend payout policy) and 
hypothesis 9 (asset transfer). The questions were aimed to seek the opinion of each 
respondent on the subject matter based on their respected role. Table 6.7 summarizes 
the interview results.  
The summary of this interview stage provides some evidence that government 
involvement in financial or funding activities can be strongly influential. When the 
respondents were asked to describe their opinion on government involvement in 
relation to government transfer policy such as subsidy and public service obligation 
(Question 1), all of the respondents stated that government transfer is a government 
prerogative and that the decision is made by the government without t negotiation 
(one-way communication). When asked about the impact of government transfer to 
SOEs, the respondents claimed that government transfers created a loss for the SOEs 
since the costing calculated by the government as stipulated in the annual budget 
documents, is lower than the production cost required. All respondents shared a 
similar view that the budget execution, because often the amount paid was less than 
what was planned, did not follow as intended. For example, when an oil subsidy was 
provided to an oil company and the demand for the oil exceeded the quota; the 
company was forced to sell the oil to the public based on the subsidised price even 
though the company did not receive any compensation from the government. In such 
situation, the company would have to bear the cost.  
Question 3 of the government involvement in financial issues questions, asked for 
respondent‟s opinions with regard to government involvement in dividend payout 
policy. Strikingly, all respondents agreed that dividend payout policy was another 
government prerogative. They also claimed that the process of dividend payout 
determination was one-way as the SOEs had to agree with the government‟s 
determination. Another statement by 4 respondents affirmed that the SOE bargaining 
power to negotiate the dividend payout ratio was low. 
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Table 6. 7: Summary of interview relating to government transfer, dividend payout policy and asset transfer  





G6 S3 S4 S5 S6 
1 
 
How do you view 
government transfers?   
H7 The policy is government prerogative (The decision is made 
by one way communication by government) 
√ √ √ √ √ 
2 How does a government 
transfer impact on SOE? 
H7 Budget realization does not follow budget plan (amount, 
payment time, costing) 
 √  √  √ √ √ 
 It is non-profitable and create loss for SOE   √ √ √ √ 
 It creates moral hazard  √     √   
3 How do you view dividend 
payout policy? 
H8 The policy is government prerogative (The decision is made 
by one way of communication) 
√ √ √ √ √ 
 Low power of negotiation for SOE  √ √ √ √ 
 Subject to the need of financing for annual budget √ √ √ √ √ 
4 How does the dividend 
impact on SOE? 
H8 Dividend target outweigh SOE or  too high target √  √   √  √ 
 It suppresses investment plan   √ √  √ √  
5 How do you view asset 
transfers?    
H9 The decision is made by one way communication by 
government  
 √  √  √ √  √ 
 Asset provided is unmatched with the need        √  √ 
 It has limited value or benefit        √ √  
6 How do asset transfers 
impact on SOE? 
H9 Assets are obsolete and not optimal in function         √  √ 
 Assets are overvalued or overstated √     √   
 It creates cost or inefficiency for SOE √   √  
 It creates cost or inefficiency for line ministry (budget 
spender)  
√     





Furthermore, all respondents viewed dividend payout policy as driven strongly by 
the need to cover government expenditure in the annual state budget.  In addition, 
when the respondents were asked about the impact of the determined dividend 
payout on the SOEs, 4 of them also explicitly stated that the payout ratio set by the 
government was excessive, especially if the company already set an investment 
strategy. As such dividend payout policy was viewed as discouraging investment.  
Lastly, Question 5 seeks opinion in relation to government involvement in regulating 
asset transfers from the central government to SOEs. As documented in the 
matriculation table, 4 respondents declared that asset transfers are a one-way 
communication from the central government indicating that it is at government‟s 
discretion to initiate an asset transfer. Question 6 attracted many views of the limited 
value or benefit that could be gained from asset transfer due to the minimum value or 
obsolescence of the assets. Several respondents claimed while asset transfer required 
SOEs to introduce the assets into their accounting record, the value of the assets 
provided by the government was often overvalued. Such accounting issues would 
lead to overstated capital expenditure, and distortion of their financial statements.  
 
6.6. Discussion   
6.6.1. Governance Related Government Involvement  
Government Ownership  
Proposition one hypothesizes that the level of government ownership has a negative 
impact on SOE performance. It infers that when ownership reaches a certain level, 
the majority owners are benefited by major or full control (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 
759), exploiting the minority shareholders. This leads to SOEs with more 
government ownership being less likely to maximise long-term profit than those 
SOEs with less government ownership. Therefore, hypothesis 1 proposes that 
“government ownership is negatively associated with SOE financial performance”. 
The investigation of the OLS regression test does not provide evidence that the 




plausible reason to explain this finding is to link it to earlier analysis. As exhibited in 
the univariate analysis result (Chapter 5 sub-section 5.4.1), Indonesian SOEs are 
majority owned by the Government with a mean (median) rate of 0.94 (1.00) for 
2007-2009 (Table 5.3); about 81 per cent are fully owned and 12 per cent are 50-
69% owned by the Government (Figure 5.2). This supports La Porta‟s finding (1999) 
that in companies with state or government ownership, the government is typically 
the controlling shareholder. 
The very high level of government ownership in the majority of sample companies 
(105 of 125 SOEs (84%) are greater than 90%) suggests that these dominate the 
results of those with lower ownership. The small portion of non-fully owned or 
dominant government owned SOEs does not allow for the financial performance of 
SOEs with low ownership to be discerned in the statistical analysis.  This may 
explain why the result is inconsistent with that of Gunasekarage, Hess and Hu (2007, 
20) whose study concluded that a high level of government ownership influences the 
company‟s performance negatively in China.  
CEO External Appointment  
An appointment of a CEO with an outsider background can be seen as a way of 
securing the interest of the principals since a CEO from outside may provide 
independent leadership that creates value for the organisation due to new 
information, competence and ideas (Said, Zainuddin, and Haron 2009; Karaevli 
2007). The selection process of external CEO candidates benefits the organisation in 
a number of ways such as careful examination of the relevance of past experience 
and the future strategy of the company (Westphal and Fredrickson 2001, 1127) as 
well as pushing the appointed outsider to build commitment that should bring about 
the implementation more effectively (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, 192). 
Particularly in an unstable company environment, external CEOs can offer a more 
prospective transformation of the company (Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli 1992, 
87). Following up the evidence of diverse studies, hypothesis 2 proposes that CEO 
external appointment relates positively to the SOE financial performance.  
The univariate test documents that SOEs are dominated by internally appointed 




SOEs was 78.40 per cent in 2008 (Figure 5.3). Despite the decline in figures in 2009, 
the number of CEOs with a SOE career background is far larger than those from 
government and external (76 per cent). This describes the preference of the 
shareholders to select insiders to outsiders as appointed CEOs. One of the 
respondents, who has a background as the senior officer at the Ministry of SOE, 
raises the following: 
There is no guarantee that outsider is always better than insider. We 
consider outsider depending upon the challenge the SOE is facing. If 
an SOE is in steady condition, we give priority to internal 
candidates to be the CEO. However, if the SOE is in turmoil, then 
we look for someone from outside. For example, to build a new 
corporate culture we need someone with strong leadership track 
record. To boost the performance of natural resource related SOE, 
we need someone with specific expertise (G1). 
The interview results, reveal that the GMS prefers an outsider as CEO in special 
circumstances, including need for specific ex  pertise, need for conflict resolution, 
need for culture change and other special requests (Question number 3 on the Table 
6.5). This statement is supported by the result of the univariate analysis. Table D.5 
confirms that CEO external appointment varies among different industry group. 
SOEs from mining, basic industry and chemicals, infrastructure, utilities and 
transportation, finance and trade, services and investment are more likely to be led by 
an outsider. These are areas where specific expertise or corporate culture 
improvement are required.    
With regard to external CEO appointment, the main analysis of OLS regression 
reveals an insignificant relationship between CEO external appointment and ROA; 
therefore hypothesis 2 is rejected.  
In the interview, all ten respondents were asked two core questions about the CEO 
appointment process. Their answer was alike. First, when asked about the process of 
CEO appointment, they responded that the CEO appointment is strongly controlled 
by the Minister of SOEs. For SOEs categorized as strategic industries, the 




officials (ministers) chaired by the President of the Republic of Indonesia. This 
taskforce is known as the Final Assessment Joint-Team
42
 (known as Tim Penilaian 
Akhir or TPA). They also shared commonality in that a fit and proper test takes place 
to assess CEO candidates. Such a process follows the State Owned Enterprise Law
43
 
that the appointment and dismissal of CEO and BOD members are done by the 
General Meeting of the Shareholders. This seems to be an attempt at practicing good 
corporate governance in the recruitment process, especially because the fit and 
proper test involves an independent third party in the assessment team. A senior 
government officer (G1) claims during the interview that:  
Having established a CEO candidate, we appoint an independent 
consultancy agent to do the assessment or fit and proper test. The 
result is a short list of names for further interview before we make 
the decision (G1). 
Second, when respondents are asked about factors affecting CEO appointment, they 
refer to their own experience in the interview team or their opinion based on their 
knowledge about the interview process, that track record and leadership are the most 
important factors the team observed during the selection. Other important factors, 
such as performance, integrity, technical competence, business competence and other 
soft skills, are also mentioned. The emphasis on the background of the CEO from 
outside is only relevant for special cases because they believe that an internal CEO is 
as capable as that from outside. Therefore, the external appointment is not always 
viewed as the best option for an SOE depending upon the needs of the SOE.  
Chairperson’s  External Experience 
The third proposition affirms that a supervisory board (or Board of Commissioners) 
functions as an effective disciplining mechanism (Baums 2003) to resolve the 
emerging conflict of interest between principals and agents (Jensen and Meckling 
                                                 
42 The Final Assessment Joint-Team is regulated by the Presidential Instruction Number 8 Year 2005 (the 
Appointment of Directors Members and/or Commissioners/Supervisory Board of State-Owned Enterprises) and 
the Presidential Instruction Number 9 Year 2005(The Amendment of Presidential Instruction Number 8 Year 
2005.  
43 The State-owned Enterprise Law (No. 19/ 2003), the appointment and dismissal of CEO and BOD members 
are done by the General Meeting of the Shareholders (article 15 point 1). In the case of the Minister of SOEs are 





1976). One of the keys for an effective supervisory board concerns the appointment 
of a chairperson of the BOC who acts on behalf of the General Meeting of 
Shareholders (GMS). An independent chairperson is generally experienced and an 
expert from outside the company (Sari, Halligan, and Sutiyono 2010). The 
appointment of a chairperson has a direct impact on promoting an effective 
disciplining mechanism and to guarantee a successful alignment between the interest 
of shareholders (the GMS) and the accomplishment of management (Jensen 1993)
 
and therefore is a very critical element of governance in SOEs (Syakhroza 2005). 
Univariate analysis shows the dominance of chairpersons from government offices 
(66.40 per cent in 2007) and its upward trend (72.80 per cent in 2009). The number 
of external chairpersons fluctuates reaching the peak to 21.60 percent of the total in 
2008 and declines afterwards at the lowest level to 18.40 percent (Table 5.4).  
Appendix D (Table D.6) documents that finance is the industry with the highest 
number of external chairpersons, followed by agriculture, basic industry and 
chemicals, property/real estate and building construction, and infrastructure, utilities 
and transportation. This finding is strengthened by the statements of the respondents 
who claim that being expert in an area and having competence/knowledge of the 
company or industry is one of the criteria for electing a chairperson (Table 6.6 
question 1). According to one respondent (a senior government officer),   
It is the minister’s prerogative to decide a chairperson. Mostly, he 
considers the industry background of an SOE when inviting someone 
from outside as a chairperson (G3). 
The Pearson correlation test provides initial support to the proposition that a 
chairperson’s external experience is correlated with SOE financial performance at a 
significant level.  The main multivariate analysis shows that a chairperson’s external 
experience is positively related to SOE financial performance at a moderately 
significant level. Accordingly, it allows the acceptance of hypothesis 3 (H3: 





The Proportion of Government Related Directors on the BOD  
The fourth proposition posits that an agency problem arises because of the separation 
of ownership and management functions. As a utility maximiser, managers can 
potentially take advantage of their expertise and accessibility to internal information 
for personal use, but at cost to the owner (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997) when the owner has a limited ability to monitor the company (Li 
2008). An effective management board (board of directors) may resolve such agency 
problems, possibly by having a combination of insider and outsider directors in a 
company (Byrd and Hickman 1992; Erickson et al, 2005). Insider directors are 
usually favoured because of their knowledge about the company‟s day-to-day 
operations and regulations built from their experience working in the company (Bryd 
and Hickman 1992), while outsider directors are recruited because of their expertise, 
knowledge or experience in certain areas (Palmieri 1979; Erickson et al, 2005) that 
create value to the company they join (Said, Zainuddin, and Haron 2009).  
In the context of SOEs, an insider director may come from someone inside the 
government or a military officer or inside the specific SOE or other SOE (Puspasari 
and Evans 2012a). A study by Frye and Iwasaki (2011, 643) on Russian government 
behaviour indicates that the tendency of the government to place government officers 
at better performing companies can give mutual benefits for both government and the 
companies. The presence of government officers in the company enhances corporate 
governance yet conversely worsens the practice of collusion between state directors 
and government officials. In contrast, the presence of outsiders on the board, as 
recognized by agency theory (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983), is believed to 
promote effective monitoring and therefore increase the company‟s value.    
Descriptive statistics analysis documents a high proportion of government related 
directors on the BODs but with a declining trend over the three-years of observation. 
It starts with the mean of 0.92 in 2007 and slightly falls to 0.89 in 2009 (Table 5.5) 
indicating an increase of demand for external directors every year.  
The Pearson correlation analysis of the Return on Assets and government related 
directors on the BOD does not support evidence of a significant correlation. 




government related directors on the BOD is a contributing factor to the negative 
financial performance of the SOE. Hence, hypothesis 4 is rejected.   
There are at least six aspects of BOD composition uncovered by this study. The first 
relates to company size. A one-way ANOVA test, analyzing government 
representation on the BOD and its association with company size (Table D.7), shows 
that the larger companies are more likely to have less government related directors 
on the BOD.  
The second factor determining BOD composition is business complexity. According 
to one respondent: 
BOD size depends on the company size and business complexity. If 
the size is large yet the business process is not that complex, then 
there is no need for large number of BOC. In addition, the level of 
competition within the industry also affects the BOD size as happens 
in the banking sector (G4).   
Based on the respondent‟s statement, the level of competition is another factor in 
determining the BOD composition. The fourth factor relates to problems or issues a 
company is facing. According to one of former senior government officer in the 
Ministry of SOE:  
When hunting for BOD candidates, we perform a need analysis 
based on the problems being faced by SOEs. From there, as we try 
to meet regulations, we also look for persons who can match with 
the existing problems. If we are unable to find an ideal composition 
of BOD, then usually we try to cover it from the composition of the 
commissioners (G2).   
Another statement referring to SOE specific problems that drives the BOD 
composition is expressed by a senior government officer as below:  
We are seeking for outsiders for the purpose of building a better 
corporate culture. If the corporate culture is established already, 




Specific problems of an SOE can come from the need for specific expertise. For 
some industries where the SOE is the major player, such as plantations, the local 
experts might come from SOEs. In other words, technical expertise is stronger from 
inside SOEs than from outside. Meanwhile, for other industries, such as banking, 
outsiders are considered to have higher qualifications in the market than those from 
inside. A senior government officer from the Ministry of SOE explained in the 
interview that: 
We used to have a policy to promote bankers or financial experts to 
become CEO or finance directors in many SOEs. Their presence is 
good for SOEs which are in the IPO preparation stage because they 
are innovative and knowledgeable in financial restructuring (G4). 
Another respondent seconds the above argument, saying that  
For mining companies, we need to appoint a local expert who can 
approach and be acceptable by the local people, especially because 
it deals with natural resources (G7). 
The statements above are supported in Table D.8 presenting the outcome of the one-
way ANOVA testing the difference in government related directors of the BOD 
among industry groups. The result suggests that SOEs from the mining industry, 
finance, trade, service and investment, basic industry and chemicals are more likely 
to have less government representation on the BOD compared to the remaining 
industry groups.  
The last two factors influencing BOD composition are special requests, either from 
inside (CEO request) or from outside the SOE. This can be a case of political 
intervention. From five respondents who address this, one of them explained that  
We receive an official letter from ministries, such as Ministry of 
Defence, Ministry of Industry, Minister of Research and Technology 
and Ministry of Transportation, proposing names of BOD 
candidates. We also receive requests from Parliaments, political 
parties and non-government organisation. They are stakeholders 




Moreover, the special request can be very intrusive on the selection process. A 
respondent with the senior government officer and BOC experience comments that,  
Decision bias is due to the presence of non-corporate intervention… Ministry 
of SOE office is the main gate for the intervention. This can be political 
intervention, non-government office intervention, media intervention and law 
enforment intervention (G2).  
The Proportion of Government Related Commissioners on the BOC   
The fifth proposition is based on the premise of agency theory of the importance of 
separating decision management (eg executing decisions) and decision control (eg 
supervising decision) in order to perform an effective decision process (Fama and 
Jensen 1983, 304). The presence of a supervisory board or BOC is argued as the 
most important control for this (Bathala and Rao 1995, 59). Moreover, the board 
composition (proportion of independent board members in the BOC) is the enabling 
mechanism that alleviates agency conflicts in the company. Independent directors are 
effective monitors of the boards‟ decisions due to their independence and reputation 
(Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Kaplan and Reishus 1990). On the other hand, a 
government officer on the board is suspected of being unable to perform 
independently (Hamzah 2007). They can be influenced by non-corporate 
interventions (Didu 2011a) that may jeopardize the quality of the BOC independence 
when they prioritize their personal agenda over the best interest of the organisation. 
Because of this, government related commissioners on the BOC are predicted to 
negatively impact on SOE financial performance.  
The Pearson coefficient correlation analysis reveals that government related 
commissioners on the BOC are insignificantly associated with ROA. A consistent 
result is generated from the OSL regression test showing that government related 
commissioners on the BOC is not a significant predictor to determine SOE financial 
performance. Therefore, this study rejects hypothesis 5. 
The interview result is used to investigate the rationale of this finding. Table 6.6 
explains that there are a number of considerations in selecting the BOC composition. 




performance, the track record of applicants, ability to control intervention from 
various stakeholders, integrity and specific expertise or competency. On top of these, 
additional factors are claimed by many respondents, i.e. the prerogative right of the 
Minister and special requests from the non-corporate sector.   
It should be noted that BOC membership is a prerogative right of the Minister as the 
owner of single voting rights in the GMS in the fully owned companies or as the 
controlling shareholder in the majority owned companies. With such a condition, the 
decision on BOC size, composition and membership always adheres to the Minister‟s 
preference. Therefore, the method of selection and appointment of the BOC 
membership becomes a crucial as part of the governance mechanism. While the 
regulation does not stipulate specifically the mechanism for BOC appointment, the 
criteria is subjective to the situation as stated by a former senior officer in the 
Minister of SOE during the interview,  
There is an absence of specific mechanism for BOC selection and 
appointment. All processes are subjective…. We are strict in three 
criteria, i.e. competence, integrity and professionalism. …..However, 
we have to accept the fact that special request does exist (G5).  
With regard to specific expertise, both ordinary commissioners (government related) 
and independent commissioners have a certain capability that can benefit the SOE. 
Ordinary commissioners include senior government officers, military/police/law 
enforcement officers and retired government /military/policy/law enforcement 
officers.   
Senior government officers are high-level government officers from various 
ministries, including the Ministries of SOEs, Finance, Energy, Transportation and 
other line ministries which have a relevance to the industry the SOEs belong to.  
According to one respondent, a government representative on the BOC understands 
the processes of bureaucracy better than those from non-government. This benefits 
the SOEs. Moreover, they also to some extent gain networking opportunities and 
accessibility to the bureaucracy, including the minister, parliament, and policy 




For military or ex-military (including army, navy, air force), their presence on the 
BOC can be very useful to circumstances that relate to security. For example, for 
SOEs related to the maritime or shipping industry, accessibility to authorities in the 
navy can stop some crimes from occurring on shore. Similarly, illegal logging and 
theft in the plantation, forestry, and mining industries can be controlled with the ex-
army or police deploying their networks. A respondent states that, 
It is good for an SOE to have army in the BOC…They have 
capability to communicate with their strong networks (G7). 
 Placing strong figures, such as Head of Police, Commander or ex-
commander, in SOEs’ BOC are good since they have power to stop 
crime (G1). 
Independent commissioners have certain advantages that may not be found in 
ordinary commissioners. The main reason stated by many respondents was the 
specific expertise or competency they possess. According to a respondent with 
chairperson and BOC member experience:  
Independent commissioners have an adequate level of technical 
competence or expertise in the industry that the government officers 
may not. Also, they have confidence to deliver their opinion without 
being afraid of losing their position in the BOC (G6).  
Another opinion by a respondent with BOC membership experience adds:  
The choice of independent commissioners is closely related to 
corporate culture transformation. We observe that insiders that have 
been staying too long in the company may be resistant to change for 
a better working culture that might shift their comfort zone. In such 
circumstance, BOC is best served from independent commissioner.  
Independent commissioners on the BOC are invited for specific reasons based on 
their background. During the interviews, respondents with senior government 
experience in the Ministry of SOE or experience on BOCs name academics, 




enforcement officers, local community figures and retired government officers as 
independent commissioners. An academic is invited to be a BOC member because he 
or she can help develop the SOEs in the long-term. A respondent confirms that   
We believe academicians have better sensitivity to the issue. We need 
them to help the board develop the SOE. Sometime we also involve 
academicians from local universities and invite their participation in 
the SOEs in their domicile (G2).   
A BOC member from a local community can benefit SOEs in local or remote areas 
where there is some sensitivity because they can be the intermediary between the SOEs 
and the local community. This approach is essential to resolve various sensitive issues 
concerning the environment, exploitation of natural resources, local economic 
development, local government income and redistribution and labour. According to one 
respondent,  
We need local representations, scholars from the local university or 
local community leaders, as a bridge that connects the SOEs plan 
with the needs of the local community. Their voice represents the 
local government. Their strategic ideas can be accommodated (G5).  
Another respondent seconds this opinion. As he explains,  
The local prominent figures can protect SOEs from avoiding 
unnecessary problems that may happen due to miscommunication. 
They can explain to the local community addressing the issues that 
arise (G2).  
To conclude, it is evident that both commissioners originating from government and 
independent commissioners benefit the supervisory function of the BOC in their own 
way. It is a logical approach to assume that a balanced BOC with both a corporate 
context (non-government members) as well as a political context (government members) 
can be more beneficial for the company. This may explain why a high number of 
government related commissioners on the BOC does not always have a negative impact 




Number of Board Sub-Committees 
In the sixth proposition, it is stated that a check and balance mechanism is vital for 
minimizing agency problems that emerge as an impact of principal-agent relationships 
(Mallin 2004). One of the vital tools of this mechanism is to form a board sub-
committee(s) to help the BOC monitor the managers (Weir, Laing, and McKnight 
2001a, 9). The OECD‟s recommendation states that an SOE should establish a 
specialised sub-committee to support the board in performing its respective functions 
(2005) to help ease agency problems and eventually increase firm financial 
performance.  
For this sample, a mean (median) of the number of board sub-committees is 1.34 
(1.00) within the range of 0 to 6 (Table 5.7). At least 20 per cent of the SOEs have no 
sub-committee on board.    
In the univariate analysis, support is given to the number of board sub-committees 
showing highly significant correlations with ROA. The OLS regression analysis 
finds a positive relationship to SOE financial performance and therefore allows the 
study to accept hypothesis 6.  
With specific expertise, a sub-committee works for and is dedicated to help the BOC 
run their functions. As one of the respondents, who is a BOD member, also 
emphasizes:  
A board sub-committee is in charge of data analysis on a specific 
area. The establishment of the board sub-committee needs people 
with specialty. Their presence is useful (S3).   
An effective board sub-committee relies on the independence and clear direction of 
the BOC. A respondent with experience in the BOD states that,  
The type of sub-committees as well as the number of each sub-
committee members is solely determined by the BOC. If not well-
coordinated, they will create confusion and slow down our job 
because each individual work on their own, does not share with each 




number of members of a committee is optimized, they consist of the 
expertise in particular field, they are better organized and more 
effective and lead to the result of much faster decision making by the 
BOC.  
To sum up, an addition of board sub-committee(s) established by the BOC is shown to 
affect the performance of SOEs positively yet only when it is effectively managed.  
6.6.2. Financial Related Government Involvement  
Government Transfer Payment in the form of subsidies or public service obligation 
(PSO)  
The next propositions are newly introduced to the area of study of government 
intervention in SOEs. Proposition 7 affirms that government transfer in the form of 
subsidy and public service obligations (PSO) leads to SOEs having anti-competitive 
behaviours  (Tye 1980, 204). In common practice, subsidy which is aimed to help 
SOEs become competitive in the market, fails to achieve the goal since they have 
urgent demands for profit. Subsidy used to off-set the high cost of operations of the 
SOEs, promotes inefficiency (Sakai and Shoji 2010; Sidak 2002). Subsidy 
encompasses strong political intervention (Ritschel et al. 2003) with various types of 
risks involved, such as severe financial difficulties and environmental problems.  
As for PSO, there seems to be no comparable international study. In this study, PSO 
is treated equally as subsidy because the PSO has similar characteristics. Both are 
government transfer funds allocated for the end-goal of providing goods and services 
to the public. Both are also highly regulated by government.  
From the univariate analysis, the descriptive statistics show only a small number of 
SOEs receiving government transfer but with very significant value (26.01 per cent 
of the total operating revenue of 125 SOEs) as presented in the Figure 5.7 and the 
Table 5.14. Also the figure fluctuates with the peak in 2009. A mean comparison 
shows that the industry group has an influence in the determination of government 
transfer. Among nine groups, only four received a subsidy, comprising agriculture, 
mining (the highest mean), infrastructure, utilities, and transportation, and trade, 




From the univariate analysis, support is given to government transfer and ROA 
indicating a significant correlation between both (Table 6.1). Consistently, the OLS 
regression test finds a highly significant relationship between government transfer 
and ROA allowing the acceptance of hypothesis 7 (H7: government transfer).  
The negative impact of government transfer may be related to the following reasons. 
First, according to the Central Government Annual Budget Law, the budget plan for 
government transfer, either subsidy or PSO, must follow the state budget mechanism. 
This means that government transfer is a government funding activity and is 
unilaterally set by the government. In the calculation, the government merely 
considers the production cost plus the percentage rate of the minimum profit margin. 
This may be because the main purpose of subsidy and PSO is to deliver the 
government‟s social agenda, not to provide opportunities for SOEs to run profitable 
businesses. Such motives with subsidy are common in other countries (Ritschel et al. 
2003).  
Second, instead of providing an avenue to earn profit, a government transfer was 
likely to create a loss. Interviews have confirmed the negative impact of government 
transfer activity. The result of the interviews consistently reported that the 
government transfer policy resulted in a loss of business. All five respondents agreed 
upon the government prerogative in government transfer activity (Table 6.7).  
Moreover, three of them stated that the funding transfer is solely one-way 
communication from the government causing the disparity between what the 
companies planned in the budget and what the government controls on their policy 
and subsidy or PSO budget allocation. One of the respondents, a chief financial 
officer (CFO) at one SOE, stated that: 
…every year there is an evaluation on the PSO realization; and the 
next PSO prediction is always based on this realization data. 
However there is always a sudden change made by the Parliament at 
the end. This is problematic for us to sell the PSO goods while the 
amount of approved PSO and funding availability are uncertain 
(S3). 




PSO policy leads to great loss for SOEs because any cost due to the 
excess of the quota [the work that was accomplished yet unpaid by 
the government because of the exceeding amount of PSO] became 
SOE’s debt and the SOEs had to cover the loss (unpaid amount) 
(S4). 
Likewise, another CFO from medium sized SOE supports the previous arguments by 
commenting that: 
PSO policy is unfair because it only takes into account the direct 
cost and disregards indirect cost. In addition, the realization of PSO 
policy is not the same as the plan (S5).  
To conclude, government transfer is a significant factor contributing to the decline of 
SOE financial performance. In the context of subsidy in international studies, the 
result is consistent with earlier findings studied by Tye (1980), Sidak (2002) and 
Wang and Wang (2013). 
Dividend Payout Policy  
While dividend policy can be driven by various factors, cash dividend is a reflection 
of a controlling shareholder using its power and position to control the corporate 
economy from individual investors (Wang, Manry and Wandler 2011). In particular, 
for Indonesian SOEs, the dividend payout ratio set by the government 
characteristically prioritises the needs of government. According to Patriadi, the 
approach and projection models for dividend policy prepared by the government 
(Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of SOE) are without specific formulation for 
optimal dividend policy as well as providing opportunity for SOE business 
development (2013, 4).  
The univariate analysis shows an upward trend of SOEs paying dividends to the 
government, comprising 62 SOEs or 45.60 per cent of the total in 2009 (Figure 5.6). 
A test of one-way ANOVA concludes tha t there are significant differences amongst 
SOEs from different size groups where larger companies are likely to pay higher 
dividends. Another one-way ANOVA test using the industry groups reveals that 




policy, with certain industries having a greater dividend payout rate than others. The 
mining sector, infrastructure, utilities and transportation sector, and the finance sector 
are the groups with higher rates of dividend payouts and value.  
Correlation analysis demonstrates that dividend payout policy is significantly 
correlated with ROA. Consistently, the multivariate data analysis provides evidence 
that dividend payout policy is a highly significant predictor of SOE financial 
performance. Hence, hypothesis 8 (H8: dividend payout policy) is accepted.  
Dividend payout ratio is determined by the government as part of the budget process 
because the government views dividend as a source of non-tax revenue. However, 
there is no fixed standard to formulate the rate of dividend of an SOE as it is driven 
by the current financial situation and political policy (Sunarsip 2012a, 30). 
Intervention in the dividend rate determination seems to be highly controlled by the 
government. A respondent with chief financial officer experience claims that 
There is a chance for negotiation of the amount of the dividend with 
the government but not with equal bargaining power. The final 
decision on dividend payout is more a one-way communication by 
the Ministry of Finance as the ultimate shareholder (S4). 
This is confirmed by another respondent (a CFO):  
Dividend payout policy on SOEs is more emphasized to meet the 
source of revenue of state finance rather than SOE’s interest. The 
government relies heavily on this source and hence SOE investment 
plan is lower priority (S4). 
Dividend payout policy formulation begins with the government (Ministry of 
Finance and Ministry of SOE) setting a non-tax revenue for the state budget (Patriadi 
2013). Each SOE prepares the initial data and submits it to the Ministry of SOE. 
Then the Ministry of SOE hands over the data to the Ministry of Finance for further 
decision-making within the Parliament. This was confirmed in the interview as one 




Determination of the amount of dividends has to go through several 
processes, started from submission of data by SOE to the Ministry of 
SOE, from the Ministry of SOE to the Ministry of Finance and 
discussions between the Ministry of Finance and Parliament to 
determine the state budget. At this stage of discussion, the focus is 
only for the interest of the state, i.e. the state revenue. SOEs cannot 
say anything (S3). 
When setting the target, the payout ratio can be extremely high, especially when it is 
compared with projected earnings. However, this seems to be an effective trigger for 
SOE management to strategize to meet the dividend target. A respondent from the 
BOD members of an SOE comments that:  
The dividend payout policy set by the government is extremely high and 
to some extent as we wonder how we could pay that much of dividend. 
However, by the end of the day, surprisingly we meet the target because 
we generate more earnings and enforce greater efficiency (S3).  
To conclude, this finding confirms that company size and industry specifics are two 
important determinants for the formulation of the dividend payout ratio. Also, the 
high dividend payout ratio targets motivate the management to work efficiently. 
Therefore a high dividend payout ratio is associated with SOE financial performance. 
6.6.3. Regulatory Framework Related Government Involvement  
Asset Transfer from Central Government to SOEs   
Principal-agency problems in SOEs emerge as two goals of the government in 
controlling SOEs - social and political objectives and a profit maximization conflict. 
Hypothesis 9 is based on the asset transfer as another political interference leading to 
a decrease in performance. Despite the fact that the asset transfer policy is not based 
on profit orientation, this practice of regulatory intervention affects the operation and 
performance indicators of an SOE.  The presence of an asset transfer itself is most 
likely recognized when audit findings related to asset transfer are announced by the 




The result of descriptive statistics analysis suggest the number of SOEs receiving 
asset transfers rose from 10 SOEs in 2007 to 16 SOEs or 12.8 percent in 2009.  A 
mean comparison documents that only capital-intensive industries receive an asset 
transfer, including the infrastructure, utilities, and transportation industry (the highest 
mean of IDR 1,596 billion), mining industry and miscellaneous industry. This 
suggests that the receiving SOEs are selected by the industry category as the 
determinant factor.  
Correlation analysis concludes that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
relationship between asset transfer and ROA. The OLS regression documents a 
positive direction with p=0.103 significant level. It signifies that the result does not 
support hypotheses 9 (H9:  asset transfer).  
From the interviews, all five respondents claimed that asset transfer policy is a one-
way communication. However, the number of companies receiving transferred assets 
is limited.  
Legal Case Resulting from Non-compliance with Regulation   
Lastly, hypothesis 10 views the need for a clear separation of function between 
government as the owner and as regulator (OECD 2004). Also, an assurance of an 
effective legal and regulatory framework for SOEs by the government is required for 
fair competition in the market. This means rules for private companies and state 
owned companies should be applied equally (OECD 2005).   
Frequency distribution documents that about 12 percent of total SOEs experience 
violations against regulations that are bound to specific SOEs (Table 5.16).  The 
independent sample t-test confirms that a significant difference exists between the 
groups of SOEs with legal cases and those without legal cases, suggesting that legal 
cases are more likely to occur in larger companies than smaller ones (Table 5.17). A 
comparison of these two groups by industry indicates that legal cases are mostly 
found in the infrastructure, utilities and transportation industry (4.53 percent) 
followed by the finance industry (2.67 per cent) (Table 5.31).   
The multivariate analysis suggests a highly significant correlation exists between 




contribute significantly to the SOE financial performance and therefore hypothesis 
10 is rejected. 
 
6.7. Sensitivity Test  
The descriptive statistics and univariate analysis illustrate that the 125 companies 
range in company size ranging from very small companies (total assets less than IDR 
1 trillion) to very large companies (total assets equal or more than IDR 50 trillion). 
Tests run using an independent sample t-test demonstrated find that company size is 
a factor influencing government ownership, CEO external appointment, chairperson 
external background, government related directors on the BOD, government related 
commissioners on the BOC, number of board sub-committees, dividend payout policy 
and legal case variables. Correlation analysis also documented consistent results 
indicating initial support for a relationship between company size and all 
independent variables (section 6.3 Table 6.2). It is therefore important to investigate 
whether the model is sensitive to company size.  
The following sensitivity analysis assesses the robustness of the result from the main 
analysis and examines whether or not the results are sensitive to all government 
involvement related variables in the practice of Indonesian SOEs. To do so, unit 
measurement of size (log) is transformed back to metric data (the values of total 
assets) into categories (company size group). Size group contains Group 1 (total 
assets worth less than IDR 1 trillion), Group 2 (total assets worth between IDR 1 
trillion and 10 trillion) and Group 3 (above IDR 10 trillion). Data of 2007 total asset 
value is used as the baseline to determine the size group of each sample. 
Following that, 366 data are grouped into three. Accordingly, there are 185, 140 and 
41 samples for group 1, group 2 and group 3, respectively. The multiple regression 
test is then replicated for each group. The analysis will examine whether the results 
of each group to demonstrate consistency with the main regression result.  
As summarised in Table 6.8, the adjusted R-square score for group 1, group 2 and 




different key explanatory variables. First, Group 1 (SOEs with the total assets less 
than IDR 1 trillion) shows five variables statistically support the hypothesis with one 
of them highly significant (H8: dividend payout policy). Hypothesis 2 (H2: CEO 
external appointment), hypothesis 5 (H5: government related commissioners in the 
BOC) and hypothesis 6 (H6: number of board sub-committees) are also accepted 
suggesting that these variables make the highest contribution to explaining the SOE 
financial performance. Hypothesis 1 (H1: government ownership) should be 
interpreted with caution since there is limited sample for those with low percentage 
government ownership in this group (refer to Section 6.6.1). Second, for group 2 
(SOEs with total assets between IDR 1 trillion and 10 trillion), it reveals that nine 
predictors are found statistically supporting, where five are moderate to highly 
significant contributors to the model. Therefore, hypothesis 3 (H3: Chairperson 
external experience), hypothesis 6 (H6: number of board sub-committees), 
hypothesis 7 (H7: government transfer), hypothesis 8 (H8: dividend payout policy) 





N 185 140 41
R-Squared 0.297 0.654 0.757
Adj. R-Squared 0.226 0.606 0.577
 F-statistic 4.152 13.562 4.207
 Significance 0.000 0.000 0.001
Unstandardized CoefficientsStandardized Coefficients Unstandardized CoefficientsStandardized Coefficients Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -23.986 18.267 -1.313 0.095 12.821 22.618 0.567 -41.979 57.875 -0.725
H1: OWN NEG 10.017 7.467 0.101 1.341 0.091 * -2.482 5.469 -0.034 -0.454 0.325 -5.632 12.160 -0.125 -0.463 0.324
H2: CEO POS 4.807 3.564 0.134 1.349 0.090 * -1.953 3.060 -0.053 -0.638 0.262 7.213 4.023 0.370 1.793 0.043 **
H3: CHAIR POS -1.191 2.496 -0.037 -0.477 0.317 3.062 1.757 0.123 1.743 0.042 ** -3.026 5.209 -0.170 -0.581 0.283
H4: BOD NEG 8.769 7.138 0.121 1.229 0.110 -0.956 5.294 -0.015 -0.181 0.428 15.339 8.805 0.393 1.742 0.047 **
H5: BOC NEG -8.284 4.396 -0.152 -1.884 0.031 ** -3.092 3.457 -0.062 -0.894 0.186 12.704 5.896 0.348 2.154 0.021 **
H6: SC POS 2.201 1.245 0.147 1.768 0.039 ** 1.365 0.702 0.144 1.945 0.027 ** 0.773 1.356 0.105 0.570 0.287
H7: TF NEG -1.957 4.117 -0.034 -0.475 0.318 -7.304 3.002 -0.170 -2.433 0.008 *** -17.923 8.321 -0.714 -2.154 0.021 *
H8: DIV POS 22.192 6.780 0.250 3.273 0.001 *** 26.047 5.380 0.373 4.841 0.000 *** -5.189 10.454 -0.099 -0.496 0.312
H9: AT NEG -1.849 6.064 -0.021 -0.305 0.380 -3.102 2.038 -0.123 -1.522 0.065 * -3.090 4.057 -0.123 -0.762 0.227
H10: LEG NEG 0.555 3.363 0.011 0.165 0.435 -0.588 1.723 -0.019 -0.341 0.367 1.827 2.923 0.103 0.625 0.269
HIST 0.834 2.034 0.029 0.410 0.341 -2.463 1.327 -0.120 -1.856 0.033 -9.665 3.169 -0.531 -3.050 0.003 ***
SIZ log 1.031 1.376 0.062 0.749 0.227 0.573 1.681 0.024 0.341 0.367 4.388 3.803 0.361 1.154 0.130
CI 3.797 1.911 0.167 1.987 0.024 ** -1.984 1.600 -0.100 -1.240 0.109 0.724 4.744 0.041 0.153 0.440
IC 1.808 2.305 0.063 0.784 0.217 -1.783 1.940 -0.080 -0.919 0.180 0.434 3.933 0.022 0.110 0.457
LEV -4.691 1.539 -0.231 -3.048 0.001 *** -10.941 2.020 -0.452 -5.416 0.000 *** -30.775 6.802 -0.838 -4.525 0.000 ***
Yr08 (Dummy) 1.831 1.812 0.077 1.010 0.157 0.794 1.339 0.037 0.593 0.277 3.686 2.678 0.200 1.377 0.091 *
Yr09 (Dummy) 4.532 1.861 0.192 2.436 0.008 *** -1.484 1.320 -0.070 -1.124 0.132 4.116 2.650 0.216 1.553 0.067 *
Size Group3: Total Assets > IDR 10 trillion
Pred. 
Sign
tSig.1-tailed Sig.1-tailed Sig.1-tailed tt
Variables
Size Group 1: Total Assets < IDR 1trillion Size Group 2: Total Assets IDR 1trillion - 10 trillionModel Summary
 Table 6.8:  Sensitivity test for Return on Assets
a  
Note: ***highly significant at p<0.01 (one-tailed). **significant at p<0.05 (one-tailed).  *moderate significant at p<0.10 (one-tailed).  . Dependent Variable: ROA. a. Predictors: (Constant), Year 
2009 (Dummy), Government Ownership , CEO External Appointment , Government Transfer (dummy), Legal Case , Asset Transfer (dummy), Number of Board Sub-Committees, Chairperson 
External Appointment, Dividend Payout Policy, History of Establishment ,.Leverage, Year 2008 (Dummy), Industry Competition , Log Size, Government Related Commissioners on the BOC, 
Capital Intensity , Government Related Directors on the BOD. c. Predictors: (Constant), Year 2009 (Dummy), History of Establishment , Capital Intensity , Log Size, CEO External Appointment 
, Legal Case , Government Related Commissioners on the BOC, Dividend Payout Policy, Government Transfer (dummy), Government Ownership , Year 2008 (Dummy), Number of Board Sub-
Committees, Chairperson External Appointment, Asset Transfer (dummy), .Leverage, Government Related Directors on the BOD, Industry Competition. d. Predictors: (Constant), Year 2009 
(Dummy), Chairperson External Appointment, Asset Transfer (dummy), .Leverage, Government Related Directors on the BOD, Government Related Commissioners on the BOC, Dividend 
Payout Policy, History of Establishment , Log Size, Year 2008 (Dummy), Industry Competition , Legal Case , Number of Board Sub-Committees, CEO External Appointment , Capital Intensity , 




Lastly, for group 3 (SOEs with total assets more than IDR 10 trillion) four significant 
contributors to support the hypotheses (H2: CEO external appointment; H4: 
Government related directors on the BOD; H5: Government related commissioners 
on the BOC;   and H7: government transfer).   
Table 6.9 summarizes the multivariate tests: both the main analysis and sensitivity 
analysis. Group 2 generates the most consistent results with the main analysis. There 
are eight predictors in group 2 that match the result of the main analysis even though 
there is a slightly different level of significance. There are six results of group 1 that 
are consistent with that of the main analysis and four results of group 3 that is 
coherent with that of the main analysis.  To conclude, the sensitivity test for 
examining the robustness reveals that only small to medium sized companies (group 
1 and group 2) tends to conclusively support the main findings. 
 







Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
H1: Government ownership (-) - - S S 
H2: CEO external appointment (+)  S* - S** 
H3: Chairperson external experience (+) S* - S** - 
H4 :Government related directors on 
the BOD 
(-) - S S - 
H5: Government related commissioners 
on the BOC 
(-) S S** S - 
H6: Number of board sub-committees (+) S** S** S** S 
H7:Government transfer (dummy) (-) S*** S S*** S** 
H8:Dividend payout policy (+) S*** S*** S*** - 
H9:Asset transfer (dummy) (-) S S S* S 
H10:Legal case (-) S - S - 
Note: S*** : statistically highly supported with p<0.01. S** statistically supported 
with p<0.05. S*: statistically moderately supported with p<0.10. S statistically 





6.8. Concluding Comment  
This chapter presents the results of analysis of the variables testing government 
involvement and its impact on SOE performance. The ten main hypotheses (H1-H10) 
are tested with the main regression model finding four of them as significant 
contributors.  
The four hypotheses include H3:Chairperson external experience relates positively to 
SOE financial performance. H6:  number of board sub-committees relates positively 
to SOE financial performance. H7: government transfer relates negatively to SOE 
financial performance and H8: dividend payout policy associates positively with SOE 
financial performance. In addition, history of establishment, capital intensity, 
leverage and year 2009 (dummy) are statistically significant control variables.  
The next chapter provides a further detailed analysis of all findings from univariate 
and multivariate testing. Additional qualitative data from the interviews will be 




CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
RESEARCH  
 
7.1. Introduction   
In this chapter, a summary of the research methodology and key findings are 
presented. This is followed by a discussion of the implications of the findings. The 
limitations of the research and suggestions for future research conclude the chapter. 
 
7.2. Summary of Hypotheses, Data Samples and Research 
Contexts 
The hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 propose that government intervention is 
related to SOE financial performance. All SOEs are more than 50 per cent 
government owned, which gives the government ultimate power over all researched 
predictors. It extends the study of SOEs to test the impact of the high degree of 
control of the government on SOE financial performance in the Indonesian context.  
The success of the SOEs financial performance is measured through Return on 
Assets, a recognised indicator of SOE financial performance. The magnitude of 
government control is cascaded into the form of intervention in the SOE governance 
system represented by ten key factors including CEO external appointment, 
chairperson background, government related directors on the BOD, government 
related commissioners on the BOC, the number of board sub-committees, 
government imposed transfer in the form of subsidy and public service obligation 
and dividend payout policy, asset transfer from central government to SOEs and 
legal action resulting from non-compliance with SOE specific regulations.  
This thesis investigates the whole population of fully commercially based SOE 
groups, both listed (SOE Persero Terbuka) and non-listed (SOE Persero) from 2007-




investigation on government involvement on SOEs is based on secondary data from 
various sources, including SOE annual reports/financial statements and government 
documents, SOE performance reports and central government financial statements. 
Data sourced from the ANTARA database is also utilized. An interview process was 
undertaken to further investigate the findings.  
The thesis provides new insight into a set of policy and regulation based actions by 
the government, as well as the level of control and how effective those intervention 
factors are in influencing the financial performance of SOEs.   
 
7.3. Summary of Key Findings  
Prior literature suggests mixed results on the impact of government ownership on 
SOE performance. Some report government as a factor inhibiting the SOEs 
performance with conflicting goals of profitability as well as a political goal of 
providing service to society (eg Dornstein 1976; Lin, Cai and Li 1998; Chang 2007; 
Nugroho and Wrihatnolo 2008; Siqueira, Sandler and Cauley 2009; Zhang and 
Rasiah 2013; Xiongyuan and Shan 2013). Others evidenced the increase of SOE 
performance with government intervention such as in Singapore (e.g. Feng, Sun, and 
Tong 2004; Chang 2007) and in China (e.g. Sun, Tong, and Tong 2002; Lu, Tao, and 
Yang 2010).  
Indonesian state-owned enterprises are established as part of the Indonesian political 
system as mandated by the Indonesian Constitution (Section 2.5). This leads to 
having government involvement in almost every aspect of SOE operations.  
Government influence appears under three authorities. First, the Ministry of SOEs, a 
proxy shareholder who controls the voting rights in the General Meeting of the 
Shareholders (GMS). This influence is extended to the BOD and BOC whose leader 
and members are selected by the GMS. Second is the government as the regulator of 
fiscal policy, which is represented by the Ministry of Finance. Third is authority in 




explores whether these governance, financial and regulatory measures influenced by 
government impact on performance in Indonesian SOEs. 
The key findings of this research are summarised below. The main empirical analysis 
confirmed that SOE financial performance was influenced positively by the 
chairpersons‟ external experience, the number of sub-committees assisting the BOC 
and dividend payout. Meanwhile, SOE performance was affected negatively by 
government transfer in the form of subsidy and public service obligations. CEO 
external appointment, government related commissioners on the BOC, government 
related directors on the BOD, asset transfer and legal action were found to have no 
significant influence on SOE financial performance.   
With regard to control variables, leverage was found to be the most significant factor 
with a negative relationship to SOEs performance. Interestingly, the history of SOE 
establishment was also associated negatively with SOE performance. This inferred 
that non-nationalised companies tend to perform better than companies with a 
nationalisation history. In contrast, capital intensity (measured by whether a 
company has a capital expenditure greater than 5 per cent of total assets) displayed a 
positive relationship with SOE performance.  
The sensitivity analysis revealed that company size was a significant determinant 
factor in assessing the impact of the independent variables on SOE performance. The 
small to medium size SOEs (equal to or less than 10 trillion rupiah of total assets) 
support the main findings, whereas large companies (more than 10 trillion rupiah of 
total assets) produce different results. Despite a slightly different level of 
significance, CEO external appointment, Chairperson external experience, 
government related commissioners on the BOC, and number of board sub-
committees are governance related factors that are largely consistent between small 
and medium size SOEs and the main analysis.  
With regard to financial and regulatory framework related factors, government 
transfer and asset transfer at all groups were consistent with the main analysis.  It 
should be noted, however, dividend payout policy and legal case supported in the 




The semi-structured interview conducted with 13 respondents shed light on the 
strong government involvement in governance activities. With respect to the 
appointment of CEO and BOD members, the interviews revealed the importance of 
the fit and proper test in providing a shortlist of CEO candidates. The strongest 
factors consisted of track record, leadership and performance. In the selection of 
BOD members; they comprised performance, track record, and technical 
competence. The need for specialists, corporate culture change and politically related 
special requests were the main factors influencing the choice of external CEOs, while 
the need for specific expertise was the strongest reason to prefer an external BOD 
member (Table 6.5).   
With regard to the appointment of chairpersons and BOC members, the interview 
concluded that the Minister of SOE‟s prerogative rights were paramount. Networking 
or someone‟s access to the bureaucracy and politically related special requests were 
found to be the most important reason for BOC member appointment. The preference 
for independent (non-government) membership of the BOC was mainly controlled 
by the need for expertise in supporting business processes and politically related 
special requests (Table 6.6).  
In addition, respondents viewed government transfer, dividend payout policy and 
asset transfer as the government‟s right to determine. The responses on how 
government transfer impacted on SOEs are consistent and assist in explaining the 
negative relationship between government transfer and SOE performance.    
The respondents propose that government policy on dividend payout prioritised the 
need of funding for government‟s over the SOE‟s need for future investment in its 
infrastructure. They further suggest government transfers in the form of subsidies 
often do not cover the cost of the service leading to losses in the SOE. They also 
believe that the subsidies are subject to arbitrary changes from that initially budgeted 
by government.  
During the interview, respondents frequently referred to non-regulatory issues such 




These were not specifically defined as one of predictors in the hypothesis, but from 
the interviews are a potentially influential variable. 
 
7.4. Implications 
The findings from the research lead to a number of theoretical and practical 
implications as outlined below. 
7.4.1 Theoretical Implications  
This study contributes to corporate governance literature by showing that the 
entrenchment effect can explain the impact of government involvement on the 
success of SOE performance.The research findings (Section 6.8) reveals that four 
variables in this research (chairperson external appointment, number of board sub-
committees, government transfer payment in the form of subsidy and PSO and 
dividend payout policy) are significant contributors to SOE financial performance. 
Based on the findings, government involvement in Indonesian SOEs could be seen as 
rooted in the business processes of SOEs, from the appointment of the BOD and 
BOC, and as the provider of funding and regulation setter. The discussion below 
highlights the implications of the research findings on academic theory and policy 
practice.   
Taking into account existing governance attributes from common international 
practice and bringing in new attributes of government involvement variables, the 
results of this study present several theoretical implications.  First, the study reveals a 
more nuanced definition of SOEs in the Indonesian context. As discussed in Section 
2.2, international practice based on the OECD definition has characterized SOEs as 
„enterprises where the state has significant control, through full, majority, or 
significant minority ownership‟ (OECD 2005). This gives possibility to government 
having different roles as a single owner or as minority owner. In the Indonesian 
context, the Law defines an SOE as a „business entity which is fully or majority 
owned by the state‟, indicating that government is always in the dominant or 




different groups. First is SOE Perum, which is fully owned by the government but 
non-fully commercially based. Second, SOE Persero, which is a wholly or majority 
owned and fully commercially based SOE. Third, SOE Persero Terbuka is a publicly 
listed SOE. This sheds light on the need for three different approaches to Indonesian 
SOE research as they are unique in their corporate mission and levels of government 
involvement. This study looks uniquely at all commercial based SOEs (SOE 
Persero). 
Previous studies on SOEs in Indonesia predominantly focused on SOE performance 
in certain industries, such as the weaving industry (Hill 1982), mining mineral 
industry (Gillis 1982), banking industry (Prabowo and Soegiono 2010) and 
construction industry (Pamulu, Kajewski, and Betts 2007, 2009;  Pamulu 2010; 
Widjajanto, Pribadi, and Suraji 2011). Others conducted specific case studies (e.g. 
Kamal 2008; Kamal 2010; Hadiyanto 2012). Some researchers have tried to study 
SOEs across industries with a specific theme or limited samples, such as Board of 
Commissioners (Sari, Halligan, and Sutiyono 2010) or privatisation (Siagian 2004; 
Sugiharto 2008; Laksanawan 2008). This study, however, adopts a different 
approach through investigating the government‟s role as the dominant and 
controlling shareholder (the principal in agency theory) and how it impacts upon the 
SOEs acting as agents.  
New variables to the study of SOE performance are also introduced. Unique 
variables included of ‘government transfer payment in the form of subsidy or PSO’, 
„dividend payout policy’ and „asset transfer from the central government to SOE‟ 
give new insight to the uniqueness of SOEs in the Indonesian context. Additionally, 
new control variables „history of establishment‟, and „capital intensity‟ seem to be 
the significant factors impacting on SOE performance. These new variables should 
enrich the existing theory on SOE governance in the Indonesian context.   
7.4.2 Practical Implication  
Government involvement appears to be prominent based on policies that impact on 
SOE operations and performance; however, the study reveals the involvement occurs 




the government‟s influence in the General Meeting of the Shareholders. The 
preference to appoint CEOs from inside the SOEs rather than outside and the high 
level of government related directors on the BOD show the involvement in BOD 
governance. Likewise, a high preference to appoint officers from government as 
chairpersons as opposed to outsiders also implies very dominant intervention by the 
government. The interview data evidences the prerogative of the Minister (for overall 
SOEs) and the join-team led by the President (for SOEs on strategic sectors) to 
appoint their own candidate. In fact, regulation allows this practice. The interviews 
also highlighted political interference that allows BOC members to be appointed as a 
reward for contributing to the success of the Presidential election. One of the 
respondents states the following: 
There are commissioner members, such as the President’s dedicated people 
who handle special task, the vice President’s people. Some officials work for 
the state with low level of salary, becoming commissionaire members 
provides them with additional income…it is ok, but one person at one SOE 
which is not too strategic (G1)  
Such interference might lead to SOEs being unable to or hampered in achieving their 
optimum performance. The Minister of SOE has single voting rights in the GMS of 
the fully owned SOEs (SOE Persero) and has a position as the controlling 
shareholder in the GMS of majority owned SOEs (SOE Persero Terbuka). It implies 
that the operating efficiency of SOEs can only prevail if the Minister acts 
independently of political interest.   
By definition, the appointment of a Minister by the President is politically charged. 
Under such circumstances, a mechanism that ensures a governance system that 
independently examines BOD and BOC candidates and guarantees the quality of the 
election results is needed. Currently, attempts are being made to eradicate collusion 
and interventions, including s the formation of a talent pool and independent third 
party assessment of candidates. An open transparent and independently managed 
recruitment process should produce the best chance for an optimum appointment.  
With regard to SOE finances, government intervention is also influential. As 




government transfer policy and dividend payout policy are significant contributors to 
SOE financial performance. As also previously discussed, the form of intervention is 
shown as "one-way communication," which tends to prioritise the interests of the 
government in carrying out governmental priorities and to be less accommodating to 
the SOE financial agenda. For example, subsidies are meant to reimburse prices of 
goods and services set by the government with the cost of SOE delivery. In the case 
of PSOs, the government sets the goods and services and value unilaterally.  
Fund transfers or subsidies/PSOs create a moral hazard for both SOEs and the 
government. For the government, the SOE is considered a political vehicle, mirroring 
departments, and government policies. Policies adopted by the government may not 
take into account the financial performance and strategy of the SOEs in the 
fulfilment of the government agenda.  
For SOEs, the government funds transferred can create losses if the value does not 
take into account the full cost of service delivery. Equally however, the fund transfer 
may generate profits if the SOE overstates the true cost of delivery to government. 
This situation negatively impacts on the company and creates dependency upon the 
government.  It is, therefore, important to ensure a more open two-way 
communication process to ensure the accountability of both the SOEs and 
Government  
 
7.4. Limitation of Research 
The data collection period 2007 to 2009 is used in this study.It captured data arising 
from the 2007 introduced w obligation for SOEs to report the summary of financial 
statements to the Ministry of Finance required by the State Finance Law. The use of 
three years of data is a limitation of the study and this research would benefit from 
extension over a longer time-frame covering different economic situations.  
In studies relating to SOEs, numerous measures of company performance have been 
modelled. The company financial performance measurement included predicting 




(Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami 2005); efficiency such as sales efficiency and net 
income efficiency (Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu 2005); labour productivity (Major 1999) or 
financial stability such as leverage (Major 1999). The use of only one variable as the 
dependent variable (Return on Assets) is also a limitation of this study. Other market 
value based measures were not available as they require market value information 
and the majority of the sample SOEs (89 per cent) are non-publicly listed.  
 
7.5. Suggestion for Future Research  
This study investigates government involvement in two groups of fully commercially 
based SOEs, namely non-listed SOEs (SOE Persero) and listed SOEs (SOE Persero 
Terbuka), whereas non-fully commercially based SOEs (SOE Perum) are excluded. 
Further study in this area could be replicated to SOE Perum groups where many of 
the variables tested in this study are comparable and relevant.  
The result of the sensitivity analysis shows that large companies behave differently 
from other groups. One example is shown by „CEO external appointment‟, which 
was a significant contributor to SOE financial performance in large companies but 
not in others. Therefore, it is suggested that a similar study could be undertaken 
specific to the larger sized group in a broader timeframe than for this study.  
During the interview stage, the researcher uncovered a number of interesting 
opinions about government involvement in SOEs, particularly as the controlling 
shareholder. For example, while the Minister and to some extent the team led by the 
President, have prerogative rights to decide the membership of the BOD and the 
BOC, political intervention is likely to continue. Further qualitative research in this 
area is required to investigate this rich source of information.  One finding 
documented from this study is that the dividend payout policy is a significant 
determinant of SOE financial performance. As governments demand dividends as 
one of the main revenue sources of their budgets, the exploitation of SOE earnings 




Further study regarding government intervention in the dividend payout policy and 
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2012 Annual Budget Law, Number 22 Year 2011 (the Republic of Indonesia).  
2013 State Budget Law, Number 19 Year 2012 (the Republic of Indonesia).  
Capital Market Law, Number 8 Year 1 995 (the Republic of Indonesia).  
Determination of Government Regulation for State-Owned Enterprises Form Law, 
Number 9 Year 1969 (the Republic of Indonesia).  
Foreign Investment Law, Number 1 Year 1967 (the Republic of Indonesia).  




Nationalisation of the Dutch-Owned companies Law, Number 86 Year 1958 (the 
Republic of Indonesia). 
Public Service Law, Number 25 Year 2009 (the Republic of Indonesia).  
State Finance Law, Number 17 Year 2003 (the Republic of Indonesia).  
State-Owned Enterprise Law, Number 19 Year 2003 (the Republic of Indonesia).  
State Treasury Law, Number 1 Year 2003 (the Republic of Indonesia).  
The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945 (the Republic of Indonesia).  
 
Government Regulation 
Government Accounting Standards Government Regulation, Number 24 Year 2005 
(the Republic of Indonesia). 
Government Investment Government Regulation, Number 8 Year 2007 (the Republic 
of Indonesia).    
Government Regulation as a Substitution of Law on Public Corporation, Nubmer 19 
Year 1960 (the Republic of Indonesia).  
 
Presidential Instruction  
Appointment of Directors and or Commissioners/Supervisory Board Members on 
State Owned Enterprise Presidential Instruction, Number 8 Year 2005 (the 
Republic of Indonesia). 
Direction and Simplification of Public Corporations Presidential Instruction, Number 
17 Year 1967 (the Republic of Indonesia). 
The Amendment of Presidential Instruction Number 8 Year 2005 on Appointment of 




Owned Enterprises Presidential Instruction, Number 9 Year 2005 (the 
Republic of Indonesia).  
 
Ministerial Decree and Regulation 
Implementation of Good Corporate Governance for State-Owned Enterprise Minister 
of SOE Decree, Number KEP-117/M-MBU/2002 (Central Government of 
Indonesia). 
Implementation of Good Corporate Governance for State-Owned Enterprise Minister 
of SOE Regulation, Number PER- 01/MBU/2011 (Central Government of 
Indonesia).  
Organisation and Work Procedures for Ministry of Finance Minister of Finance 
Decree, Number PMK 184/PMK.01/2010 (Central Government of 
Indonesia).  
Payment Mechanism of the Dividend Sourced Non-Tax Revenue Minister of Finance 





Appendix  A:  Corporate governance ratings  
 













PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), 2001. The Opacity Index.PWC rating reflects the 
accounting/corporate governance opacity of the country. Higher rating indicates 
lower standards of corporate governance. 
 
b
McKinsey & Company, 2002. Global Investor Opinion Survey: Key 
Findings.McKinsey rating represents the average premiums investor would pay for a 
well-governed company in a particular country. Higher premiums indicate lower 
standards of corporate governance. 
 
c 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), 2002. Saints and Sinners, Who’s Got 
Religion? CLSA rating is the weighted average of ratings on key areas of corporate 
governance such as discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, fairness, and social awareness. The higher rating indicates higher 





Appendix  B: Laws related to state-owned enterprises 
 
A. Specific to SOEs  
1. The Cooperatives Law (Number 25 of 1992)  
2. The State Non-Tax Revenue Law (Number 20 of 1997) 
3. The Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism- Clean and Free State Governance Law 
(Number 28 of 1999) 
4. The Corruption Eradication Commission Law (Number 30 of 2002) 
5. The Sovereign Debt Law (Number 24 of 2002) 
6. The Synergy between State-Owned Enterprises Law (Number 109 of 2002) 
7. The State Finances Law (Number 17 of 2003) 
8. The State-Owned Enterprises Law (Number 19 of 2003) 
9. The State Treasury Law (Number 1 of 2004) 
10. The Establishment of Regulatory Legislation Law (Number 10 of 2004) 
11. The Management Audit and State Financial Responsibility Law (Number 15 of 
2004) 
12. The National Social Security System Law (Number 40 of 2004) 
13. The Supreme Audit Institution Law (Number 15 of 2006) 
 
B. Not Specific to SOEs  
1. The Capital Market Law (Number 8 of 1995) 
2. The Company Documents Law (Number 8 of 1997) 
3. The Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition Law 
(Number 5 of 1999)  
4. The Foundations Law (Number 28 of 2004) 
5. The Special Economic Zones Law (Number 39 of 2009) 
6. The Public Information Law (Number 14 of 2008) 
7. The Information and Electronic Transactions Law (Number 11 of 2008) 
8. The Limited Liability Companies Law (Number 40 of 2007) 
9. Other sectoral regulations.  
 












1 Agriculture 11 Crops 
  12 Plantation 
  13 Animal husbandry 
  14 Fishery 
  15 Forestry 
  19 Others 
2 Mining 21 Coal mining 
  22 Crude petroleum and natural gas prod. 
  23 Metal and mineral mining 
  24 Land/stone quarrying 
  29 Others 
3 Basic industry and 
chemicals 
31 Cement 
 32 Ceramics, glass, porcelain 
 33 Metal and allied products 
 34 Chemicals 
 35 Plastics and packaging 
 36 Animal feed 
 37 Wood industries 
 38 Pulp and paper 










41 Machinery and heavy equipment 
 42 Automotive and components 
 43 Textile, garment 
 44 Footwear 
 45 Cable 
 46 Electronics 




Appendix  C: Mapping of industry group and industry sub 
group (continued)    
 
Code Industry Group Code Industry Sub-Group
b
 
5 Consumer goods 
industry 
51 Food and beverages 
 52 Tobacco manufacturers 
 53 Pharmaceuticals 
 54 Cosmetics and household 
 55 Houseware 
 59 Others 
6 Property, real 
estate and building 
construction 
61 Property and real estate 
 62 Building constructing 





 72 Toll road, airport, harbor, and allied 
products 
 73 Telecommunication 
 74 Transportation 
 75 Construction 
 79 Others 
8 Finance 81 Bank 
  82 Financial institution 
  83 Securities company 
  84 Insurance 
  85 Investment fund/mutual fund 
  89 Others 
9 Trade, services, 
and investment 
91 Wholesale (durable and nondurable 
goods) 
 93 Retail trade 
 94 Restaurant, hotel and tourism 
 95 Advertising, printing, and media 





Appendix  C: Mapping of industry group and industry sub 
group (continued) 
 
Code Industry Group Code Industry Sub-Group
b
 
  97 Computer and services 
 98 Investment company 
 99 Others 
Note:
 a
 Based on Indonesian Stock Exchange (ISX) categorization. 
b
 Based on DJKN 




Appendix D: Additional Univariate Analysis   
 
Additional univariate analysis below aims to investigate if company size and industry 
group variables control variaous governance variables.   
A mean comparison by company size, as presented in the Table D.1, shows that the 
larger companies are likely to have less government ownership. For instance, the 
largest companies group with total assets equal to or more than IDR 50 trillion have 
less than 80 per cent government shares (Mean=.79) whereas the rest of the groups 
have at least 90 per cent shares. 
 
Table D. 1: Government ownership mean comparison by company size (in IDR) 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Group 1: <1 trillion 63 .96 .11 
Group 2: 1 trillion to < 5 trillion 39 .95 .13 
Group 3: 5 trillion to < 10 trillion 9 .91 .19 
Group 4: 10 trillion to <50  trillion 7 .90 .17 
Group 5: (≥ 50 trillion) 7 .79 .21 
Total 125 .94 .14 
 
It is reasonable to assume that listed companies have more diverse shareholders and 
therefore less government shares.  Even though not trading in shares on the stock 
market, non-publicly listed SOEs can be owned by a non-Central Government entity, 
such as local governments, other SOEs, subsidiary companies and private companies 
(DJKN 2009). Using an independent sample t-test analysis, the result of Levene’s test 
for government ownership is less than .05 (sig.=.005) indicating that the equal 
variance not assumed data should be used. As presented in the Table D.2  below, the 
result also reveals that there is a significant difference between two groups (t=-
17.866, p<.000). It specifies that publicly listed SOEs are likely to have less 
government ownership by 64.81 per cent mean as compared to non-publicly listed 












t-test for equality of Means 




Public Listed 42 .6481       
Non Public Listed  333 .9742       
   7.951 .005 -17.866 48.349 .000 -.326 
 
A one-way ANOVA test was used to investigate the level of relationship between 
government ownership and industry group. The result (Table D.3) reveals that there 
is a significant difference of government ownership among different industry groups 
or economic sectors at the p=.000 (p<.05) [Government ownership, F (8,366)=4.464, 
p=.000)]. The mean comparison concludes that three industry groups have less 
government ownership. These include the mining industry (mean=.86), the consumer 
goods industry (mean=.87); and property, real estate, and the building construction 
industry (mean=.89).   
Table D. 3 Summary of one-way ANOVA test for government ownership by industry 
group in pooled data  
 N Mean SD 
    
Mining 15 .86 .18 
Basic industry and chemicals 30 .93 .168 
Miscellaneous industry 21 1.00 .00 
Consumer goods industry 18 .87 .17 
Property, real estate, and building 
construction 
45 .89 .19 
Infrastructure, utilities, and transportation 63 .94 .15 
Finance 57 .94 .13 
Trade, services, and investment 54 .92 .15 
Total 375 .94 .14 





.660 8 .083 4.465 .000** 
Within Groups 6.764 366 .018   
Total 7.424 374    




Furthermore, the CEO external/internal appointments are further explained by the 
size of the company. Using the independent sample t-test analysis (Table D.4), the 
result of the Levene’s test for CEO appointment is less than .05. It indicates that there 
is a significant difference between the two groups (t=2.147, p<.037) with CEOs 
originating from outside the Government/SOE more likely to be appointed to larger 
sized companies as compared to smaller sized ones. 
 
Table D. 4: Independent sample t-test for CEO external appointment by company 
size 
Levene‟s Test t-test for equality of Means 
F Sig. t Df Sig.2-tailed Mean Diff. 
34.796 .000 2.147 47.255 .037 30,605,777,925,375 
 
Table D.5 supports this conclusion showing that SOEs in the trade, service, and 
investment industry have the most consistent number of independent CEOs (four) 
over the three years. External CEOs in14 SOEs in the finance sector, however, 
declined from seven SOEs (2007) to only 3 SOEs (2009). SOEs from agriculture, 
consumer goods, and property, real estate, and building construction all have CEOs 
from SOEs or with a government career background.  
 
Table D. 5: Distribution of SOEs with independent CEO by industry group 
 Frequency (SOEs) 
2007 2008 2009 
Agriculture 0 0 0 
Mining 2 1 2 
Basic industry and chemicals 3 1 3 
Miscellaneous industry 0 0 1 
Consumer goods industry 0 0 0 
Property, real estate, and building construction 0 0 0 
Infrastructure, utilities, and transportation 1 0 3 
Finance 7 6 3 
Trade, services, and investment 4 4 4 




Other evidence of a relationship is found describing the CEO appointment based on 
their history of establishment. As shown in the cross-tabulation table, nationalised 
(with a Dutch ancestry) SOEs are more likely to have a lower proportion of 
external/outsider CEOs than that of non-nationalised SOEs (4.7 per cent as opposed 
to14.8 per cent).  
 
Furthermore, a cross-tabulation in Table D.6 shows the spread of chairpersons 
originating from government and those who are external across 9 industry groups. It 
shows that every year, the finance industry has the highest number of independent 
chairpersons, followed by agriculture. Other industries that are likely to have a 
chairperson from outside are basic industry and chemicals, property, real estate and 
building construction, and infrastructure, utilities and transportation. The information 
suggests that industry group is a determinant factor in the background of the 
chairperson.  
 
Table D. 6: Proportion of chairpersons with external experience by industry group  
 2007 2008 2009 
Gov. External Gov. External Gov. External 
Agriculture 20 4 17 7 21 3 
Mining 3 2 4 1 4 1 
Basic industry and 
chemicals 
7 3 7 3 8 2 
Miscellaneous industry 6 1 6 1 6 1 
Consumer goods industry 5 1 5 1 5 1 
Property, real estate,  
building construction 
12 3 14 1 14 1 
Infrastructure, utilities, 
transportation 
18 3 18 3 17 4 
Finance 14 5 12 7 12 7 
Trade, services, and 
investment 
16 2 15 3 15 3 
       
Total Count  101 24 98 27 102 23 
 
To further examine the government related BOD members variable a one-way 




D.7 shows that there is a statistically significant difference for the five company size 
groups at the p=.000 (p<.05) [Government related directors on the BOD, F (4, 
359)=7.662, p=.000)]. This suggests that the larger companies are more likely to 
have less government related directors on the BOD.  
 
Table D. 7: Summary of one-way ANOVA test for government related directors on 
the BOD by company size (in IDR) 
In IDR  N Mean Std. Deviation 
Group 1:  <1 trillion 185  0.926  0.161 
Group 2: 1 trillion to < 5 trillion 108  0.932  0.152 
Group 3: 5 trillion to < 10 trillion 35  0.843  0.190 
Group 4: 10 trillion to <50  trillion 24  0.833  0.212 
Group 5: ≥ 50 trillion 23  0.765  0.207 
Total 375  0.904  0.174 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Between Groups .869 4 .217 7.709 .000**
a
 
Within Groups 10.426 370 .028   
Total 11.295 374    
a
 ** very significant p<.01 
 
 
Table D. 8: Mean comparison of government related directors on the BOD by 
industry group in pooled year 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Agriculture 67 0.96 0.10 
Mining 15 0.69 0.31 
Basic industry and chemicals 24 0.85 0.20 
Miscellaneous industry 21 0.94 0.18 
Consumer goods industry 18 0.92 0.13 
Property, real estate, and building construction 45 1.00 0.03 
Infrastructure, utilities, and transportation 63 0.92 0.14 
Finance 57 0.82 0.20 
Trade, services, and investment 54 0.88 0.19 




A mean comparison is conducted to detect any difference in government related 
directors on the BOD among industry groups. Table D.8 suggests that SOEs from the 
mining industry are more likely to have less government representation on the BOD 
(Mean=.69). An additional Tukey test also recognizes that the mining industry is the 
only industry with a significant mean difference compared to the rest of the industry 
groups. Other groups including finance (Mean= .82), basic industry and chemicals 
(Mean=.85), and trade, service, and investment (Mean=.88) have slightly lower 
government representation compared to the rest of the industry groups.  
 
A mean comparison by company size is presented in Table D.9. SOEs with total 
assets about IDR 50 trillion have an average of 0.53 government officers functioning 
as BOC members, which is notably less than SOEs worth IDR 1 trillion with an 
average of 0.82 commissioners from the government. As 87.47 per cent of SOEs 
have total assets of less than or equal to IDR 10 million, it reveals that overall, the 
BOC is strongly dominated by government representatives in the majority of the 
small to medium size SOEs. For the remaining 12.53 percent (large sized SOEs), 
external or independent BOC members comprise nearly half of the total composition. 
 
Table D. 9: Mean comparison of government related commissioners on the BOC by 
company size in pooled year  
In IDR N Mean Std. Deviation 
Group 1: <1 trillion 185 0.824 0.209 
Group 2: 1 trillion to < 5 trillion 108 0.797 0.185 
Group 3: 5 trillion to < 10 trillion 35 0.800 0.197 
Group 4: 10 trillion to <50  trillion 24 0.639 0.256 
Group 5: ≥ 50 trillion 23 0.533 0.256 
Total 375 0.784 0.221 
 
Another figure (Table D.10) compares means of SOEs by industry groups. SOEs 
from miscellaneous industries (consisting of machinery and heavy equipment, 
electronics, and national defense and technology based industries) have most 




as well as the consumer goods industry are likely to have less government 
representation (with mean equal to 0.68 and 0.69 respectively) compared to others.  
 
Table D. 10: Mean comparison of government related commissioner in the BOC by 
industry group in pooled year  
 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Agriculture 72 0.74 0.19 
Mining 15 0.81 0.22 
Basic industry and chemicals 30 0.68 0.27 
Miscellaneous industry 21 0.88 0.14 
Consumer goods industry 18 0.69 0.21 
Property, real estate, & building construction 45 0.85 0.21 
Infrastructure, utilities, &transportation 63 0.82 0.21 
Finance 57 0.76 0.25 
Trade, services, and investment 54 0.82 0.22 
Total 375 0.78 0.22 
 
One of the determinants of the number of sub-committees is the size of the company, 
which is measured by the amount of the total assets. Table D.11 below presents the 
one-way ANOVA analysis for company size. It shows that company size is very 
significant with p-values of 0.000 (p<0.01) indicating that size is a substantial 
determinant to the number of board sub-committees established in a company. The 
mean comparison also shows that the larger sized group has a higher mean 
suggesting that larger companies are more likely to establish more board sub-
committees.  
Similar to company size, industry group appears to be an important factor in 
determining the number as well as type of sub-committee formed. The one-way 
ANOVA test result as shown in the Table D.12 above reveals there appears to be a 
very significant difference among companies from different industry groups with p-
value of 0.000 (p<0.01). The table also exhibits that SOEs related to the mining 
industry have the highest mean of 2.47 while SOEs from agriculture and trade, 
services and investment industries set up the least number of sub-committees (none 





Table D. 11: ANOVA analysis of number of board sub-committees by company size  
In IDR  N 
Percent of 
SOEs 




Group 1: <1 trillion 185 49.33% 0.77 .69 
Group 2: 1 trillion to < 5 trillion 108 28.80% 1.39 .81 
Group 3: 5 trillion to < 10 trillion 35 9.33% 2.14 1.35 
Group 4: 10 trillion to <50  
trillion 
24 6.40% 3.17 1.52 
Group 5: ≥ 50 trillion 23 6.13% 3.52 .90 
Total 375 100.00% 1.40 
 
ANOVA 





Between Groups 270.510 4 67.628 85.842 .000**
a
 
Within Groups 291.490 370 .788   
Total 562.000 374    
Note:
 a
 ** very significant p<.01 
 
Table D. 12:  ANOVA analysis of number of board sub-committees by industry group  








Agriculture 72 19.20% 0.92 .64 
Mining 15 4.00% 2.47 2.17 
Basic industry and chemicals 30 8.00% 1.37 1.77 
Miscellaneous industry 21 5.60% 1.43 .75 
Consumer goods industry 18 4.80% 1.06 1.11 
Property, real estate, and building 
construction 
45 12.00% 1.53 1.22 
Infrastructure, utilities, and 
transportation 
63 16.80% 1.84 1.22 
Finance 57 15.20% 1.81 1.31 
Trade, services, and investment 54 14.40% 0.81 .48 
Total 375 100.00% 1.40 1.226 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 77.075 8 9.634 7.272 .000** 
Within Groups 484.925 366 1.325   
Total 562.000 374    





To conclude, company size is found to be an important determinant in government 
ownership, appointing CEO and chairperson, selecting the composition of 
government and non-government background of BOD and BOC, and determining the 
number of sub-committees. Likewise, industry group is significant factor in all 




Appendix E: Histogram for variables with continues type of 
measurements 

























Appendix E: Histogram for variables with continues type 


























Appendix E: Histogram for variables with continues type of 
measurements (continued) 
 
After Data Transformation  
 
Figure 9 
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